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Preface 
In many ways, this book is the product of my response, through research and writing, 
to a series of events, rather than pre-planning. My long-term research focus has 
been, and remains, one around multiculturalism, ethnic identity and young people. 
From shortly after the 2001 riots in northern England, I have been carrying out field 
research in Oldham, and neighbouring Rochdale, in Greater Manchester into how 
the apparently new race relations policy approach of ‘community cohesion’ has been 
understood and operationalized by professionals on the ground, and how the issues 
that it addresses are experienced and understood by young people. That research 
involvement informed my 2011 book ‘Youth, Multiculturalism and Community 
Cohesion’ (Palgrave Macmillan), which tried to use that grounded research evidence 
to suggest more nuanced and progressive understandings of what community 
cohesion has the potential to represent and be than many academic critiques based 
solely on readings of national policy documents and accompanying political 
discourses largely have allowed. 
 
However, events and governmental policy reactions to them have intervened to alter 
the landscape of ethnic relations and the promotion of community cohesion that I 
have been attempting to make sense of. The 7/7 London bombings of July 2005 
occurred as I was carrying out field research with youth workers in Oldham, having a 
significant impact on the tone and content of a number of those in-depth 
conversations. The impact grew as it became apparent that all four of the attackers 
were from West Yorkshire. Three attackers came from the city that I live in, Leeds, 
and the other came from the town, Huddersfield, that I work in. The ring leader, 
Mohammad Sidique Khan, had been a part-time Youth Worker and was known to a 
number of youth work professionals that I have trained, or liaised with, whilst another 
of the attackers was well known to friends of mine. Within a year of the 7/7 attacks, it 
was starting to be clear that, as a result of those events, government was 
determined to take the focus and content of policy relating to British Muslim 
communities in  a significantly difficult direction. The Prevent agenda was announced 
in October 2006, and the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder’ initiative 
commenced in April 2007. From the moment it started to be implemented, 
experienced Youth Workers, Community Workers, and other local authority officials 
who I knew, and whose judgement I trusted, were flagging Prevent up as not only 
highly problematic in itself but flatly contradictory to the community cohesion agenda 
they were attempting to develop locally, often through highly-imaginative pieces of 
work. To those workers, and me, Prevent seemed to have forgotten all the concerns 
that the 2001 riots had crystallised, and which the Cantle Report had identified, 
around both increasingly racialised community identities and relations, and policy’s 
failure to address that, as well as the well-documented problems of previous 
approaches to tackling racist extremism in white communities. In both cases, 
monocultural policy approaches that essentialised and reified ethnic or faith identity 
in an absence of focus on social class and identity complexity had proved counter-
productive, as the community cohesion analysis so clearly identified, but Prevent 
seemed determined to ignore those lessons of history. Research involvements in 
and around the local implementation of Prevent in both Greater Manchester and 
West Yorkshire confirmed those feelings, and provided evidence of community 
cohesion thinking and practice being side-lined by Prevent. 
 
Such concerns were my motivations for writing journal articles on Prevent and 
making the evidence submission to the House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee Inquiry that led to the invitation to present oral 
evidence to the Committee in December 2009. My argument there, and the main 
focus of this book, is not just that the government focus on Prevent and the resulting 
local implementation of it, has side-lined, possibly even stalled, the developing 
progressive local practice around cohesion and integration, but that the design and 
implementation of Prevent has largely failed to consider the key analysis of 
community cohesion.  
 
That cohesion analysis suggested that policy approaches of essentialising and 
focussing on separate and distinct ethnic identities and experiences, despite the 
increasingly complex diversity of real British life, are both problematic and potentially 
counter-productive. Such an essentialising approach will inevitably create ‘space’ for 
minorities within communities to espouse and grow towards extreme versions of 
such identities, and doctrines of violent extremism based on those identities, whether 
that is extreme white supremacist racism, or jihadist Islamist violent extremism. That 
is not to suggest that real  economic and social circumstances, and domestic and 
foreign policy actions, are not contributory to such violent extremism, but rather to 
argue  that the only effective way to build real resilience against violent extremism 
within and between communities, is not more focus on separate identities but 
actually less; real resilience will come from  the building of stronger shared identities 
and experiences, and processes of meaningful citizenship and real democratic 
engagement for all British citizens, based on mutual respect and equality. 
 
In arguing for that cohesion-based approach to preventing attraction towards violent 
extremism, the book is not seeking to deny the reality of either distinct 
‘identifications’ in society, or of specific and unequal experiences for some groups, 
but to argue that policy can only effectively address such realities, and win popular 
consent to do so, within a stronger framework of commonality. Similarly, the book is 
not naively suggesting that any inter-ethnic contact will inevitably be positive and 
productive – there is clear evidence that the opposite can often be true. Rather it 
argues that approaches to preventing violent extremism that aim to build strong and 
active democratic involvement by young people of all backgrounds, in a well-planned 
and appropriately-resourced manner, offer the best hope of building that resilience 
against violent extremism. 
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Introduction: A new threat of violent extremism? 
 
Two number-based symbols seem to sum up the very different political world that 
Britain now inhabits: 9/11 and 7/7. The terrorist attacks on The World Trade Centre 
buildings in New York on the 11th September 2001 have become both iconic in their 
imagery and pivotal in relation to political actions and assumptions, not only for the 
USA, but also for key allies such as Britain. In the direct wake of the 9/11 attacks has 
come the long-running military involvement in Afghanistan and its substantial 
impacts on neighbouring Pakistan, as well as the highly controversial invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. The former involvement was directly linked to the threat of 
Islamist violent extremism, the latter less so, but both involvements have had a 
profound impact on the relationship Western states concerned have with other, 
Muslim-populated states, and with their own domestic Muslim populations. The 
question of the relationship between military involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and Islamist violent extremism was brought in to sharp relief for Britain by four co-
ordinated suicide bomb attacks on public transport in central London on the morning 
of Thursday7th July 2005. Two weeks later, London narrowly averted further terrorist 
attacks when another series of suicide bombings failed due to technical deficiencies. 
The attack on Glasgow airport in June 20071, by the same Islamist cell who had 
failed to explode a car bomb in central London just days before, re-focussed public 
attention on the level of the threat. 
 
The shocking attacks of 7/7 were carried out by four young British Muslims, all from 
West Yorkshire and apparently ‘integrated’, leading to the deaths of 52 commuters 
from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds, as well as the serious injury of 
many others. The videoed statements left behind by two of the 7/7 bombers explicitly 
addressed the British military involvements outlined above, with the broad Yorkshire 
accents of the terrorists somehow adding to the chilling impact of the statements. 
These 7/7 attacks in London mirrored the even more deadly attacks carried out in 
the Spanish capital Madrid the previous year, when a series of bombs planted on 
commuter trains  on Thursday 11th March 2004 by Moroccan-origin young Islamists 
killed over 180 people in and around the central Atocha station, and at two suburban 
stations . About a third of those killed in these Spanish attacks were immigrants from 
a variety of countries. The Spanish government’s immediate and wrong attribution of 
the responsibility to the Basque separatist group ETA led to public outrage and a 
change of government in the subsequent election, a far-reaching impact for what had 
been a ramshackle plot 2. In the years since 7/7, British police have foiled a number 
of substantial Islamist plots, with many leading to convictions 3. These plots have 
overwhelmingly involved young British Muslims, including a significant number of 
converts, in plans to cause explosions aimed at members of the general public, often 
on public transport or in other public spaces. The origins of a significant number of 
these plots can be traced earlier than 7/7, or even before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
so questioning the simplistic cause and effect argument put forward that British 
military involvement has inevitably provoked radicalisation. Some of these British 
Islamist plotters have had contact with each other, but there has been no evidence of 
any formal organisational structures or command hierarchies nationally4. The 
suggestion that the Al-Qaeda leadership of Osama Bin-Laden and his associates, 
prior to Bin Laden’s killing by American Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 
May 2011, had commissioned and directed such British bombings and plots is at 
least partially countered by the reality that these groups of plotters have more often 
already conceived and started to plan their attacks, and then sought finance and 
support from ‘Al-Qaeda central’. Some have had no documented contact with Al-
Qaeda figures at all, suggesting that a significant part of this undoubted Islamist 
terror threat comes from ‘self-starting’, autonomous cells. The attempted murder of 
East London Labour MP Stephen Timms by Roshanara Choudhry, a Bangladeshi-
origin young woman acting alone, in May 2010 showed that sometimes even a small 
cell of like-minded believers is not necessary. Choudhry was a highly-gifted 
University student, close to finishing her degree and with a bright future in front of 
her, but whose political anger over British policy seemed to be further radicalised 
through viewing of internet material, particularly sermons by radical Islamist preacher 
Anwar al-Awlaki 5. 
 
Not only is this threat of British domestic Islamist violent extremism a serious and 
continuing one, but it is a significantly different one from the dangers previously 
posed to Britain by Irish republican terrorism. The Irish republican threat between the 
early 1970s and the mid-1990s largely came from the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), or off-shoots such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). These 
Irish republican organisations were hierarchical organisations with military-style 
command and control structures, meaning that terrorist actions were planned and 
authorised by commanders. Whilst deadly force was often used, targets were largely 
military or political, with the minority of actions aimed at public spaces or places 
normally involving warnings to avoid civilian causalities. Incidents that did involve 
civilian deaths, such as the 1974 Guildford and Birmingham pub bombings, were 
portrayed by the Irish republicans as resulting from bungled warnings or the actions 
of rogue operatives who were then harshly punished. The current Islamist threat to 
Britain appears to be very different, both in its targets, but also in its organisation, 
and attempting to understand the nature and make-up of this Islamist threat is one of 
the key areas of focus for this book. 
 
In using the term ‘Islamist’, itself something explored in more detail, the book is 
acknowledging that this current and very serious terror threat faced by Britain is 
primarily about a minority of young British Muslims espousing a radical political 
narrative of Muslim identity, grievance and oppression, the drift of some of those 
young Muslims towards violent extremism to promote that political narrative, and the 
need to combat it. This terror threat of the past few years, combined with the 2001 
disturbances in a number of northern English towns and cities that all involved young 
Muslim men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin 6, has suggested to some politicians 
that Britain has a significant ‘Muslim problem’ 7. The meaning and relevance to 
national cohesion and security of apparently strengthening Muslim identification in 
the context of globalisation and the profound associated impacts on identity and 
experience are highly contested issues. What is beyond dispute is that since the 
2001 riots, and the global shock of the 9/11 attacks that occurred just weeks later, 
there has been a significant shift in the aims, language and content of British policy 
approaches to ethnic relations in general, and to British Muslims in particular. The 
previous emphasis on ethnic diversity and specificity has been replaced post-2001 
by an emphasis on ‘community cohesion’, a stated concern with commonality and 
shared values and experiences 8. In itself controversial, this move towards 
community cohesion has been accompanied by explicit attacks on multiculturalism 
that have suggested previous multiculturalist policies have encouraged separation 
and allowed ethnic minority communities to separate themselves. Such political 
pronouncements by Prime Minister David Cameron 9 and others have given the 
impression that Britain is part of a lurch across northern Europe back towards 
assimilationist policies that are much less sympathetic to the needs and identities of 
ethnic and religious minorities or even to their presence at all. 
 
The Policy response of Prevent 
The British political response to the Islamist terror threat has arguably encapsulated 
this wider reaction against ethnic diversity in general and Muslims in particular, 
leading to important questions as to whether the anti-terrorist policy responses, 
including the Prevent element, have been proportionate to the actual terror threat, or 
have rather symbolised wider societal fears about the Muslim ‘others’ within. The 
Prevent policy approach was first introduced in October 2006 as one of the four 
elements of the wider Government counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Prior to 
the 7/7 attacks of July 2005 outlined above, Prevent had been the least developed of 
the four CONTEST strands but, for one commentator, ‘over the course of the 
following five years, Prevent became the world’s most extensive counter-
radicalisation policy’ 10.It has subsequently been replicated significantly in policies 
developed by Denmark, Australia and Canada, and influenced the development of 
similar initiatives in Germany, Sweden and the USA.  Prevent was initially 
operationalised through targeted funding for all Local Authorities in England having 
Muslims as 5% or more of their local population. Following this initial ‘Pathfinder’ pilot 
year of 2007/2008, Prevent was developed and extended as a national policy 
priority. Funding was given to all Local Authorities firstly with 4,000 or more, then 
2,000 or more Muslim residents, with Local Authority involvement and compliance 
policed by the central government department concerned, the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), through compulsory ‘National 
Indicators’ and monitoring of progress against them. At the same time, Prevent 
funding from The Home Office was directed at local Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) 
and Young Offenders Institutes (YOIs) via the Youth Justice Board (YJB), Prisons, 
and Further and Higher Education Institutions. The element of this funding aimed 
directly at the Police Service nationally led to over 300 new, dedicated Prevent police 
posts, whilst both the Secret Intelligence Service MI5 and the Counter-Terrorism Unit 
(CTU) opened regional offices for the first time, explicitly to address the threat of 
violent extremism. In total, this national government Prevent programme of activity 
involved £140 million between 2008 and 2011. Taking power in May 2010, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government quickly scaled back the DCLG 
element of Prevent funding for that financial year and arguably echoed the 
recommendations of the recent House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee Inquiry 11 into Prevent by re-directing some of the 
money saved towards their new youth-focused National Citizen Service, a scheme 
claimed as community cohesion in action 12. The Coalition then commissioned a 
formal review of Prevent by the Government’s Security ‘watchdog’ Lord Carlile, the 
outcome of which was serially delayed amidst allegations that the government was 
riven by exactly the same tensions and dilemmas over Prevent that had arguably 
marked the Labour government’s approach to Prevent. The eventual publication of 
the revised Prevent strategy in June 2011, its content, and the political discourse 
around it all showed that these fundamental tensions remained13. Those continuing 
tensions and dilemmas over Prevent relate both to its actual effectiveness in 
‘preventing violent extremism’ and to the impact and consequences of Prevent for 
wider issues of ethnic relations and community cohesion in Britain, and  are the 
focus of this book. In particular, the book argues that Prevent has been badly flawed 
in its failure to accept and incorporate the community cohesion analysis of the 
dangers of over-emphasising specific and separate ethnic or faith identities, and has 
consequently both worked in opposition to community cohesion and significantly 
damaged community support for the fight against terrorism. 
 
To many observers, this programme of Prevent activity by the previous Labour 
government appeared to explicitly target Britain’s Muslim communities as a whole for 
a mixture of admonition, education, intervention and surveillance, all based on the 
belief that there needed to be ‘demonstrable change’ in those communities14. Stuart 
Hall, Britain’s most important sociological commentator on post-war immigration and 
the accompanying journey towards a more multicultural society, has characterised 
the response of Prevent as a very serious development and deepening of UK state 
multiculturalism, in both its explicit national government control and organisation, and 
in the extent of its ‘internal penetration’ of Muslim communities. 15 The aims, 
assumptions, content and implications of Prevent are examined in this book. 
Throughout its relatively short life, Prevent has been actually understood and 
operationalized under a number of titles, including ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, 
‘PVE’ as an acronym, or even as the obscure ‘Pathfinder’. These changing names 
and the fact that in some localities Prevent work has operated without any formal title 
or reference at all, highlights the sensitivities and tensions around this policy. For 
consistency, this book uses Prevent throughout. One of the most controversial 
aspects of Prevent has been its explicit focus on Muslims and Muslim communities, 
something that the book argues has not only been damaging to the broader goal of 
community cohesion, but which has actually damaged attempts to win vital 
community support for identifying and defeating violent extremism.  
 
A corollary of this has been an absence of focus on right-wing violent extremism, or 
similar activity by animal liberationists or anti-globalisation and anti-capitalism 
protestors. This is because Islamist violent extremism is viewed as ‘International’ in 
nature, both in its organisation and personnel, and so falls under the CONTEST 
strategy and funding, which focuses on International Terrorism 16, whereas those 
other forms of potentially violent political extremism do not. For that reason, and to 
do justice to the complexities and ambiguities of the past and present Prevent work, 
the book primarily focuses on Prevent’s concerns with Muslims and Islamist violent 
extremism, but does highlight parallels with right wing/racist extremism and attempts 
to combat it when they are helpful. In particular, the book argues that the terrible 
events in Norway in July 2011, when a far-right activist killed 77 people, most of 
them young people shot at a socialist youth camp, showed the serious flaws in this 
UK government position. Coming just weeks after the re-launch of the UK Prevent 
strategy reiterated the lack of a domestic far-right terror threat, the Norway killings 
highlighted how an apparent ‘lone wolf’ terrorist was actually embedded within a 
large and growing right-wing, pan-European network that is increasingly drawn 
towards violent extremism. The killer, Anders Behring Breivik, had regular links with 
the English Defence League (EDL) and other UK right-wing groups whose members 
already have convictions for acts of terrorism, yet Prevent to date has shown no 
interest in this potential terror threat. This book suggests that is badly misguided, and 
that it demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of both the Islamist and far-
right terror threats. Above all therefore, the book aims to identify how Prevent can 
both be more effective in its efforts to prevent violent extremism of all kinds, and can 
support wider efforts to positively build common identities and cross-ethnic cohesion 
and resilience. 
 
 
The purpose of this Book 
Given that the explicit aim of Prevent is indeed to ‘prevent violent extremism’, the 
book draws on a range of empirical research by the author and others, and a 
broader range of recent academic work around Prevent and ethnic relations, to 
question how effective Prevent has actually been so far in relation to this stated aim. 
The book’s position is that neither the undoubted Islamist terror threat posed by a 
small minority of young British Muslims, or the effectiveness of Prevent policies in 
relation to the broader mass of British ‘Muslims’ (itself a questionable 
characterisation) can be understood without debating the wider policy developments 
and discussions around ethnic relations, diversity and identity symbolised by 
community cohesion. 
 
 In this way, this book is a development of the analysis of the meaning and potential 
of community cohesion begun in my previous book, ‘Youth Multiculturalism and 
Community Cohesion’ 17.  Like that earlier publication, this book is concerned with 
social policy, and with how public policy design and practice implementation can be 
more effective. ‘Youth, Multiculturalism and Community Cohesion’ offered what 
continues to be one of the very few empirically-based analyses of how post-2001 
community cohesion policies in Britain have actually been understood and 
implemented on the ground, and what this suggests about its future potential as a 
policy approach. That analysis was based on significant empirical research in 
Oldham and Rochdale, Greater Manchester around how educational practitioners 
such as youth workers had understood and implemented community cohesion 
approaches, and what were young peoples’ understandings of cohesion, segregation 
and ‘identity’ within their highly-racialised local areas 18. That research suggested 
that, rather than being the lurch back to assmilationism that it is often portrayed as, 
community cohesion actually represents a potentially positive way forward for 
multiculturalism. Here, community cohesion is a re-balancing of multiculturalism, an 
approach that still recognises, accepts and works with ethnic difference, but one that 
puts greater emphasis than previously on augmenting those separate identities with 
overarching common identities and interests. In practice, community cohesion is 
doing this through forms of work with young people based on ‘contact theory’, a 
social psychology-based approach to reducing prejudice and fear, and building 
commonality 19. Such inter-ethnic ‘contact’ has no guarantee of producing positive 
outcomes around cohesion and commonality, and the conditions under which 
greater inter-ethnic contact can and do contribute to more cohesive and tolerant 
communities and to greater resilience against extremism is discussed in this book. 
Implicit in the Oldham and Rochdale case study of community cohesion in practice, 
and in the national government community cohesion policy documents, is the 
acceptance that existing and ‘hot’ ethnic or religious identities need to become of 
necessity somewhat ‘cooler’, and more ‘de-centred’ and intersectional forms of 
identity encouraged, if Britain’s complex and increasingly diverse multicultural 
society is to operate peacefully and successfully 20. 
 
That analysis is crucial to the way this book tries to understand what the Islamist 
terror threat is, how government has responded so far, and how policy aimed at 
‘preventing violent extremism’ can be more effective in the future. As in ‘Youth, 
Multiculturalism and Community Cohesion’, the book develops this analysis through 
examination of a strong base of empirical evidence around how Prevent approaches 
to date have been operationalised, understood and experienced. This empirical 
material includes my involvement in 2007/08 in evaluating the initial ‘Pathfinder’ year 
of Prevent activity in Kirklees, West Yorkshire (home of two of the 7/7 bombers) for 
Kirklees Metropolitan Council, my design and research leadership in 2007/08 of 
collaborative, Prevent-funded research in to how young people understand ‘identity’ 
and cohesion in Rochdale, Greater Manchester for the Rochdale Pride Partnership 
(the Local Strategic Partnership for the area including Rochdale Metropolitan 
Borough Council and other public sector bodies), my presenting oral evidence in 
December 2009 at the House of Commons to the Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee Inquiry witness hearings in to Prevent 21, my 
collaborative research with colleagues at the University of Huddersfield in to how two 
West Yorkshire Local Authorities have to date implemented and embedded Prevent 
and Community Cohesion policies within their activities (2009/2010) 22, and my 
collaborative involvement with colleagues in the University of Huddersfield’s Applied 
Criminology Centre who have evaluated for the Youth Justice Board local 
implementation by Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) of Prevent (2009- to date). This 
empirical evidence, and previous academic outputs based upon it, are drawn on and 
supported by a series of recent interviews with professionals and community 
members involved in education, local government and community activity who have 
had personal experience of Prevent and the issues that it addresses in practice. 
Additionally, previous research into approaches to promote effective anti-racist 
education with white young people is also drawn upon 23. 
 
 Alongside this personal empirical research, the book also draws on empirical 
material by others, including academic analysis of Prevent, approaches to British 
Muslims, and their relationship to the wider policy context of community cohesion. In 
particular, it draws on the helpful data relating to Prevent within key sources such as 
Husband and Alam’s ‘Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism’ (2011) and Eatwell 
and Goodwin’s ’The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain’, augmenting this with 
new empirical data, and further developing the debates over Prevent’s content and 
purpose there. It uses all this material to analyse the aims, starting points and 
content of Prevent policy approaches initiated by the then-Labour government from 
2006 onwards, as well as the new directions that the Coalition government have 
mapped out since their election in May 2010. Within this, the book closely examines 
how Prevent has been understood and implemented in practice, how Britain’s 
Muslim communities and those working with them have experienced and reacted to 
Prevent, and what evidence there is as to the effectiveness so far of these Prevent 
policies. This enables the book to squarely examine and discuss a number of inter-
related criticisms of those Prevent policy approaches. These are: 
 That Prevent to date has focussed on and worked with Muslims only, in 
blatant contradiction to the analysis and approach of broader community 
cohesion policies, and what they suggest about the dangers of over-
emphasised ethnic identities, and the causes of ethnic tensions and 
resentments in society. 
 In doing so, Prevent has re-enforced and utilised simplistic and partial 
understandings of ‘Muslim’ identity, so arguably deepening one of the causal 
factors on Islamist violent extremism. 
 This monocultural approach has involved clumsy and counter-productive 
attempts by the state to influence and engineer particular forms of leadership 
and religious practice within Muslim communities. 
 This Prevent approach has also effectively ignored violent extremism in other 
communities, such as far-right/fascist politically-motivated violence, so further 
stoking resentments amongst some British Muslims. 
 More seriously still, the popular belief that Prevent has involved significant 
levels of surveillance on British Muslims has badly damaged the trust and 
dialogue between the state and Muslims that will be central to effective 
counter-terrorism in the long run. 
 Profound political and operational tensions have been built in to the design 
and implementation, both nationally and locally, of Prevent to date, so badly 
hampering efforts to prevent violent extremism. 
 
In outlining and discussing such criticisms, the aim of the book is not to simply be 
negative about Prevent approaches to date, but rather to learn from them and 
propose a number of ways in which future policy and practice approaches to this 
serious and long-term threat to British society, and its people of all backgrounds and 
beliefs, can be more effective, based on cohesion-based approaches that emphasise 
cross-community dialogue and resilience-building, and genuine democratic 
involvement and debate. Whilst clearly focussed on analysis of the British Prevent 
policy approach, its aims, content and flaws, the book attempts to make parallels 
with experiences of Islamist terrorism and policy approaches to preventing such 
violent extremism in other states, such as the USA and The Netherlands, where 
appropriate. It is certainly my hope that in examining the British Prevent policy 
experience, the book offers evidence and insights of use to policy makers and 
academic colleagues in other countries who are grappling with similar challenges 
and dilemmas. 
 
The Structure of the Book 
Chapter One examines the threat of violent extremism facing Britain. It critically 
discusses 7/7 and the other Islamist terrorist incidents that have occurred alongside 
details of other foiled plots and convictions. This allows the Chapter to step back and 
offer analysis of how we can understand the young British Islamist violent extremists 
involved – their backgrounds, motivations and beliefs. Such British events need to be 
understood within the context of the growth of Islamist neo-fundamentalism globally 
and Al-Qaeda-influenced radical extremism within it, and the Chapter draws on key 
academic sources to examine different academic perspectives on the causes of and 
influences upon the growth of this international Islamic militancy, and especially its 
violent extremism forms.  
 
Chapter Two provides a wider context for the discussions of Chapter One, and for 
the examination of Prevent policy aims, content and implementation later in the 
book. It does this by setting both the minority Islamist terror threat and policy 
responses to it within the wider picture of ‘race relations’ and changing British policy 
responses to ethnic diversity and identity since 2001. Here, the 2001 northern riots 
and the subsequent prioritisation of a new ‘race relations’ policy goal, ‘Community 
Cohesion’, are outlined and summarised. In particular, the Chapter examines what 
the community cohesion analysis suggests about ‘parallel lives’ and separate 
identities within specific ethnic, religious and geographical communities, and how 
community cohesion practice has attempted to address the dangers of those 
separate and mutually antagonistic identities in areas of tension. Drawing on my 
previous empirically-based academic work around the meaning and purpose of 
community cohesion, the Chapter suggests the goals and standards by which state 
policies aiming to tackle separate, antagonistic identities and build stronger support 
for, and active involvement in, common identities, experiences and values, should be 
judged. Together, Chapters One and Two outline key things we know about the roots 
and causes of Islamist violent extremism, and the wider problem of separate and 
oppositional identities within British society, thereby suggesting standards by which 
we can judge the aims, content and implementation of governmental policy efforts to 
date to prevent violent extremism. 
 
Chapter 3 begins the analysis of Prevent policies by examining the design and 
factual implementation of those UK policies, including both their stated and implicit 
assumptions and antecedents. This historical overview of the development of 
Prevent, and the significant modifications made along the way since 2006, enables 
the Chapter to identify key past and present issues and tensions that are then 
examined in more detail in the three subsequent Chapters. This Chapter both 
examines past policy statements and implementation under the past Labour 
government, and discusses the arguably contradictory statements and actions to 
date of the Coalition government that took power in May 2010, including their major 
revision of the Prevent strategy announced in June 2011. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the monocultural focus on Britain’s Muslim communities of 
Prevent policies, and the stark contradiction that approach has presented in relation 
to the broader political prioritisation of community cohesion. The Chapter examines a 
number of problematic issues arising from this approach, including the resulting overt 
and clumsy ‘engineering’ of changes in the leadership, culture and religious practices 
of Muslim communities, the resentment engendered amongst young Muslims at the 
broad focus on them combined with an apparent indifference to ‘extremism’ within 
other communities, and a  perverse ‘envy’ amongst non-Muslim communities at the 
very considerable resources focussed on Muslim communities through Prevent. In 
making links with ‘extremism’ in other communities, the Chapter highlights learning 
for Prevent from previous, highly-problematic, attempts to promote ‘anti-racism’ in 
white working class communities. It builds on this to examine the Norway massacre 
of July 2011 and what this revealed about far-right extremist networks that have 
strong links to the UK through groups such as the EDL, the fallacy of the ‘lone wolf’ 
far-right violent extremist, and Prevent’s failure to address this growing threat. 
 
Chapter 5 draws on significant empirical evidence to focus on the actual 
implementation of Prevent and the very considerable resulting tensions and ‘turf 
wars’ between different parts of the state at both national and local levels. Those 
tensions examined include the mechanisms by which central government has 
‘forced’ local government involvement in and compliance with Prevent, tensions over 
leadership and direction at a local level and the dilemmas of local authorities who 
have seen both their autonomy and their on-going efforts to develop cohesion and 
integration strategies locally seriously compromised by the imposition of Prevent 
from above, and the problematic relationship between the two different national 
government departments responsible for Prevent. Additionally, the Chapter 
examines the involvement in Prevent policy implementation of specific sectors such 
as Universities and Further Education Colleges, Prisons and Youth Offending 
Teams, to suggest that common problems can be identified across the range of 
Prevent policy implementation at ground level. 
 
Chapter 6 develops further some of the tensions and issues identified in Chapter 5 
by discussing the most powerful allegation against Prevent policy approaches to 
date, namely that it has been an elaborate and far-reaching surveillance programme 
aimed at Britain’s Muslim communities in general. The evidence for and against this 
allegation is considered, alongside discussion of how policy managed to find itself in 
such a fraught and politically-charged controversy. Within this, the Chapter 
discusses the very considerable growth in counter-terrorism policing and Security 
Service structures that Prevent has resourced and facilitated, and the role that these 
security-focused personnel have played in community engagement roles, such as 
the ‘Channel’ programme. 
 
The Conclusion not only summarises the evidence and arguments developed in the 
earlier chapters, but uses this to propose concrete ways in which Prevent policy 
approaches to ‘preventing violent extremism’ can be more effective and win more 
trust and support from people of all backgrounds and political persuasions, so 
building greater cross-community solidarity and resilience and also reducing the 
chances of another terrorist outrage like 7/7 occurring in Britain. 
 
Issues of Terminology 
In a book that is centrally concerned with assumptions around, and understandings 
of, highly-contested concepts such as ‘values’, ‘loyalties’ and ‘identity’, it is important 
to discuss terminology deployed. Throughout the book, young Britons of  ethnic 
minority backgrounds such as Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Somali origin are referred 
to as ‘Muslims’ for two reasons. Firstly, governmental attempts to ‘prevent violent 
extremism’ since 7/7 have, in my view, unhelpfully and simplistically generalised and 
essentialised these diverse individuals and communities as ‘Muslims’. Secondly, 
there is significant academic evidence, including data presented in this book, that 
young Britons with ethnic backgrounds such as Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Somali 
are increasingly identifying their Islamic faith as their most preferred form of 
‘identification’ when asked. These apparent developments, how we might 
understand them, and what their implications are, is a key focus for the book. 
Despite these justifications, in so using’ Muslim’ as a description for these young 
people,  I am aware that the book risks perpetuating exactly the sort of broad-brush 
‘essentialising’ that it criticises and questions both within policy, and some academic, 
approaches. Here, the book is deploying the strategy that Gunaratnam describes in 
her important account of researching ‘race’ and ethnicity24 as ‘working with and 
against ‘race’ ’, utilising the identification that most young British people of Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi and Somali origin choose, and which is ascribed to them by political 
and media discourse, but also critically examining the strengthening of this 
identification, and questioning its usefulness and limitations. 
 
For consistency, the terms ‘Islamist terrorism’ or ‘Islamist violent extremism’ are used 
throughout  to describe the terror threat that policy attempts to ‘prevent violent 
extremism’ have been focussed on since 7th July 2005. ‘Islamist’ is deployed to 
denote individuals and groups committed to working towards both civil society and 
government being determined and controlled  by Islamic religious doctrine/teachings, 
a position informed by their understanding and interpretation of Islam and the 
perceived situation of the Muslim ‘ummah’ globally. Academic understandings of the 
key tenets and motivations of this Islamist ideology are briefly outlined in Chapter 
125. Other authors have used terms such as ‘neo-fundamentalist’, Al-Qaeda-directed, 
or Al-Qaeda-inspired, but none of those are wholly satisfactory. The concept of 
‘Jihad’ is much-debated within the Muslim world, but some Islamist violent extremists 
see their justification in ‘Jihad’ and are so labelled by themselves and others as 
‘Jihadis’, whilst other commentators favour the term ‘takfiri’ to identify radical Islamist 
extremists prepared to wage violence against Muslims who they view heretics. It is 
important to note that ‘Islamist’ when used here linked to ‘terrorism’ or ‘violent’ 
extremism’, has specific meaning, as there are much larger numbers of Muslims in 
Britain and internationally whose outlook and philosophy could be described as 
‘Islamist’, but who totally reject illegality or violent extremism in any form. Similarly, 
‘terrorism’ is a very controversial term, with many Muslim and non-Muslims alike 
seeing state military action by the USA, UK and others in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
‘state terrorism’. Chapter 1 begins by summarising understandings of ‘terrorism’, and 
then goes on to discuss the relevance of UK foreign policy to the threat of Islamist 
violent extremism currently faced, alongside other factors and influences. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: The Threat of Violent Extremism 
 
Introduction: ‘Terrorism’? 
The threat of ‘violent extremism’ faced by Britain over the last few years is a complex 
one that defies simplistic analysis or explanation. This Chapter aims to both outline 
the key facts and scale of that violent extremist threat, and to draw on a range of 
academic material and perspectives to discuss how we can understand its nature, 
motivation and make-up. Such detailed discussion of the threat is a vital prerequisite 
for a meaningful assessment of whether British policy attempts to date to ‘prevent 
violent extremism’ have been realistic or well-designed. The threat of Islamist violent 
extremism to Britain clearly can be characterised as ‘terrorism’, yet too often political, 
media and academic discussions of the problem and policy responses to it have 
focussed on Muslims and the nature of Islam, rather than what we know more 
broadly about terrorism. This is particularly surprising, both because of the 
considerable academic literature based on examples of terrorism around the world, 
and Britain’s own modern experience of terrorist activity in both Northern Ireland and 
Britain itself relating to the northern Irish conflict. That experience and body of 
academic material relating to terrorism cautions against overly-simplistic 
understandings of the make-up and motivations of terrorists, or against ill- conceived 
or even counter-productive policy responses. 
 
Defining ‘terrorism’ is surprisingly complex. A common understanding focuses on 
violence by ‘non-state actors’, on the basis that any actions by terrorists are often 
mirrored by state military forces in situations of war or occupation, a parallel not lost 
on political opponents of the ‘war on terror’ state military actions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. A suggestion that terrorism focuses on civilians is similarly simplistic, given that 
some terrorist movements have avoided attacks on civilians, whilst state military 
operations have involved bombing civilian areas. Coming originally from the Latin 
word ‘terrere’, to frighten, deter or scare away, terrorism came in to popular use after 
the ‘terror’ period of violence and anarchy in the aftermath of the French Revolution 
that saw as many as 40,000 people sent to the guillotine. However, long before then 
Britain had arguably already faced its gravest ever terrorism threat in the form of the 
1605 Gunpowder Plot, designed to kill the monarch and members of Parliament, with 
the religiously-motivated plotters having also considered kidnapping and killing the 
royal children. Given this history, and the fact that ‘zealots’ were Jewish ‘terrorists’ of 
the 1st Century AD, English (2009) suggests that the ‘new’, post 9/11 Islamist 
terrorism facing Britain and other Western states is actually much less new than it 
appears. Indeed, he questions whether terrorism is actually still a helpful term, given 
that: ‘Terrorism might best be considered by people who collectively see themselves 
as engaged in a war’1. This is echoed by Dipak Gupta, who suggests that: ‘it is 
perhaps useful to think of terrorism as an epi-phenomenon, a minor sideshow of a 
larger social problem’ 2. These characterisations immediately challenge notions of 
terrorists as deranged or unbalanced individuals, living in their own fantasy world. 
Instead, these leading analysts of terrorism see individual terrorists and their actions 
as part of wider social movements, with the individual acts of violence a form of 
altruism towards ‘their’ social group. Other commentators identify a number of 
metaphors used in relation to modern Islamist terrorism. The terrorism as ‘war’ 
formulation deployed by the US Bush administration in the wake of 9/11 has rightly 
been criticised as fundamentally flawed and counter-productive in their inspiration for 
military involvements 3, whereas notions of terrorism as a ‘disease’ that can spread 
amongst populations if unchecked can be seen as the inspiration for preventative 
domestic policy efforts around ‘preventing violent extremism’ 4. 
 
This immediately gives some sense of the complex debates around the motivations 
of terrorists generally and in particular the young British Muslims involved in the 
current threat of ‘violent extremism’. This is far from being a uniquely British problem, 
with the United States Attorney General, Eric Holder, admitting in December 2010 
that the domestic Islamist terror threat in America was now more about American 
Muslims, rather than foreign visitors 5. This chapter will explore some of those 
arguments and theories. It first briefly outlines the pivotal events of 7/7 and 
subsequent terrorist events, plots and convictions. It then discusses how we might 
understand the motivations and actions of the young British Muslims involved by 
focussing on six distinct but inter-related theories and explanations for such Islamist 
terrorism: 
 Radical Islam: the ‘single narrative’ 
 A reaction to British foreign policy? 
 A foreign hand? 
 A product of Ethnic/racial segregation and poverty? 
 Radicalisation: Radical Mosques and ‘Preachers of hate’? 
 Group dynamics  
 
In discussing these theories and explanations, the Chapter will suggest that 
understandings of the current and serious threat of Islamist violent extremism facing 
Britain are complex and inter-related, and that policy responses need to recognise 
that. 
 
7/7: Home-grown suicide bombers 
Some years on, the visceral shock of the 7/7 bombings in central London remains 
strong. Whilst the number of deaths involved was on a smaller scale to the 9/11 
attacks on New York in September 2001, or the attacks on Madrid’s public transport 
system in March 2004, the resulting impact of the British domestic population seeing 
the world in a slightly different way was similar. The shock came not only through the 
large-scale deaths and very serious injuries, but in the associated realities that these 
attacks were suicide attacks, carried out by four young British Muslims. The 
attackers were four young men from West Yorkshire in the north of England, 3 of 
them of Pakistani-origin from Beeston in south Leeds, and one an African-Caribbean 
convert to Islam from nearby Huddersfield. All had been brought up and educated in 
Britain, with the broad Yorkshire accents of two of them captured in a video 
statement prior to the attacks being all the more unsettling for the general British 
public – these young men looked and sounded like many thousands of other young 
Muslims in Britain’s multiracial towns and cities. The oldest attacker, viewed 
subsequently as the ringleader, was Mohammad Sidique Khan, a popular Learning 
Mentor at a south Leeds multiracial primary school, and a part-time youth worker at 
the Hamara Youth Access Point in Beeston. Through his youth and community 
activities, Khan had got to know Shezad Tanweer, a 22 year old University student 
and keen sportsman, and 18 year old Hasib Hussain. Nineteen year old Germaine 
Lindsay from Huddersfield had converted to Islam as a fifteen year old, taking the 
name Abdullah Shaheed Jamal. Married to a white Muslim convert with a young son, 
and with his wife expecting their second child, Jamal was living in his wife’s home 
town of Aylesbury prior to the attacks, but still spending a lot of time in West 
Yorkshire. It is likely that he met Khan when attending talks by radical Islamist 
preachers in 20046. 
 
Having apparently carried out a ‘dry run’ the week before, the four attackers travelled 
down to London early on the morning of Thursday 7th July 2005. Parting in Kings 
Cross station after hugging each other, they then travelled in separate directions on 
public transport , where they each detonated their explosives that they had 
previously prepared in their ‘bomb factory’ flat in the Hyde Park area of Leeds. Three 
detonated their bombs around 8.50am on underground tube trains, with Hasib 
Hussain detonating his bomb on a diverted Number 30 bus in Tavistock Square 
about 30 minutes later after  apparently failing to get on to the tube system. The 
motives for Hussain attempting to phone his fellow bombers after they had blown 
themselves up remain unclear. In the confines of tube train and buses, the impact of 
their improvised explosives, packed with bolts and other metal objects was both 
deadly and horrific. In total, 52 commuters from widely varying national, ethnic, age 
and occupational backgrounds, died, and hundreds were injured, some very 
seriously with life-long after effects. In the aftermath, many critical questions were 
raised, firstly about the speed of the response by the emergency services, and 
whether this attack was preventable through information already held by MI5. Calls 
for a full public Inquiry were resisted by government, with a much more limited report 
issued by Parliament that outlined the key facts as known. After much campaigning, 
survivors and bereaved relatives did succeed in gaining an Inquest in 2010/117.This 
both provided the opportunity for survivors and relatives to hear the full facts about 
what happened to individuals during each bomb attack, but also shed some new light 
on the behaviour of the individual bombers in the run up to the attack. This added 
some helpful detail to the facts of the plot identified by the initial Police investigation 
and by the previous Government report. It remains unclear whether others were 
involved in the planning and preparation of the 7/7 attacks. In 2008 the trial of three 
associates of Sidique Khan collapsed after they had been accused of conducting a 
’hostile reconnaissance’ mission with two of the attackers seven months before the 
July 2005 attacks. All three had attended training camps in Pakistan with Sidique 
Khan, and objects belonging to them were later found in the ‘bomb-making factory’ in 
Hyde Park, Leeds, but this was not enough to secure convictions 8.  
 
The fact that this 7/7 attack was not an isolated one-off was graphically illustrated 
just two weeks later on the 21st July, when four young men of Somali  origin 
attempted to carry out further suicide bomb attacks on London transport. These 
attacks only failed because their home-made explosives failed to detonate, leading 
to their later capture and conviction. In the heightened tension of the intervening 
period, armed Police chased and shot dead an innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de 
Menenezes, at Stockwell tube station, believing him to be one of the 21/7 attackers 
who was about to detonate explosives. That incident and the official slowness to 
accept liability for the unlawful death, set an unhelpful context for future government 
attempts to win public support towards anti-terrorism measures. Two years later, in 
June 2007, Bilal Abdulla a doctor of Iraqi origin and Kafeel Ahmed, an Indian-origin 
engineering student, both resident in the UK, were arrested after an attempted 
bombing of Glasgow airport, this coming days after their earlier failed attempt to 
detonate a car bomb in crowded part of central London. Ahmed later died of the 
injuries he sustained during the attack 9.  
 
 These actual incidents have proved to be just the tip of the iceberg, with a number 
of other plots foiled, leading to convictions and long terms of imprisonment. Those 
plots have included plans to bomb major shopping centres and nightclubs, and to 
detonate bombs simultaneously on a number of transatlantic airliners. These plots 
have largely involved young British Muslims, or young Muslims with transnational 
links to Britain. This reality and the Christmas Day 2009 arrest of the London 
University-educated Nigerian Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called ‘underpants 
bomber’, after his unsuccessful attempt to detonate a bomb on a flight landing in 
Detroit, USA, have all led to a picture of a very serious terror threat amongst young 
British Muslims, something not undermined by the failure to proceed with trials after 
some arrests. All these incidents and other plots have involved plans to carry out 
explosions in public places, often through suicide attacks. This raises the key issue 
of why some young British Muslims have been suddenly attracted to violent 
extremism over the past few years and what is motivating them. 
 
 
 
Radical Islam: the ‘single narrative’ 
What is clear about this terror threat is that the consistent motivation or justification 
for all these attacks and plots by people of Muslim faith , some of them only very 
recently converted or re-discovering this faith, is a complex mixture of religion and 
politics. Here, a very strong identification with the ‘ummah’, or one global Muslim 
community, and a political analysis of Muslims internationally being oppressed, 
threatened and humiliated provides a context within which a small minority of those 
holding such views then travel further down a path towards acts of violent extremism. 
As the rest of this Chapter outlines, there is no one simple profile of, or explanation 
for, those individuals who do travel in that direction, but their common starting point 
has been the acceptance of a hard-line Islamist position, a politicised understanding 
of Islamic faith, that provides what had been described as the ‘single narrative’10. 
This ‘single narrative’ explains the world, and the individual’s life and experiences 
within it, in terms of the oppression of the Muslim ‘ummah’ and the need to take 
action against that oppression. To describe this shared ideology underpinning the 
threat of Islamist violent extremism as ‘religious’ is simplistic, given that in both its 
outlook and the ways in which it is understood and operationalised by its adherents 
is arguably closer to the revolutionary anarchist ideology of the nineteenth century, 
or the Marxist-Leninist ideology that inspired revolutionaries across the world for 
much of the twentieth century 11.To combat the Islamist ‘single narrative’ and how it 
can inspire violent extremism, it is important to understand its key elements. Whilst 
space does not allow a full examination, the aim here is to briefly outline the key 
components. These include the growth of political Islamism globally over the past 
sixty years and its development in Britain, the role of foreign Muslim countries such 
as Saudi Arabia in promoting particular and literalist forms of Islamic adherence, and 
the role of new technology in enabling new understandings of both the Muslim 
‘ummah’, and radical Islamist interpretations of its position and needs. 
 
One key source of this radical Islamist ideology has been a political understanding of 
Islam which has its roots in the struggles for independence from colonialism and the 
creation of a nation state in Arab and other Muslim countries. In many of these 
countries, such as the Egypt of General Nasser, a broadly secular nationalism, more 
influenced by socialism than religion, was the dominant political ideology. However, 
the limited national development in the face of continued western post-colonial 
economic domination, and the failure of these national rulers to create meaningful 
democracy, liberty or equality led to increasing disillusionment with both nationalism 
and socialism. This, combined first with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the 
only Muslim-dominated power bloc, and the failure to arrest the development of 
Israel that was seen a humiliation for all Arabs, led to increasing support for an 
interest in Islamist ideologies and organisations that saw Islam as the answer. A key 
focus for this was The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-
Banna, whose influence grew in opposition to the post-independence regime of 
Nasser through radical leaders and ideologues like Syed Qutb, who was hanged by 
the Egyptian authorities. Qutb, a key disciple of al-Banna, wrote a book ‘Milestones’ 
that portrayed the West as deliberately anti-Muslim, and which proposed overtly 
Islamic societies as a solution. This book remains highly influential on Islamist 
activists 12.Whilst al-Banna’s influence has largely been on ‘evolutionary Islamists’ 
working within democratic processes, Qutb’s work has inspired revolutionary 
Islamists. This emerging Islamist ideology saw Islam not just as a faith, but as a 
blueprint for a socio-economic system and for society as a whole. This growth of 
Islamist thought in contrast to secular nationalism can be seen in the triumph of 
religious forces following the 1979 Iranian popular revolution and the increasing 
dominance of the Islamist Hamas over the largely secular and nationalist PLO in 
Palestine, in the wake of their failure to secure a viable and independent Palestinian 
state. This ‘wave’ of Islamist political ideology superseding nationalist and socialist 
thought in a broad political way is mirrored in a more specific way in the respective 
‘waves’ of terrorism. Gupta (2008) identifies previous global terrorist ‘waves’ based 
first on nationalism, then on Marxist/socialist thought. Just as the perceived political 
failure of those socialist/nationalist ideologies led to the growth of Islamist political 
movements, so did the failure of violent extremism based on those former ideologies 
create an attraction towards violent extremism based around Islamism within the 
Muslim world, but with significant overlaps with this previous ‘wave’ of violent 
extremism as Al-Qaeda with the 9/11 and other attacks on US power, ‘targeted 
modern imperialism, as the ultra-leftists of the late 1960s and 1970s did with less 
success’13. 
 
 Islamist groups based on this ideology, which draws on key thinkers like Qutb and 
the Indian Maududi, a key ideologue within the Indian-based and ultra conservative 
Deonbandi movement, have gradually spread across the world, first appearing in the 
UK in an organised form in the shape of Hizb-ut-Tahrir after the first Gulf War in 
1991. In contrast to the Sufi traditions of the majority of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
origin British Muslims that views faith as largely spiritual and unconnected from 
politics, such an Islamist perspective focuses on political action and on making overt 
demands on behalf of Muslims and their religious practice, so intensely politicising 
Muslim life and identity. The granting of asylum to violent Islamist extremists from 
Algeria, Egypt and other North African and Middle Eastern states between the late 
1980s and late 1990s also did much to enable the growth of Islamist politics in 
Britain, as did the plight of Bosnian Muslims during the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia 14. At the same time, Britain has been on the receiving end of very 
considerable religious propaganda and funding for conservative Islamic activities 
from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The twin threats of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution with its more radical form of a political Islam, and the growth of Leftist 
nationalism in other states led the oil-rich Saudis to commit huge amounts of funding 
to the promotion of their own conservative and literalist Wahabi interpretation of 
Islam. This was directed at Muslim communities globally through printed and internet 
propaganda and through the strategic use of funds for Mosques and organisational 
funding. The pivotal role of Saudi Arabia as the focus for the Hajj pilgrimage and the 
training of many Imams enabled them to deepen this impact. 
 
This growth both of an overtly political Islamism combined with the global promotion 
of literalist and uncontingent forms of Islam through Wahabism and Deobandism 
have led to significant developments within Muslim communities, both in Britain and 
internationally. It is important to state that these more politicised and/or more literal 
positions are still often held by only a minority of Muslims, but that minority has 
grown both in numbers and influence through generational change. Within this 
development, key concepts can be identified. ‘Salafi’ denotes Muslims who view 
many other individual Muslims and Muslim-dominated states as not pure or 
observant enough, with some ‘Salafis’ expressing this through doctrinal practice and 
debate, and others drawn towards political, or even violent, expression. Oliver Roy 
(2004) terms the politicised form of this held by some young western Muslims as 
‘neo-fundamentalism’. Whilst the vast majority of Salafis oppose violence, they have 
little support for or involvement in wider, non-Muslim society. A more extreme 
development from that position is that of ‘Takfiri’, radical Salafi Islamists who believe 
that violence against other, less devout Muslim is justified. Here, Al-Qaeda leaders 
have talked about ‘far’ and ‘near’ enemies, with ‘far’ denoting non-Muslims powers 
like the USA, and ‘near’ denoting Muslim states and their rulers viewed as corrupt or 
not pure enough. The fact that the video statement left by Sidique Khan spent as 
much time addressing British Muslims and their leaders for their lack of ‘purity’ as it 
did addressing the wider British public illustrates this ideology15. 
 
A key component in this Islamist ideology, and its extreme violent off-shoots, is its 
emphasis and exploitation of the concept of the ‘ummah’, one Muslim community 
globally, irrespective of national or ethnic boundaries. Chapter 2 outlines the 
significant support for this identity and concept amongst young British Muslims 
generally and how we might understand this, as well as the progressive and 
internationalist potential the concept offers 16.However, this attachment to the 
‘ummah’, the Muslim ‘imagined community’  can be exploited and directed towards 
violent extremism. Here, the ‘single narrative’ that Muslims are everywhere 
oppressed and humiliated, and that action must be taken, can be the motivation for 
violent extremism on their behalf. This understanding motivates Gupta’s (2008) belief 
that terrorism is an altruistic act, with Islamist terrorists acting on behalf of the 
‘ummah’, especially when a strong and simplistic narrative is built around historic 
and current diverse political events such as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
the Chechnya and Kashmir conflicts, anti-Muslim atrocities in Bosnia, the 1991 and 
2003 invasions of Iraq, and the festering Israel/Palestine conflict. This narrative 
conveniently overlooks the facts that many of the deaths in Iraq have resulted from 
attacks by Muslims on other Muslims, or of situations like Sudan where Muslims are 
the ‘oppressors’. Nevertheless, Scott Atran observes that: ‘The terrorists aren’t 
nihilists, starkly or ambiguously, but often deeply moral souls with a horribly 
misplaced sense of justice’ 17. This suggests that saying suicide-bombing terrorists, 
such as the 7/7 attackers, died for ‘a cause’ is too simplistic; rather, they died for 
others, real and imagined friends and co-religionists. 
 
This ‘single narrative’ and the way it is understood by young western Muslims can 
appear to be a conservative, backward-looking rejection of modernity, but Oliver Roy 
suggests that ‘neo-fundamentalism and radical violence are more linked with 
westernisation than with a return to the Qur’an’ 18.For Roy, the growth of this 
international Islamist ideology is just one facet of, and one reaction to, globalisation, 
both in the way that it is communicated via modern technologies, but also in how it is 
increasingly about individual understandings, identities and behaviour, and how that 
individual understanding of Islam is performed. In this way, Islamist radicalism and 
its minority violent extremism forms, can be better understood through comparisons 
with, and study of, modern ‘evangelical’ trends in other religions19, and secular 
modern radical movements, such as anti-globalisation militants or neo-fascist/racist 
networks, than by studying Islamic history or ‘tradition’. This leads Roy to suggest 
that ‘the ummah here plays the role of the proletariat for Trotskyist and leftists groups 
of the 1960s – an imaginary and therefore silent community that gives legitimacy to a 
small group pretending to speak in its name’ 20.Western countries did not focus on 
the growth in Islamist ideology and global network built around the ‘single narrative’ 
until the shock of 9/11 because they had been using such groups as a tool to oppose 
communism, radical Shiaism or Arab leftist nationalism , and were shocked to find it 
attacking the West. This suggests that Islamist radicalism in the west is a social 
movement a response to globalisation, and to the experiences of being second or 
third generations of a conservative ethnic minority community, as discussed further 
in Chapter 2. 
 
A reaction to British Foreign Policy? 
An obvious explanation of this domestic terror threat for some commentators is 
British foreign policy, specifically the highly-controversial military involvements in 
Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq between 2003 and 2010.Those involvements 
were explicitly addressed by Mohammad Sidique Khan in the first section of his 
‘suicide video’, where he stated: ‘Your democratically-elected governments 
continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your 
support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’ 21.A number of politicians 
from different political parties echoed this link to Iraq in the weeks following 7/7.In 
contrast, Prime Minister Tony Blair flatly denied such a link and government 
continued to avoid such a linkage. For McGhee, ‘By dismissing the relationship 
between British foreign policy and radicalisation, the government under Blair lost the 
opportunity to understand and respond to the grievances that extremists are all too 
eager to exploit’ 22. However, even allowing for the political dangers of accepting 
such a link, it is suggested below that such ‘grievances’ are far less clear or 
transparent than those underpinning previous terror threats, such as Irish 
Republicanism.  
 
Nevertheless, anti-Iraq war campaigners highlighted advice given to the government 
by the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, drawing on the Joint 
Intelligence Committee of government agencies, that involvement in Iraq would 
heighten the risk of terrorism 23. This link was explored further in 2004 by a joint 
Home Office/Foreign and Commonwealth Office draft document, ‘Young Muslims 
and Extremism’. This commented that, ‘there is the feeling that parts of the Muslims 
community, particularly younger men are disaffected’. As part of that report, the head 
of the Foreign Office, Michael Jay, wrote that one recurring theme within this 
disaffection was , ‘the issue of British foreign policy’, which was seen as central to 
the recruitment of the various Islamist groups  such as Hizb -ut -Tahrir (HUT) and Al-
Muhajiroun  detailed in the report. A perception of double standards held by western 
governments, especially around Israel was identified in the report itself, and these 
concerns grew as the situation in Iraq deteriorated in to large-scale violence affecting 
civilians. Richard English, a leading academic commentator on terrorism, notes that, 
‘members of the terrorist cell convicted in April 2007 of plotting bomb attacks in 
England clearly had a sense that the UK should be hit because of its support for the 
US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’ 24. 
 
It seems beyond dispute that the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
deepened feelings of marginalisation and anger amongst many British Muslims, and 
that government refusal to acknowledge a possible link to involvement in violent 
extremism has been unhelpful. However, to suggest that accepting such a link, or 
even adjusting foreign policy would ‘solve’ the problem of domestic Islamist violent 
extremism, is naïve because it doesn’t address why a small minority are drawn to 
terrorist violence, ‘underscored by the number of people who feel the same level of 
grievance and identification, yet do not turn to violent expression’ 25. Regarding that 
small minority of British Muslims involved in violent extremism, the simple equation 
of apparently anti-Muslim British foreign policy leading to an Islamist domestic terror 
response doesn’t convince for a number of reasons. Sidique Khan was already 
moving in extreme Islamist circles in 1999, and by early 2001, before 9/11, was 
trying to recruit young Muslims for training in Afghanistan with two  Muslims from 
Derby who latter carried out suicide bombings in Israel. Indeed, ’The Khan family 
and, it seems, at least a couple of dozen others, had known that Sidique was a 
potentially violent radical for at least six years before 7/7’ 27. The claim that 7/7 could 
have been prevented by MI5 is based on the fact that Khan and Tanweer met the 
‘Crevice’ plotters in 2004, but were not followed up. The so-called Crevice plot 
involved a group of young Muslims plotting to cause large explosions at venues such 
as The Blue Water shopping centre in Kent and the Ministry of Sound nightclub in 
London. They had attended a terrorist training camp and purchased 600 kilograms of 
Ammonium Nitrate, enough to cause several large-scale explosions, but were under 
surveillance, leading to arrest and long-term imprisonment. The ring leader, Omar 
Khyam, from Crawley in Sussex, had attended an Islamist training camp in Kashmir 
in 2000, again before 9/11, then returning to raise funds for Islamist fighters in 
Afghanistan and Kashmir. This picture of British Islamists preparing for violent 
extremism not only before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but before 9/11, is highlighted 
by the arrest in December 2001 of British Muslim convert Richard Reid after he 
attempted to explode a bomb hidden in his shoe on a trans-Atlantic flight from Paris 
to Miami. Reid had trained in the same Afghanistan terror camp as fellow Briton 
Saajid Butt from Gloucester. Butt withdrew from the long-planned airline plot at the 
last minute, was arrested and imprisoned for 13 years. Similarly, Dhiren Barat, a 
Hindu convert to Islam, was jailed in 2007 on terror charges, after having fought with 
Kashmir militants and other Islamists since the late 1990s 27. Clearly, the threat of 
Islamist violent extremism pre-dates the invasion of Iraq, or even 9/11. However, 
what will never be known is whether British Islamist extremists such Omar Khyam 
and Sidique Khan, who initially volunteered to fight in Afghanistan, would have 
planned attacks on Britain without the foreign military involvements , as ’the 
motivations of those who received training abroad before September 2001 did not 
necessarily centre upon the desire to attack civilian populations in western 
states’28.Certainly, violent Islamist extremists identified more recently have clearly 
been motivated by foreign policy issues.  Roshanara Choudhry, the talented young 
Muslim student jailed for life after stabbing her local MP, Stephen Timms, in 2010, 
said in her Police interviews shortly after the attack that, ‘I thought that it’s not right 
that he voted for the declaration of war in Iraq… I feel like I’ve ruined the rest of my 
life. I feel like it’s worth it because millions of Iraqis are suffering and I should do 
what I can to help them’ 29. For Jonathan Githens-Mazer, this showed that ‘we can 
definitively put to rest Tony Blair’s claims that foreign policy isn’t linked to terrorism at 
home’ 30. 
 
A Foreign Hand? 
It seemed self-evident to some people that the carefully-planned and co-ordinated 
7/7 attacks must have been commissioned and controlled by Osama Bin Laden and 
Al- Qaeda in an echo of the 9/11 attacks. That in itself was a mis-understanding of 
how 9/11 had been planned 31, but support for this came from the fact that a 
statement of responsibility for 7/7 was issued by a previously unknown group within 
hours of the attacks. Written in Arabic, the prose and content identified the statement 
as almost certainly the work of Bin Laden’s associate Ayman al-Zawahiri, with the 
sites of the four London explosions intended to mirror his phrase about the four 
points of the compass 32. The video statement by two of the 7/7 attackers 
subsequently released largely consisted of a speech by al-Zawahiri. However, 
analysis of the ‘Al- Qaeda central’ leadership based in Afghanistan suggests that 
their role has often been to finance, advise and support proposals and plots brought 
to them, rather than necessarily initiating and actually planning themselves. Indeed, 
both Sidique Khan and Omar Khyam went to Afghanistan to volunteer their military 
services to the Taliban, but were directed to ‘do something back home’ by the 
Islamist leadership there 33. Dhiren Barat had led a group that planned to explode 
bombs on the sections of the London underground under the Thames river, and had 
merely submitted a ‘business’ plan to Al- Qaeda for financial support – the ideas and 
motivation they already had themselves. Similarly, the 2004 Madrid bombers had no 
direct contact with Al-Qaeda, and did not seek any funding , leading Gupta to 
observe that ‘modern jihadi terror groups are linear, open-sourced, decentralised 
conglomerations of small, quasi-independent groups drawn more by inspiration from 
Bin Laden than a direct instruction from him’34. This sort of ‘leaderless struggle’, 
inspired by ideology rather than orders, is very reminiscent of the Anarchist terrorism 
that posed a real threat to western states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and 
which included assassinations of the Russian Csar and the President of the USA. 
The new US President made defeat of the anarchist threat his number one priority, 
but there was no central command or control structure to attack, as increasingly 
appears to be the case today: ‘Al Qaeda today is mostly an idea, more a violent 
Islamist revivalist social movement than a terrorist organisation’ 35. Whilst the 
possible influences of ‘gateway’ Islamist organisations or radical preachers are 
discussed below, the sobering reality is that most British violent Islamists convicted 
or having been involved in plots, are ‘self-starters’, and it is more productive to focus 
on the inter-related issues of the ideology or beliefs guiding self-starters, and the 
small-scale interpersonal dynamics within groups of them, with these two factors 
seeming to be at the heart of the threat of violent extremism. 
 
Ethnic Segregation, Poverty and Marginalisation? 
Rather than the plight of Muslims abroad, is it the lived reality of Muslims in Britain 
and other European states that has primarily produced this domestic Islamist terror 
threat? In the wake of the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, a prominent 
American academic commentator on national security highlighted ‘Europe’s Angry 
Muslims’ 36, characterising the Muslims in the UK, France and The Netherlands as 
poor, ghettoised and peripheral to their national societies, with the blame being put 
on policies of ‘multiculturalism’, that have allowed separate and oppositional 
identities to develop. This, of course, skirted the fact that France has emphatically 
rejected multiculturalism, but still has a problem of both ghettoisation and Islamist 
violence 37. The contrast was made to the USA, where the Muslims population was 
portrayed as diffused, integrated and unconflicted over their national American 
identity. However, in the years since that 2005 article, the USA has faced a number 
of Islamist terror incident and plots very similar in nature to those faced by Britain 38. 
These have seen settled and apparently successful American Muslims 39 get 
involved in Islamist Violent extremism, with the most graphic example being the 
shooting dead of 13 fellow military personnel at Ford Hood, Texas by a Muslim 
Military psychologist. These developments have now led to Congressional Hearings 
on domestic radicalisation and the first signs that dedicated anti-radicalisation policy 
measures may be developing in the USA 40.  
 
Nevertheless, as Chapter 2 discusses in more detail, Muslims in many of Britain’s 
towns and cities are significantly ethnically segregated, often living ‘parallel lives’. 
The acceptance of this reality , and consequent action to address it, has been central 
to the post 2001 shift of emphasis within UK ‘race relations’ policy approaches, as 
discussed more in Chapter 2. Analysis of the 7/7 bombers and how that plot and the 
close relationships sustaining it grew, does suggest that the close knit and somewhat 
insular nature of the Pakistani origin community in Beeston enabled radicalisation to 
develop without external reporting  41, based on certain ‘taken for granted’ attitudes 
and norms within the community.  
 
In the wake of the 7/7 attacks, professional colleagues from different ethnic 
backgrounds praised the work with young people of Sidique Khan, and white 
neighbours spoke very positively about Shezad Tanweer as a polite and promising 
young man. This led the Association of Chief Police Officers to suggest that the 7/7 
bombers ‘were nurtured in cohesive communities’42. However, whilst Beeston did not 
have rigid ethnic segregation in the manner of the towns and cities facing riots in 
2001, it had, and has, significant localised segregation, and a long history of youth 
racial tensions encompassing a cocktail of ‘race’, territorialism and machismo. 
‘Geraldine’  is  a white-Irish origin local authority officer who grew up in Beeston 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and remembers ethnic physical and cultural 
segregation hardening in the area as she got older: 
 
When I look back at my time growing up in Beeston, there seems to be a big 
difference between the late 80s and the 90s. I grew up on the Cross Flatts side of 
the park and I had friends from lots of different backgrounds but at the time I don’t 
think much was made of it – it was just normal. I had friends who were Irish, 
Caribbean, Polish, Italian, Sikh as well as White British living on both sides of the 
park. ..But by the time I went to high school in 1990, it seemed like the park was a 
dividing line, between “White Beeston” on the one side, with a small percentage of 
people generally accepted as comfortably integrated from lots of other backgrounds; 
and “Asian Beeston” on the other, with very few people who weren’t of Asian origin. 
Again, looking back – they were collectively labelled “Asian” by everyone, but 
actually they were predominantly Muslims from Kashmir, Pakistan or Bangladesh – 
and the Sikh and Caribbean families I had known had moved out too. If I’m really 
honest too, I remember thinking that the “white” families who still lived there were 
quite chaotic and intimidating. 
  
When I think of multi-cultural places, I picture New York or London – people of all 
backgrounds living in every street across all income brackets. When I look back to 
growing up in Beeston, it was at best bi-cultural with one version of multiculturalism 
on one side and another version on the other side. 
 
 Rai (2006) in his thoughtful analysis of the 7/7 attacks and their political context 
quotes ex-school friends of Hasib Hussain saying that he often got in to fights with 
non-Muslims and that ‘it was always whites against Asians and there were so many 
fights’43.This was little changed from the previous generation represented by Sidique 
Khan. ‘Luke’ taught Sidique Khan at Mathew Murray High School (MMHS) in south 
Leeds in the late 1980s and comments that: 
The social climate in South Leeds generally and MMHS. at that time -late 80s- 
was anything but multicultural. When I arrived at MMHS in 85, almost every 
single desk had swastika graffiti on it – literally almost all. The management 
didn't understand racism as a problem because they were ignorant and racist 
themselves by and large. When Sidique got to the school, the balance of 
power had shifted so that the Asian kids were less of a minority and there was 
an uneasy peace between them and the white kids that occasionally flared 
into running warfare that brought heavy policing to Holbeck. At this time, the 
Pakistanis had a one in, all in policy that made them a formidable force. I 
never saw Sidique involved in fighting but there would have been no ambiguity 
about whose side he was on. So the climate was one of fear and loathing. As 
an Asian kid in MMHS at that time you would have had to face ignorance, 
prejudice and racism on a daily basis, it was impossible to escape it. It was 
very difficult to talk about it to the young people as a teacher, because the 
battle lines were drawn up and there was so much tension constantly bubbling 
away under the surface. I was threatened with disciplinary action by the 
school management for doing too much stuff about racism at one point. They 
didn't know how to deal with it and they couldn't handle it appropriately. The 
Pakistani parents seemed very conservative and they controlled what their 
sons did at school and many girls left school early or were limited in their 
choices. The white girls felt very oppressed by the behaviour and attitudes of 
many of the Pakistani youth and this fuelled their racism. It would not be an 
exaggeration to describe it as an environment of hatred and I strangely 
unsurprised when I heard about Sidique, although I had no idea that it would 
lead to terrorism as such. 
Such ethnic segregation, racism and racial tension is problematic for society in a 
number of ways, as Chapter 2 discusses but recent demographic analysis shows 
that British Muslims have been no more likely to be involved in Islamist violent 
extremism activity if they come from ‘dense’, clustered and segregated Muslim 
communities, than if they come from much smaller and apparently ‘integrated’ 
settings 44. Omar Khyam, ringleader of the ‘Crevice’ plot, came from Crawley in 
Sussex, where the Muslim population was too small for the Local Authority to qualify 
for initial Prevent funding. Similarly, Saajid Butt came from Gloucester, again a 
Muslim community of limited size in an overwhelmingly white area. Government 
statistics show the Pakistani and Bangladeshi-origin communities, who represent the 
substantial majority of Britain’s Muslims, as having higher rates of unemployment, 
poor housing and poverty than other ethnic backgrounds, and much higher rates 
than the white majority communities. Gupta (2008) notes that Aristotle saw poverty 
as the root cause of political unrest and violence, but  Jason Burke, a journalist with 
a long-term involvement in coverage of Islamist violence found that: ‘Fewer than 
20% of UK militants come from genuinely deprived or low income backgrounds’ 45. 
Some militants, such as the ex-criminal Richard Reid, or Hasib Hussain, who 
achieved little at school, could be characterised as marginalised, but others had 
higher education qualifications or involvements and were seemingly both ‘integrated’ 
and personally ‘successful’. Sidique Khan, with his wife and child, qualifications and 
a good job, and the two people involved in the Glasgow Airport bombing, suggest 
that personal social circumstances and experiences cannot explain terrorist 
involvement. 
 
 Indeed, the varied social backgrounds of those involved in British Islamist terrorism 
means that, ‘the security services can identify neither a uniform pattern by which a 
process occurs nor a particular type that is susceptible’ 46. Here, it is clear that any 
suggested link between ethnic segregation or economic marginalisation and 
terrorism is misplaced, but also that ‘integration’ and apparent success is no 
guarantee of moderation. Some generalisations have been offered, such as in the 
Government’s ‘Draft Report on Young Muslims and Extremism’, which suggested 
that, ‘by and large most young extremists fall in to one or two groups: well-educated 
undergraduates or with degrees and technical professional qualifications in 
engineering or IT, or under-achievers with few or no qualifications, and often a 
criminal background 47. That does mirror what is known about Islamist extremists 
internationally, but sheds only limited light on how preventative policies should be 
targeted. Given that close to 50% of young Britons now go on to Higher Education, 
and that University participation rates for Pakistani and Bangladeshi young people 
are rising steadily, such profiling suggests a very large potential target group. This is 
also true for the increasing numbers of young Muslims involved in the criminal justice 
system, as discussed below. What is clear is that members of Britain’s Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities are having increasingly diverse experiences in relation to 
education and employment, with what can be termed ‘class differences’ becoming 
more apparent 48. 
 
Perhaps the key issue is not personal poverty or marginalisation, but perception by 
an individual, based on their acceptance of the Islamist ‘single narrative’ outlined 
above, that their people are marginalised and oppressed. However, which Muslims 
are likely to be attracted to this ‘single narrative’ is far from clear. Gupta (2008) 
outlines psychological explanations for terrorism in general, including Freud’s belief 
that unresolved sexual issues motivate a revolutionary to act against natural 
authority figures, based on a feeling of humiliation.  Such a simplistic equation of 
sexual frustration equals terrorism seems to be answered by the reality that many of 
the western-based Islamist terrorists have lived lives of sexual freedom, with many of 
the 9/11 and Madrid attackers being womanisers 49, and the 7/7 inquest identifying 
that Shezad Tanweer had a ‘secret affair’ with a girlfriend for three year, with his last 
meeting with her just days before the 7/7 bombings 50. Other non-Freudian 
psychologists focus on frustration/aggression, social learning and the attractions of 
‘group-think’ as possible explanations for violent extremism, but all available data 
suggests that those involved in Islamist violent extremism as ‘normal’ by the 
standards of psychological tests. 
 
 
Radicalisation: Mosques, ‘preachers of hate’ and recruiters? 
Much of the popular media discussion of the nature and causes of the Islamist terror 
threat has focussed on the role of some Mosques and so-called ‘Preachers of hate’, 
but caution is needed here over the role of Mosques. Many Islamists attracted to 
violent extremism had previously broken ties with local Mosques, either because 
their radical views meant that they were no longer welcome, or because the 
traditional and conservative approach, with sermons delivered in community 
languages, felt irrelevant to the interests of younger Muslims. Even in Mosques 
where illiberal social and political attitudes are seen as the norm, the link between 
such ‘extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’, a distinction problematically at the heart of 
government approaches to Prevent, is less clear. For the 7/7 bombers, the Mosque 
link does not stand up. Dissatisfaction with the irrelevance of the local Mosque and 
hostility from his family and local community to his ‘love marriage’ to an Indian origin 
woman form a different Muslim tradition led Sidique Khan and his associates in 
Beeston towards prayer and religious study meetings in local gyms and hired rooms, 
and to the performing of religious marriage ceremonies in the local radical ‘Iqr’a’ 
bookshop 51. This mirrors the experiences of many young British Muslims, leading 
some to seek their own understanding and practice of being a ‘Muslim’ away from 
Mosques, in political groups, community-based meetings with invited preachers, or in 
informal study circles, all of which have provided great opportunity for radicalisation 
unchecked by community scrutiny or norms. 
 
It is, however, clear from media investigations that some Mosques have been sites 
of extreme political, religious and social attitudes being expressed. This was 
illustrated by the ‘Wikileaks’ disclosures of American secret intelligence files relating 
to Islamist prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, which focussed on the role in 
radicalisation of Finsbury Park Mosque: the Guantanamo files disclose that by the 
late 1990s, the mosque in north London had become a ‘haven’ for extremism where 
disaffected young men from around the world were radicalised before being sent to 
al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan’ 52. The files suggested that at least 35 
Muslims, evenly split between Britons and foreign radicals granted asylum in Britain, 
were further radicalised at the mosque through viewing propaganda and preaching 
by key figures such as Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada, both of whom were foreign 
nationals granted asylum. Here, the British network of extreme Islamists was 
enlarged by the presence of a significant number of exiled Islamist radicals from 
North Africa and the Middle East in Britain, especially in London. This presence was 
the direct result of political approaches to Asylum policy in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when the British government granted leave to remain to such activists, 
believing that it was better to have them living in the open and under surveillance in 
Britain. However, for many commentators this allowed an extremist free for all, with 
the extreme attitudes of such activists influencing young British Muslims as well as 
other exiles, and turning the British capital in to ‘Londonistan’ 53, as well as spreading 
their radical influence nationally. 
 
As suggested above though, radical Mosques such as Finsbury Park, now purged of 
extremism and under the control of a new management committee, have been an 
exception, and other sources of radicalisation within Muslim communities need to be 
analysed. These include ‘preachers of hate’, radical political groups, prisons, and the 
internet. Many of the most ‘extreme’ preachers and speakers within Muslim 
communities are banned from Mosques and speak at community centres and other 
meeting places: ’It is very likely that Germaine Lindsay was ‘introduced to (Sidique) 
Khan through his associations with the radical preacher Abdullah al-Faisal’ 54, who 
spoke twice in Beeston prior to being jailed in 2003 for Incitement to Racial Hatred. 
The head of the Hamara community agency in Beeston employing Sidique Khan was 
also linked to the appearance of radical preachers at venues in Leeds.  Oliver Roy, 
one of the world’s leading analysts of modern Islamist militancy, suggests that 
‘Islamist preachers have replaced far-left militants and social workers’ in being 
influential upon marginalised Muslim youth in western countries 55. Intermeshed with 
the influence of such preacher-led meetings has been the role of Islamist political 
groups, something that has grown significantly in Britain over the two decades since 
the ‘Satanic Verses’ controversy and the first Gulf War. Hizb-ut Tahrir (HUT), or the 
‘party of liberation’, has been a group with origins in the ideologies of Qutb and 
Mawdudi and a belief in the re-establishment of the ‘Caliphate’ or pan-Islamic state. 
Operating in English and working across any traditional Muslim factional lines has 
made it attractive to some young Muslims, with HUT campaigning for Muslims to 
boycott democratic participation in wider society. The founder of the British branch of 
HUT, Omar Bakri Muhammed, went on to establish the even more militant Al-
Muhajiroun. That group and its offshoots have staged high profile stunts, such as the 
demonstration against British troops returning home from Afghanistan to Luton that 
sparked the establishment of the EDL 56. 
 
It seems highly likely now that Sidique Khan initially made contact with other 
Islamists, such as Omar Khyam and the two Derby-based Israel suicide bombers 
through Al-Muhajiroun circles, such as Omar Bakhri hosting a fundraising barbeque 
in London, the proceeds of which enabled Omar Khyam and Sidique Khan to travel 
to the Pakistani/Afghan border for military training in 2003.A significant number of the 
members of such Islamist political groups have previously been involved in far-left 
groups  such as the Socialist Workers Party, becoming disillusioned with their lack of 
focus on Muslim faith and political concerns. Ex-HUT activist Ed Husain describes 
the attractions of a Muslim-focussed group operating in English and overtly 
concerned with political issues like Palestine/Israel which Mosques and older 
members of Muslim communities wanted to downplay. Former senior HUT official 
Shiraz Maher has used the illegal drugs analogy to characterise HUT and similar 
groups as ‘gateway’ organisations to Islamist violent extremism, not advocating 
violence themselves but radicalising individuals and putting them in close touch with 
others in ways that can facilitate further small group or cell radicalisation 57. This role 
has led to the banning of Al-Muhajiroun and its successors, and calls post-7/7 for the 
banning of HUT, a controversial political stance in a situation where the BNP have 
elected councillors and MEPs nationally, and the English Defence League has been 
allowed to stage provocative public rallies. 
 
Political groups such as HUT have been successful particularly in attracting 
educated young Muslims towards radical Islamism, with activity on the campuses of 
Universities and Further Education colleges a central plank of their activity. Social 
movement theory suggests that this is a very traditional way for radical political 
movements to grow, as they are often based around educated but politically 
frustrated young people 58. To date, at least six different members of British 
University Islamic societies have been convicted of terrorism offences amidst 
concern that radical Islamist political meetings and viewings of Islamist propaganda 
DVDs on campuses has created  ‘mood music’ that provides the context for the 
further radicalisation of a minority of Muslim students.  
 
A key route to radicalisation for more marginalised young British Muslims has been 
Islamist activity within prisons and Young Offenders Institutes (YOIs). Muktar Said 
Ibrahim, the ringleader of the 21/7 failed bomb plot, was radicalised whilst 
imprisoned in Feltham YOI in West London and then sought out combat training in 
Afghanistan. Similarly, Richard Reid converted to Islam whilst in prison in the 1990s 
in an echo of the conversion of many Black American prisoners to the Nation of 
Islam 59. There have been between 100 and 200 Muslims in British prisons for 
terrorist-related offences at different points over the last few years at the same time 
as the number of people in prisons/YOIs identified as Muslims has been rising 
generally. This has created inter-related concerns around the management of these 
radicals, but also around the further radicalisation of ‘normal’ Muslim prisoners, and 
even the conversion to Islam in its radical form by other prisoners. The concern that 
Islamists committed to violent extremism are still a threat whilst incarcerated is well-
founded, with research in to such prisoners in both the UK and Spain suggesting 
both that such networks can use prison as organisational and educational bases as 
the IRA or the Basque ETA previously did, and prey on vulnerable prisoners to 
convert and/or radicalise them 60. One of the key Madrid bombers appears to have 
been radicalised during an earlier prison spell. Caution is needed over the rate of 
conversions to Islam, as factors such as group protection or even food preferences 
may also be involved, but it is clear prisons are a site of tension around Islamic 
radicalisation. 
 
Group Dynamics 
All the available data of young Muslims for Britain and other western countries who 
have become involved in Islamist violent extremism not only suggests that there is 
no single economic or educational ‘profile’ of such terrorists, but also that 
psychologically these people appear to be ‘normal’. In analysing British Islamist 
terrorism, Jason Burke highlights ‘the apparent banality of the men who perpetrate 
it’61. The question, therefore, is why a small number of people are able and willing to 
make the journey towards the most extreme acts of violence. The suggestion here is 
that the answer is in group dynamics and peer pressure, rather than in individual 
characteristics. If this is true, it casts serious doubts on attempts to ‘profile’ possible 
Islamist terrorists in advance of events: ‘it is the psychology of the group, not the 
individual that is key’ 62. Social Psychologist Scott Atran has spent many years 
researching terrorism and suicide bombings, including the 2004 Madrid and 2002 
Bali Islamist attacks. He concludes that ‘small group dynamics can trump individual 
personality to produce horrific behaviour in ordinary people’ 63. For instance, 5 of the 
7 Madrid bombers came from the same small area of a housing estate in Tetuan, 
Morocco, with 5 of their other friends having previously gone to Iraq to fight as 
jihadis. Similarly, ‘the Bali plot...spewed from a tangled web of discipleship, kinship 
and marriage, social networks of Afghan alumni and other friends, and not really 
from any command and control organisation’ 64. The input of ‘Al-Qaeda central’ 
based in Pakistan on the Bali plot was minimal, and all the evidence from the Madrid 
plot was that they had nothing to do with it. Instead, for Scott Atran, the Madrid 
conspiracy developed from the group dynamics amongst a group of North Africans 
who together regularly watched emotive jihadist material and who had a charismatic 
central figure. This saw a coming together of Islamists and petty criminals, with the 
criminals actually coming to the fore as the plot took on a momentum of its own. A 
close analysis of this plot leads Atran to focus on how small groups can ‘self-
radicalise’ simply through discussion and the viewing of video/online imagery and 
then develop terrorist plans. Group psychology and dynamics are crucial, with 
psychology evidence suggesting that ‘to stand alone and resist conforming may be 
emotionally costly’ 65.  
 
That perspective draws on evidence such as Hannah Arendt’s study of the 
Holocaust and the German roles within it that highlighted the ‘banality of evil’, 
something confirmed by the later experiments of Stanley Milgram which showed 
volunteers willing to torture in response to orders. A key facet of the Madrid plot was 
how much time the plotters spent together in the months beforehand, something 
mirrored in the 9/11 plot that involved 3 of the 4 key suicide pilots being close friends 
together from student days together in Hamburg, Germany. They had attempted to 
become jihadis together in Afghanistan, and when they returned, they spent much of 
their time praying together and watching extreme Islamist video material. Here, the 
small Islamist group became their world, as it appears to have done for other groups 
of plotters. The three 7/7 bombers from Beeston in south Leeds spent a great deal of 
time together in local gyms, youth projects and the radical ‘Iqr’a’ bookshop, praying, 
watching videos and discussing Islamist perspectives with friends. This was 
cemented with the bonding experience of a white-water canoeing trip to Wales, just 
as the 21/7 attackers took part in an outdoor terrorist training/preparation trip in the 
Lake District and the Crevice plotters undertook a similar trip to Pakistan. Such 
intense group experiences helped to develop the central importance of the group 
and its concerns to their individual lives, making the further movement towards more 
extreme political positions and ideas for action seem natural and normal. In such 
ways, such small groups of radicalised young Muslims are undergoing a similar 
process of group formation and development as those people involved in religious 
‘cults’ or extreme political groups, with the group becoming their life. The suggestion 
that the 7/7 attackers had together been ‘brainwashed’, by themselves or anyone 
else, has been dismissed on the basis that they all individually carried on with their 
normal lives, but it is clear that they ,’had hidden the most important part of their lives 
from their parents, their families and from many of their friends’ 66. This may well 
have been a long-term strategy for Sidique Khan, with one of his former teachers 
‘Luke’ commenting that: at school ‘he came over as clever but careful - he 
guarded his image carefully’. 
 
A key part of the small group dynamics central to these Islamist plots has been the 
role of a charismatic leader. For the 7/7 attackers, this clearly was Sidique Khan. 
Older than the others, he already had a lot of status within Beeston’s Muslim 
community through his youth work, and his role in the ‘Mullah boys’ who had 
successfully worked against the influence of hard drugs in the preceding decade. 
Both Tanweer and Hussain attended youth activities run by Khan at the ‘Hamara 
Youth Access Point’, as well as meetings and sessions at the ‘Iqr’a' bookshop and 
local gyms. From when Hussain had been about 14 years old, Khan had been 
regularly visiting him at home to talk and prey with him, a relationship that in 
retrospect might be regarded as a form of ‘grooming’.  Similarly, Germaine Lindsay is 
described by ‘Patrick’, someone who was very close to him and his family during 
Germaine’s childhood, as ‘very intelligent but very vulnerable’, someone who could 
be influenced by charismatic older figures. Despite not pursuing education past the 
age of 16, Lindsay showed himself to be very academically talented, as well as an 
impressive sportsman. That talent, his good looks and enquiring mind all suggested 
that he could be whatever he wanted to be, but instability was a feature throughout 
his life. Never really knowing his biological father, who remained in Jamaica, 
Germaine experienced further instability as stepfathers moved on and his young 
sister went to live with her father. This culminated in his mother leaving him to live 
alone at the age of 17, when she emigrated to the USA after marrying a man she 
had never previously met. That marriage and abandonment of Germaine followed 
the conversion to Islam by both mother and son, with Germaine’s mother having 
been a long-term religious ‘seeker’ who had moved through a number of different 
Christian churches and sects. Patrick remembers Germaine talking of Muslim 
‘friends’ at that time, ‘but those friends were converters’, almost certainly older 
Muslim radicals, possibly African-Caribbean converts as Germaine then became, 
who preyed on his vulnerability, rather than school age, Asian-origin friends. 
Evidence suggests that Germaine fell under the influence of African-Caribbean 
convert and Islamist extremist Abdullah el-Faisal, and it was at one of his talks in 
Yorkshire that Germaine first met Sidique Khan, a more local mentor figure. 
 
Other British Islamist plots have had a clear ring-leader or charismatic figure, such 
as Omar Khyam for the ‘Crevice’ plot, and for the Madrid attacks such a figure was 
Sehane Fakhet, ‘the Tunisian’, who inspired the successful coming together of a very 
ramshackle group of individuals. Such charismatic individuals clearly form the key 
role of terrorist ‘leader’, or the ‘political entrepreneur’ who ‘frames’, explains and sells 
political explanations and proposed remedies to ‘followers’ 67.  This role had already 
been identified prior to 7/7 by the British government through its analysis of previous 
plots domestically and abroad: ‘The Security Service has some evidence that those 
who go on to become involved in terrorist-related activity have been radicalised as a 
result of associating with loose networks that revolve around a respected key 
individual’ 68. 
 
Whilst this focus on small group dynamics and the role of charismatic leaders within 
them, appears very convincing, they do not help explain the individuals who have 
planned and carried out Islamist terror acts entirely alone. A good example is 
Roshanara Choudhry, who stabbed her local MP Stephen Timms in May 2010 in 
response to his support for the invasion of Iraq, and whose radicalisation seemed to 
be solely based around viewing of Islamist images and information via the internet. 
In particular, she obsessively listened to and watched sermons and speeches by 
American-born Islamist radical Anwar al-Awlaki, finding his websites without any 
help, and viewing the material alone, as well as viewing other jihadist material : ‘I 
was looking at YouTube videos about the resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq… I 
didn’t want to tell anyone because I know that if anybody else knew, they’d get into 
trouble, ‘cos then they would be implicated in whatever I do, so I kept it a secret’ 69. 
Other examples are Major Nadal Malik Hassan who killed fellow soldiers stationed at 
Ford Hood in Texas, USA and Farouk Abdulmutallab, the ‘underpants bomber’ who 
tried to explode a bomb sewn in to his trousers on a plane landing in Detroit, USA in 
2009. Both of those individuals had been in internet contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, 
based in Yemen, although ‘it was likely that they sought out the popular internet 
preacher because they were already radicalised to the point of wanting further 
guidance to act’ 71. Such radicalisation can come from repeated viewing of Islamist 
material on the internet, with Germaine Lindsay having already raised concerns 
whilst still at Rawthorpe High School in Huddersfield through his attempts to find 
websites celebrating the 9/11 attacks 71. It is clear from these discussions of 
radicalisation and of the small group processes within it, that viewing of Islamist 
material on DVD or via the internet has played a crucial role. However, any policy 
responses have to acknowledge that a lot of these emotive images are actually 
carried by mainstream media outlets that repeat them throughout news cycles, so 
negating the need for Islamists to search for other sources. 
 
Conclusion: No easy answers 
This Chapter has outlined how the phenomenon of young British Muslims committed 
to violent extremism defies easy or singular explanation – causation is multi-factorial, 
with the strong role played by small group or ‘cell’ dynamics and by the influence of 
charismatic leader figures within such groups meaning that individual,’ risk-based’ 
profiling is only likely to be of limited help. This suggests that any ‘hearts and minds’ 
policy approach, such as Prevent,  needs to be multi-pronged, nuanced and realistic 
about what it can and can’t achieve, as the example of a ‘lone wolf’ attacker such as 
Roshanara Choudhry indicates. Above all, it suggests that Prevent needs to be 
careful  to not further exacerbate some of these causal factors, such as by the over-
emphasis of singular ethnic or faith identities ,feeding the physical and cultural 
segregation that can allow ‘space’ for minorities within such singular identities to 
move further towards ‘extreme’ interpretations of that singular identity, and by 
fuelling the sense that this singular identity is under attack through policies 
specifically aimed at one identity or community. That analysis has been at the heart 
of the significant re-think of British policy approaches to ‘race relations’ and the 
relationship between common and community-specific identities since the 2001 riots 
and the consequent emergence of the community cohesion policy agenda. That 
cohesion analysis and agenda is examined in Chapter 2, and is used to develop the 
argument that Prevent has counter-productively failed to understand and utilise that 
cohesion analysis, rendering Prevent ‘between two stools’, whereby it is neither 
effective as a counter-terrorism strategy nor congruent with efforts to promote 
greater cohesion and integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Community Cohesion: A changed policy context 
 
 
Introduction: The changed policy context of Community Cohesion    
 
Chapter 1 outlined the significant threat of Islamist violent extremism which Britain 
has faced over the past decade, and which it is likely to continue to face for some 
time in the future. The key concern of this book is how effective to date the resulting 
policy and practice responses to ‘preventing violent extremism’ have been, and what 
lessons can be drawn for the direction and emphasis of future policy. To make sense 
of those specific policy responses it is important to examine the wider context of 
Britain’s increasingly diverse multicultural society and the significant changes to the 
language and emphasis of ‘race relations’ policies 1, governmental approaches to 
managing relationships between different ethnic groups and their places in wider 
British society, that have taken place since the watershed moment of the 2001 riots 
in three towns and cities across northern England. 
 
One of the most controversial aspect of this undoubted shift of emphasis within race 
relations policy approaches has been the governmental belief that past policy 
approaches hardened and enabled, to an unhelpful extent, the development of 
separate ethnic or faith identities at the expense of commonality and community 
cohesion. The meaning and practice of this new policy priority of community 
cohesion, and its implications for the British state’s approach to distinct ethnic or faith 
communities, is the focus of the first part of this Chapter. For many critics, this 
community cohesion policy agenda has really been about Britain’s perceived ‘Muslim 
problem’ 2, with the 2001 riots largely involving young Muslims and the community 
cohesion concern apparently focusing on the physical and cultural separation of 
British Muslim communities. That Muslim separation, and the increasingly strong 
communal self-identification as ‘Muslims’, allegedly at the expense of wider 
identification with and loyalty to ‘Britishness’ 3 is explored in the second part of the 
Chapter. Here, primary research data and wider academic evidence around the 
strength, meaning/s and possible implications of ‘Muslim’ identification’ in Britain are 
considered. These discussions not only shed light on the discussions in Chapter 1 
about what faith identification means for British Muslims and how they are 
understanding and living it, but also  address the issue of Muslim acceptance of 
‘Britishness’. This provides a starting point for the consideration in later Chapters of 
how Prevent policies to date have impacted on British Muslims, and how they might 
be more effective in the future. 
 
The 2001 Riots and their aftermath 
The violent disturbances in several towns and cities across the north of England 
during the summer of 2001 can be seen as a watershed for British policy in that the 
official government analysis of the events prompted a distinct new direction for race 
relations policy approaches 4. Each of the 2001 outbreaks of violent disorder was 
largely dominated by young Muslim men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in 
conflict with the Police, and on some occasions with white young men. Violent 
disorder in Oldham, Greater Manchester between 24th and 28th May was followed by 
similar scenes in the Harehills area of Leeds on 5th June and in Burnley, Lancashire 
between 21st and 23rd June. The most serious rioting occurred in Bradford, West 
Yorkshire on 7/8th July, when the heightened atmosphere created by the threat of a 
far-right BNP incursion in to the British city with the largest proportion of Muslim 
residents led to extremely intense rioting by young Muslim men that resulted in 326 
Police officers being injured, and estimated £6 million pounds of damage, and very 
severe prison sentences for many of those convicted for their roles. Many other 
towns and cities in the ex-industrial north and Midlands were viewed as being at risk 
of riots over the same period, with the common thread for the areas so assessed 
being significant Muslim populations living in concentrated local areas 5.  
 
To some commentators, this outbreak of violence amongst ethnic communities seen 
as law-abiding in previous times was no surprise, and was explicitly connected to the 
Islamist violent extremism which emerged in Britain in the following years. The ’30 
year rule’ was identified by some in relation to immigrant communities in Britain: it 
takes about 30 years for a sizeable second generation to establish itself and then 
become frustrated with its status, both within its own community and the wider 
society’ 6. This was true of the African Caribbean community that had started to 
arrive in Britain after the Second World War, and which experienced significant youth 
unrest from the mid-1970s onwards, culminating in their pivotal role in the 1981 and 
1985 inner city riots. A further parallel is the socio-economic status of the Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi communities representing the bulk of Britain’s Muslims. 
Educational under-achievement and especially unemployment rates, are much 
higher for Britons of those backgrounds than the national average, and especially 
compared to the white population. Relevant here is the ‘human capital’ of the first 
generation of Muslim settlers, their concentration in industrial areas of the north that 
have witnessed profound de-industrialisation and growing social exclusion, and the 
effects of racism that has increasingly concentrated on Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
origin populations as the most culturally distinct from the white norm 7. Certainly, the 
answer to the question of why riots happened in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, 
rather than in areas of the Midlands or southern England, must focus on the 
profound economic marginalisation experienced by both Muslim and white working 
class communities in those and neighbouring northern ex-industrial towns that have 
seen little development of a viable post-industrial economy. However, some 
commentators saw this 2001 rioting as less about economic experiences, than as a 
result of mistaken, multiculturalist social policy approaches that had allowed distinct 
and oppositional communities and identities to grow, Muslim ‘ghettos’ that had little 
connection with or loyalty to wider British society: ‘multiculturalism had a dual appeal; 
it allowed these states to seem tolerant by showering minorities with rights while 
segregating them from, rather than absorbing them in to, the rest of society’8. 
 
It is certainly true that the resulting national and local government inquiries in to the 
2001 disturbances were much more interested in the longer-term situation around 
ethnic segregation than in the facts and detail of what had actually happened. The 
government established a ‘Community Cohesion Review Team’ under the leadership 
of Ted Cantle, and its resulting report focussed heavily on long-term issues and 
national implications, with a urgent  need to promote ‘community cohesion’. Local 
Inquiries were carried out in Oldham and Burnley 9, whilst a review of ethnic relations 
in Bradford prepared before the July 2001 riots was published shortly afterwards 10. 
These local reports had a more substantial but still limited focus on the actual 
events, meaning that taken together, the post-riots inquiries had the impact of 
downplaying specific local causal factors, such as persistent political agitation by far-
right groups in Oldham and Bradford, clumsy and ineffective policing in both the lead 
up to and during rioting, and irresponsible local media coverage. Therefore, it is hard 
to avoid the conclusion that the 2001 riots provided national government with the 
moment to move forward on an agenda they were already considering 11 because of 
longer-term concern about ethnic separateness within British society. 
 
The emergence of Community Cohesion 
The Cantle Report proposed that Government prioritise the development of greater 
community cohesion as a response to the ethnic segregation and racial tensions, the 
‘parallel lives’, identified by the riots and the resulting inquiries. Here, the suggestion 
was that Britain’s multiculturalism was less successful in creating a positive and 
pluralist society than had previously been assumed, and that new approaches were 
urgently needed to prevent the current divides and tensions from worsening. This 
analysis was immediately accepted by national government, with community 
cohesion rapidly becoming both a priority in its own right and a central plank in the 
government’s wider Racial Equality strategy 12. Advice was given to local authorities 
and other public bodies to promote and measure community cohesion, with evidence 
that this focus on community cohesion was gradually becoming embedded within the 
core priorities of government at all levels 13. To date, this priority has outlasted the 
previous Labour government, with the Coalition government elected in May 2010 
continuing to highlight its importance, although seeming to increasingly favour the 
term ‘integration’ rather than community cohesion. 
 
‘Community cohesion’ was a new policy term that appeared to have been rapidly 
adapted from literature on social/economic cohesion. Through analysis, both of the 
literature around it, and the policy implementation of it, a number of key themes can 
be identified: 
 Ethnic segregation and ‘parallel lives’ 
 Problematic bonding social capital 
 The role of ‘agency’ both in causing and overcoming segregation 
 The impact of past policy approaches 
 The need for ‘cooler’ identities and more emphasis on commonality 
 
The most controversial aspect of community cohesion has been its inter-related 
focus on the ‘fact’ of substantial ethnic segregation in Britain and on the considerable 
role of ‘agency’ within it. All the areas experiencing riots and/or racial tension in 2001 
had significant levels of ethnic segregation, as measured by Indexes of Isolation and 
Dissimilarity. The picture painted here was one of very considerable physical and 
cultural segregation, white and ethnic minority, mainly Muslim, communities living 
‘parallel lives’ with only the most cursory and superficial of cross-community 
interactions. This was supported by data about multi-racial towns and cities in 
general, and about increasing levels of ethnic segregation in British schools 14. 
Research amongst young people in such northern towns and cities has highlighted 
how young people see their lives and areas as rigidly segregated, with ‘race’ and 
generic territorialism combining to create powerful sense of local ‘borders’ and the 
need to violently defend them 15. Much of the academic heat over this issue has 
come from the implicit suggestion of the cohesion reports that ethnic segregation is 
getting worse, and that it is voluntary to a very significant extent.  Carefully 
researched responses 16 have suggested that generally the reverse is true, and that 
this reality is obscured by significant demographic differences between ethnic 
communities. Some of that evidence is disputed, with the trend on segregation in 
Bradford hotly contested 17, but this diverts from the reality that the community 
cohesion reports were focussing on, namely that ethnic segregation was already 
very profound in many areas. Here, community cohesion can be seen as a mark of 
the frustration that such ethnic segregation is not obviously breaking down, but 
instead may be ‘normalising’. Underpinning this, of course, is a reality often not 
acknowledged by politicians that the most profound form of social segregation in 
modern Britain is that based on social class 18. 
 
Central to this concern with segregation is the concept of problematic ‘bonding social 
capital’. The work of Putnam (2000) and others has popularised the concept of social 
capital, with it becoming central to the social policy strategies of Britain and other 
western countries. However, in advocating the importance to individual and 
community well-being of strong and inclusive community networks, Putnam 
distinguishes two types of social capital. ‘Bonding’ social capital is the traditional 
form of community – the communities we all feel part of because of where we live 
and the social class, ethnic and faith backgrounds we have- ‘people like us’. This has 
many strengths, but can on its own be dangerously insular and prejudiced against 
any sort of external difference. It needs to be balanced by forms of ‘bridging’ capital 
– networks and links that allow us to positively interact with people and areas that 
are different to us, so learning from and understanding ‘others’ more, and enabling 
access to jobs and contacts outside of our own communities. The analysis of 
community cohesion is clearly that in a situation in many towns and cities of largely 
monocultural communities and ‘parallel lives’, too few Britons have ‘bridging’ capital 
links, so fuelling mutual distrust, fear and lack of respect. The solution for community 
cohesion is to find ways of building contact, dialogue and links across ethnic lines 
between individuals and groups in all sorts of ways, with this positively building 
mutual understanding and respect, and shared understandings and identities 
through a greater focus on commonality. The concurrent attempts by leading 
politicians of all parties to promote and positively discuss notions of a modern, 
inclusive ‘Britishness’, and to ensure that all new British citizens understand basic 
English language and cultural norms can be understood as consistent with this policy 
focus. 
 
In outlining this apparent reality of significant ethnic segregation and the consequent 
lack of ‘bridging’ social capital in many apparently ‘multicultural’ areas of Britain, 
community cohesion puts considerable stress on the ‘agency’ or responsibility of 
individuals and communities.  The reports do not overtly suggest that community 
preferences are responsible for ethnic segregation, as individual and institutional 
white racism was clearly central to the development of segregated housing areas in 
towns such as Oldham. However, the Introduction to the Ouseley report in to ethnic 
relations in Bradford talked bluntly of ‘a worrying drift towards self-segregation’, and 
even the Commission for Racial Equality, the then-government agency charged with 
ensuring racial equality, focussed on ‘congregation’, or voluntary clustering, amongst 
the Muslim communities of Oldham, Bradford and Burnley 19. Whilst the community 
cohesion reports were clearly even-handed in blaming attitudes and behaviour in 
communities of all ethnic backgrounds, some critics have detected a one-sided 
focus on the ‘cultures’ of ethnic minorities, and especially Muslims, as problematic. It 
is indeed true that community cohesion has called for greater use of the English 
language by all citizens, and challenged Asian communities to look carefully at the 
continuance of sub-Continental marriage links and prolonged family visits in relation 
to the continued educational under-achievement of many young Muslims 20.  Rather 
than a lurch back to the assimilationism of the early 1960s, this arguably represents 
an honest and politically-consistent discussion around rights and responsibilities with 
communities made up of citizens, not ‘immigrants’. The suggestion of community 
cohesion is that too often individuals and organizations of all ethnic backgrounds 
have accepted de facto ethnic segregation, and hardened it through their personal 
choices over housing, schooling and leisure. Consistent with wider New Labour 
social policy 21, community cohesion takes a communitarianist approach in believing 
that the state alone cannot make people of different backgrounds get on together, 
and that communities have to play an active and responsible role in the process of 
coming together and creating shared dialogue and interests. That ideological 
position explains the reluctance of governments to promote greater cohesion by 
insisting that schools or housing areas become more ethnically-mixed, although that 
may have been an implicit goal of the programme ‘Building Schools for the Future’ 
that sought to create new High Schools in areas of educational underachievement. 
 
Underpinning this community cohesion understanding of the state of British ethnic 
relations, and the remedies needed is a critique of previous state policy approaches 
to ‘race relations’. This criticism has been wrongly and unhelpfully extended by 
others to a blaming of ‘multiculturalism’ per se 22, but the cohesion analysis actually 
focuses on the enhanced ‘political multiculturalism’ phase of policy that developed in 
response to the 1981 riots and the profound ethnic marginalisation that they 
highlighted. In keeping with policy generally in this area, political multiculturalism 
approaches developed organically from below in response to community demands 
as much as they did through national government guidelines. They involved much 
greater efforts to tackle the significant ethnic minority educational underachievement, 
racial discrimination and marginalisation in service delivery, as well as to promote 
ethnic minority employment in the state sector. Central to this was the approach of 
‘ethnic monitoring’, the measuring of the position of each ethnic group and progress 
for them, which culminated in the inclusion of an ethnicity question for the first time in 
the 1991National Census .Such data enabled target setting by public organisations 
for greater ethnic equality, and training and action plans to make progress on 
achieving those targets in relation to ethnic minority employment, participation or 
service delivery. This necessarily encompassed a policy concern with greater 
‘equality’ for each separate ethnic group, a concern with different ‘needs’ and 
requirements, at the expense of a focus on commonality. This justified, and much-
needed at the time, approach of ethnicity-based measurement and action has 
brought significant progress towards greater ethnic equality in Britain over the past 
three decades, but has involved a ‘strategic essentialism’ 23, a policy acceptance of 
distinct ethnic or ,increasingly, faith groups. This was cemented from the early 1980s 
onwards by enhanced funding by national and local funding for ethnic specific 
organisations and their facilities. Such an approach was partially in recognition of 
past ethnic minority marginalisation from public service provision, but also a policy 
attempt in the wake of inner-city riots to ensure compliant minority communities 
through the control of a layer of ‘community leaders’ that could speak for and  
informally police ‘their’ communities 24. Community cohesion understands this 
approach to ensuring ethnic equality as having a distinct downside, the promotion of 
separate ethnic identities, facilities and concerns, and consequent damage to 
notions and experiences of commonality. Whilst having been a necessary policy 
approach previously, it arguably now needs to be re-calibrated and-re-balanced. This 
nuanced position of Cantle, and the consequent government decision to both accept 
his analysis and to move away from further use of the term ‘multiculturalism’, now 
deemed unhelpful, proved to be a green light for long-term opponents of 
multiculturalism per se to blame it for any difficulties regarding ethnic minority 
citizens in Britain. 
 
Implicit in this community cohesion concern with common values and needs, and a 
shared identity is the belief that policy needs to encourage and enable more de-
centred and intersectional forms of ‘identity’. Here, in a genuinely diverse and 
multicultural society, ‘hot’ forms of strong, essentialised identities must, of necessity, 
become somewhat ‘cooler’ and more flexible if society is to work peacefully and 
positively 25. Arguably, the last Labour government developed and used the human 
rights framework of individual rights and responsibilities to balance the continued 
focus on group rights and identities enshrined in equality legislation. This approach 
suggests that the rights and equality of any ethnic or religious group must be 
balanced by their responsibility to accept the equal rights of people with different 
values and lifestyles, and that no one form of identity can be seen to ‘trump’ others 
or be used to police or speak on behalf of them. It also suggests that policy will, of 
necessity, be in conflict with any community identities claimed as more important 
than common forms of national citizenship, perhaps providing the context for why 
recent British policy concerns with ‘race relations’ have appeared to focus on 
Muslims over and above the need to ‘prevent violent extremism’. 
 
Community Cohesion in practice 
The themes of community cohesion outlined above have been highly-contested, but 
the considerable academic criticism has drawn almost exclusively on analysis of the 
content and discourse of community cohesion reports, policy documents and 
accompanying ministerial pronouncements 26. Very little empirical evidence of how 
community cohesion has actually been understood and implemented has been 
produced, and the empirical data that has been produced has too often been 
studiously ignored. As with previous phases of multiculturalism, the approaches to 
community cohesion have been developed as much through practice on the ground 
as through national government guidance or directive. Research by the author as to 
how youth workers in Oldham understood and worked with community cohesion in 
the wake of the 2001 riots there found strong support for, and acceptance of, the key 
themes outlined above 27. The aims and content of their professional practice with 
young people had altered significantly as a result, with community cohesion 
becoming a major priority. The focus for their cohesion work was the promotion of 
‘meaningful direct contact’ between young people of different ethnic backgrounds, 
with such contact built in to all their work. This was done through the ‘twinning’ of 
youth projects serving diverse backgrounds, regular residential trips away to utilise 
neutral spaces, and events that brought young people from across the area together. 
Some of this focussed on wider efforts to promote young peoples’ empowerment and 
democratic participation through initiatives such as the Youth Parliament scheme. 
Key to this community cohesion practice was young people’s voluntary participation 
in this ‘direct contact’, and that the contact was built around experiential, fun 
activities, and shared experiences and interests, rather than differences. However, 
the charge that community cohesion is a new form of assimilationism that demands 
the disappearance of distinct identities was refuted by this research. Instead of 
denying difference, youth workers were working with and positively accepting the 
distinct ethnic, social and faith identities held by young people and their 
communities, augmenting these identities with over-arching common identities, 
rather than seeking to replace them. Within this, preparation was done in local, often 
ethnic-specific groups and facilities, with such security used as a spring-broad for 
involvement in cohesion programmes of direct contact. 
 
It must be acknowledged that the stress on direct cross-ethnic contact, both in this 
case study work in Oldham, and in national community cohesion strategies is 
controversial, with any relationship between  increased cross-ethnic contact and 
prejudice reduction highly contested. Some critics actually see increasing ethnic 
diversity itself as problematic and likely to lead to growing social rifts and tensions. In 
an influential essay 28, David Goodhart  drew on the work of  ‘social capital’ theorist 
Robert Putnam 29  to suggest that Britain’s increasing ethnic diversity was stoking 
tensions and undermining support for collective institutions such as the welfare state. 
Indeed, it must be acknowledged that ‘there is much evidence that intergroup contact 
does not necessarily reduce intergroup tension or prejudice and that it may even 
increase tension’.30 Such material suggests that interethnic contact in situations of 
societal tension or inequalities can intensify, rather than change, an individual’s initial 
attitude or disposition. Therefore, an individual already holding prejudiced attitudes 
towards the ‘other’ can have that deepened by interethnic contact. This can be 
particularly true if there is a clear difference in the perceived status of the two groups 
meeting, or if individuals participating have aggressive or unbalanced personality 
traits that will always dispose them towards prejudice. 
 
In the Oldham case study outlined above, community cohesion practice was utilising 
key elements of ‘contact theory’, a social psychology-based approach to prejudice 
reduction in situations of significant social divides and tensions 31. ‘Contact theory’ 
evidence from situations of profound segregation such as Northern Ireland, suggests 
that to make meaningful reductions in communal divisions, contact has to take place 
over time, be in groups to avoid tokenism, participants need to feel that they have 
choice and control within the process, to often take place in ‘safe’, neutral settings, 
and to involve no threat or disrespect to the identities or histories of those taking 
part. Here, ‘Contact theory’ would suggest that government is right to not ‘force’ 
people to live or mix together, as the perception of coercion could be counter-
productive. Certainly, evidence from attempts to engineer ‘socially mixed’ housing 
developments of privately-owned and publicly-rented housing in the UK is that this 
has often not been successful, and that community-building efforts focussed on 
relationships between distinct housing areas have been more successful. 32   What 
the academic evidence around interethnic contact also suggests is that, ‘in many 
contact situations it is not sufficient to bring the antagonistic groups into contact and 
that these groups should have or should be given superordinate goals to make them 
cooperate across group lines. Only such superordinate goals can make the contact 
effective, thereby reducing prejudice and group tension’. 33 This can be seen in the 
successful Muslim/white cooperation in political campaigns such as the anti-Iraq war 
campaign 34, or in the Oldham youth work case study discussed above, where 
residential trips focussed on teamwork and common youth issues. In both cases, 
superordinate goals and processes were central to successful interethnic contact. 
 
 The community cohesion youth work practice outlined above, and discussed in 
detail elsewhere 35, fulfils those conditions, so making possible a ‘rooting and shifting’ 
of individual identities and attitudes 36. Such practice does not deny racism and other 
forms of structural inequality, but also does not essentialise or reify particular forms 
of identity. The professionals guiding this work clearly acknowledged the reality of 
ethnic divides and of racism within the Oldham area, but also were ambivalent as to 
whether ‘race’ alone can explain the present or be the key to a more productive 
future. These processes of community cohesion were therefore also engaging with 
‘difference’ around geographical space, gender, social class , ability/disability and 
sexuality, so operationalizing the more complex and intersectional understandings of 
identity being signposted by national government policy. 
 
This complexity can be seen in the initial experimental ‘pathfinder’ community 
cohesion activity funded by central government, and in the advice given to local 
government as to the operationalisation of community cohesion 37. Recent research 
in to the operationalisation of community cohesion by Bradford and Kirklees local 
authorities in West Yorkshire identified cohesion to be a significant policy priority and 
there to be significant community support for continued progress on it. However, it 
also highlighted the challenge that community cohesion, with its complex and 
intersectional understandings of identity, poses to the existing equality and diversity 
policy agendas, of necessity based around essentialised and rather fixed notions of 
group identity and experience 38. 
 
Refusing Britishness? 
Whilst community cohesion in practice is accepting and working with distinct ethnic, 
faith-based and social identities, it is clear from the analysis above that this post-
2001 policy direction sees ‘hot’, separate communal identities that are potentially 
antagonistic to overarching national identity as problematic. The pivotal role of 
Muslim youth in the various 2001 violent disturbances, the 9/11 attacks that took 
place as the Community Cohesion Review Team gathered evidence, and the rapidly-
growing understanding that some young British Muslims were also being attracted to 
violent extremism, all contributed to a political focus on Muslims and their identity 
within the emergence of community cohesion 39. Whilst the community cohesion 
reports themselves were balanced in their equal focus on white racism and the need 
to strengthen measures against it, a broader ‘moral panic’ about Muslim identity and 
its threat to Britain grew alongside it, and arguably overtook it. This suggested that 
‘multiculturalism’ had enabled and encouraged separate and oppositional identities 
amongst ethnic minorities in general and Muslims in particular. Such separate 
identities were seen as threatening the social cohesion essential to Britain’s welfare 
state 40 and as having made the growth of a domestic terror threat more likely 41. The 
fact that community cohesion policy approaches no longer used the term 
‘multiculturalism’, and that even equality campaigners were prepared to attack the 
concept, fuelled such viewpoints. Trevor Phillips, then head of the government 
agency the Commission for Racial Equality (now subsumed within the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission),  condemned ‘multiculturalism’ for creating ethnic 
divisions and leaving Britain ‘sleepwalking towards segregation’, in a disastrously 
mis-judged speech made just weeks after the 7/7 attacks 42. Such a linkage was 
repeated by Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2011, when he used the 
Munich Conference on Security to launch a broad attack on multiculturalism and 
supposed Muslim separateness in general, rather than focus on the specific terror 
threat 43. 
 
This broad attack on distinct Muslim identity in Britain, and upon policy approaches 
that have supposedly encouraged it, has been further developed by right-of-centre 
commentators 43, and by various Conservative-leaning think tanks. Prominent 
amongst them was a report from ‘Policy Exchange’ 45 that painted a picture of 
radicalised young Muslims living increasingly separate lives. Surveying young British 
Muslims, the authors reported that ‘86% of respondents also believed that their 
religion was the most important thing in their life. When asked the same question, 
only 11% of the wider British population felt the same’ 46, and ‘7% said they admired 
organisations like Al-Qaeda’ 47. The blame for this apparent growth in a distinct 
religious identity amongst young Muslims was squarely laid at the door of 
‘multiculturalism’: ’it is the multicultural approach that pigeonholes people and 
pressures them to keep separate from the mainstream’ 48.  
 
It is undoubtedly true that claims on behalf of ‘Muslims’ as a distinct community and 
identity in Britain have grown markedly since the late 1980s. Prior to that, political 
claims were made by minority communities under the collective terms ‘Black’ or 
‘ethnic minority’, both intended to signify a common non-white experience of 
marginalisation and racism. Such terms were seen increasingly as irrelevant to the 
experiences of different south Asian communities 49, and the post 1981 phase of 
political multiculturalism responded by recognising and funding specific ethnic 
communities, such as African-Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Whilst that 
policy approach did not initially recognise faith as a form of identity, it helped to open 
the door to such claims being made through its focus on distinct, essentialised 
‘communities’. The watershed moment for the emergence of ‘Muslim’ as a distinct 
identity in Britain came in 1989, with the ‘Satanic Verses’ controversy over the 
controversial book of that name by Salman Rushdie 50.The specific Identity claims 
made by Muslims from there on fitted with the wider approach of political 
multiculturalism in its focus on specific ‘needs’ and demands of monolithic 
‘communities’, made on their behalf by layers of ‘community leaders’, so allowing 
British Muslims to ‘surf the wave of multiculturalism’ 51.  
 
The problem for Britain, according to another right-of- centre think tank , the Social 
Affairs Unit 52, was that the ‘Muslim’ ‘community leaders’ who stepped forward to 
utilise the twin opportunities of ‘Satanic Verses’ and ethnic-specific multiculturalist 
policy approaches was that they were unrepresentative Islamists with very specific 
political agendas. Often these groups and individuals were both funded from abroad, 
by states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and had links with international Islamist 
groups. This can be seen in the fact that the first British demonstration against 
Rushdie’s book was organised in December 1988 in Bolton, Lancashire by a 
Deobandi group with little local support, whilst the national anti-Rushdie campaign 
was co-ordinated by the Islamic Foundation that has close ties to the conservative 
Islamist group Jama’at -e -Islami. Utilising controversies like ‘Satanic Verses’, and 
filling the vacuum of the lack of effective national co-ordination or representation 
amongst Britain’s locally-focussed Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, Islamist 
individuals and groups quickly became self-appointed national spokesmen for British 
Muslims. An example here is the ‘Muslim Association of Britain’, highly prominent in 
the post-2003 ‘Stop the War’ coalition, but which was largely founded by activists of 
Arab origin who drew inspiration for their overtly political Islamist positions from the 
Egyptian-origin Muslim Brotherhood. The strategic networking  by Islamist-
dominated ‘Muslim’ groups with non-Muslim local authority officials and other ethnic 
minority groups enabled them to benefit from the broader political context of ‘political 
multiculturalism’, whilst their use of English and their overtly political approach made 
such Islamist groups and causes attractive to younger Muslims disillusioned with left-
wing groups. These ‘causes’, such as the first Gulf War, and the plight of Bosnian 
Muslims during the break-up of Yugoslavia, were energetically exploited, whilst 
domestic demands for greater accommodation of Muslim lifestyles connected to the 
emerging identity issues for younger British Muslims discussed below. 
 
 To a significant degree, previous policy approaches of ‘political multiculturalism’ 
have influenced this growth of a distinct British ‘Muslim’ identity, and its organised 
political forms. In 1981, Bradford Council energetically encouraged the formation of a 
city-wide umbrella body, Bradford Council of Mosques, but was then shocked that by 
1989 Islamist-influenced leaders were organising a public burning of Rushdie’s book 
that was broadcast world-wide and which did considerable damage to Bradford’s 
public image 53. Similarly, the national governments of both Conservative John Major 
and Labour’s Tony Blair actively encouraged the formation and funding of the 
‘Muslim Council of Britain’, built on a national network of Mosques, as the 
representative voice of British Muslims, despite the fact that that leading figures in 
this movement had close links to Jama’at-e-Islami, and were far from representative 
of most British Muslims whose traditions were a localised and spiritual form of Islam. 
The fact that in 2006 the then-Labour government broke off funding and official 
contact with the MCB after pro-Jihadi comments by a leading MCB official can be 
understood as a change in government policy, rather than a shift in the MCB’s 
outlook. 
 
The picture of British Muslims having a strong attachment to their faith as their 
primary form of identity, in contrast to the approach of other Britons, painted in the 
Policy Exchange report is seemingly borne out by other academic evidence, but how 
should we understand this – is this prima facie evidence of a problematic, separate 
identity that provides the pool from which a minority of faith-motivated terrorists can 
be drawn?  Research by the author and colleague Pete Sanderson in to the 
identifications favoured by young people of all ethnic backgrounds understand in the 
Oldham and Rochdale areas of Greater Manchester, used a variety of qualitative 
research approaches, including interviews, questionnaires, word associations and an 
‘Identity Ranking’ exercise to investigate these issues 54. It highlighted the stress 
Muslim young people put on their faith identification, in clear contrast to the approach 
of other young people, and in keeping with the findings of other research processes 
55: 
 
 
However, contrary to the claims of right-of-centre thinktanks, the majority of Muslim 
young people surveyed were positive about ‘British’ identity.  63% of those self-
identifying as ‘Muslim’ definitely agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to say that I 
am British’, and only 10% definitely disagreed. Whilst this was less than the 80% of 
Self-ascribed ethnicity Rank 
Religion  
1 or 2 (%) 
Rank 
English  
1 or 2 
(%) 
Rank 
British 
1 or 2 
(%) 
White British, English, White, White English, White 
Christian, British (N=57) 
7 75 56 
Asian Pakistani, British Muslim, Pakistani Kashmiri, 
Pakistani, British Asian, Bangladeshi/Bengali, 
British Bengali, British Asian (N=54) 
93 3 20 
Black African, Black British, Mixed Race, Other 
(N=16) 
44 56 44 
the non-Muslim young people who agreed with the same statement, the difference is 
arguably surprisingly limited, given the significant criticisms of and misgivings about 
British foreign policy of recent years, such as the interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, frequently expressed by Muslim young people during the research process.  In 
contrast to the ‘indifference’ about national identity found amongst young adults 
elsewhere 56, studies of young Muslims consistently find them clear and positive 
about British national identity. A survey of Pakistani-origin young people in Bradford 
found that: ‘Young people in this sample make clear that they consider themselves 
as ‘British’ as opposed to ‘Pakistani’ – 87% said they describe themselves as 
‘British’, 11% said they describe their identity as being ‘Pakistani’ and 2% as being 
English’ 57 
The data from Oldham and Rochdale on Muslims and national identity presented 
above supports this, and evidence from the 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey, 
which found that, ‘Muslims as a group, are only slightly less likely to feel that they 
belong to Britain than Whites and are, in fact, more likely to feel that they belong to 
Britain than those in the African-Caribbean group’ 58. The large majority of Muslim 
young people surveyed by the author and colleague described themselves as ‘British 
Muslim’ or ‘British Asian’, mirroring data gathered from a Bradford survey of 
Pakistani-origin young adults that detected a ‘bi-cultural’ affiliation 59. This type of 
national identity can be seen even more clearly in Scotland, where the necessity 
linked to devolution of discussing what ‘Scottishness’ means, and the associated 
process of building an authentic national identity has had positive impacts on non-
white ethnic minority willingness to associate positively with Scottishness, in clear 
contrast to feelings about ‘Englishness’ in England. Research amongst Scottish 
young people of Pakistani-origin as devolution became real 60 found that almost 60% 
used a ‘bi-cultural’ term to identify themselves, with ‘Scottish Pakistani’ the most 
popular. For that sample, there was no conflict between ‘Scottish’ and ‘Pakistani’, 
leading to the observation that: ‘hyphenation is still a much underused resource in 
the re-configuration of plural identities in Britain’ 61. 
 
Problematic Muslim Identity? 
 Although the allegation that young Muslims lack identity with, or loyalty to, Britain 
seems to be clearly misplaced, the strength of commitment to Islamic faith as their 
preferred form of identification, a stress on religion clearly at odds with other young 
Britons, does need to be understood further. One explanation is that this is a 
defensive identification in the face of very significant Islamophobic political and 
media discourse in the UK following 9/11 and 7/7. However, is this undoubtedly 
strong faith identification amongst young British Muslims also a development 
prompted by Islamist propaganda and political agitation? Does commitment to the 
‘ummah’, the global Muslim community of believers trump any professed loyalty to 
Britain, or to its values and democratic systems? In short, how worried should we be 
about such a strong communalist identity? 
 
Olivier Roy (2004) identifies that because of post-war immigration and the increasing 
effects of globalisation, one third of the world’s Muslims now live as a minority, many 
of them in western countries, and in that context, ‘Re-Islamisation' is part of this 
process of acculturation, rather than being a reaction against it’ 62. Here, the strong 
identification with Islamic identity for many young western Muslims is a product of the 
need to explicitly consider what being a Muslim means when it is no longer sustained 
by social authority and popular convention in the way it is in Muslim majority 
countries. This leads Roy to suggest that ’acculturation does not automatically entail 
integration. It also leads to the creation of dynamic and fluctuating sub-cultures, one 
of the most visible being a so-called ‘’ Muslim youth culture’’ ’ 63. This suggests that 
the strong identification with Muslim faith identity by young Britons is actually part of 
the increasing individualisation in western, and indeed, global, society, with such 
forms of solidarity and identity being a modern (re) creation rather than being a 
community import or reclamation from the past. Others agree that for the parental 
generation of British Muslims: ‘religion was a kind of social glue. For their children, 
however, religion takes on more individually oriented, spiritual and political 
dimensions… it is the backbone of a strong personal identity’64. Part of the emerging 
Muslim youth identity is their identification with the ‘ummah’, but emotional 
attachment to this concept ‘does not transcend residential segregation or marriage 
within ethnically bounded groups’ 65. That continuing, ethnically-focussed reality 
represents the significant maintenance of ethnic community ties and obligations, with 
youth re-workings of Islam arguably representing a way of moving on from that, as is 
discussed below. Much of the discussion of new technologies, such as satellite TV 
and the internet, has focussed on their potential for maintaining trans-national 
identities concerned with the country of origin of migrant communities at the expense 
of the host country. However, such technologies may well also be playing the role of 
creating the ‘imagined community’ of the Ummah, including its radical and potentially 
violent extremist form, for a small minority 66. 
 
There is clear evidence that much of the ‘re-Islamification’ of young British Muslims 
is more about negotiating their place as a younger, British-born generation and as a  
minority community in an increasingly secular society, rather than being a 
melancholic step backwards 67. This suggests that there is considerable progressive 
potential in this strong Muslim identification, as well as the danger that it can become 
a form of dangerous radicalisation for a few. A large-scale qualitative survey of 
young Muslims in Bradford 68 found that they regarded community and clan network 
norms and traditions as a very significant restriction on their modernist aspirations 
and lives. Such norms around gender roles, marriage partners, and individual choice 
were seen as historic community traditions that had been imported and which were 
no longer helpful or relevant. In this context, young people were arguing for changed 
possibilities with families and communities by, ‘appealing to Islam, with its insistence 
on a basic equality between all believers, to trump such parochial and restrictive 
loyalties’ 69. What young people are doing here is ‘de-coupling’ religion and culture 70 
in order to negotiate changed individual roles and relationships whilst maintaining 
relationships with, and places within, family and community. This supports Roy’s 
assertion that the strong faith identification of young western Muslims, including its 
minority radical Islamist form, is actually a modernist and individualistic, 
development, with this faith adherence being lived out individually, rather than 
through community norms, as de-coupling religion and culture leads to a greater 
focus on the religion itself. Relevant here is Chapter 1’s discussion of Sidique Khan’s 
own ostracism after a love match across community boundaries, his role in 
performing such marriages for others, and the fact that Islamist extremists have been 
much more likely to discuss Islam in private study groups and political organisations 
than in community-based Mosques: ‘most radical militants are engaged in action as 
individuals, cutting links with their ‘natural’ community’ 71. 
 
This suggests that the strong faith identity of young Muslims in Britain and other 
western countries is part of significant generational tension: ‘it is a conflict between 
tradition and individuality, culture and religion, tribalism and universalism, passivity 
and action’ 72.There may well be a substantial gender factor in the way that young 
British Muslims re-interpret a ‘true’ Islam that is de-coupled from ethnic culture. Here, 
the increased religiosity amongst young Muslim women, symbolised by the 
significant  growth in numbers wearing the ‘hijab’ headscarf, can be understood as a 
deployment of ‘true Islam’ to justify greater individual freedom, such as involvement 
in higher education and employment, and greater say in marriage partners 73.This is 
all of a piece with the increasingly strong and progressive role played by young 
Muslim women in community organisation and provision. In contrast, the ‘Muslim’ 
identity of young men is sometimes used more negatively, both to symbolise and 
defend ‘territory’ 74 against young men of other areas and communities, and to police 
the behaviour of  Muslim young women and non-Muslim ‘others’ within their own 
communities. Certainly, the author’s field research amongst young Muslims in 
Oldham and Rochdale, Greater Manchester found a significant minority of 
respondents, especially young men, making highly-negative, faith based judgements 
about non-Muslims through terms such as ‘drunkenness’ and ‘godless’ being utilised, 
as this excerpt from two different youth group shows: 
White people: Shameless, not believing in God, no respect for other people; 
I don’t understand their tradition – they haven’t really got one, they haven’t got a 
background.  
 
A Minority of lslamist extremists 
The discussions above suggested that the strong Muslim faith identification of many 
young British Muslims can be understood as a product of two inter-related forces. 
Firstly, the post 1981 phase of ‘political multiculturalism’ governmental policies that 
have privileged specific ethnic and faith identities generally, so enabling  the claiming 
of the reality and importance of a distinct ‘Muslim’ identity in society by Islamist-
influenced leaders, and a consequent policy response to that expressed ‘need’. 
Secondly, the considerable generational tensions and changes experienced by 
migrant communities in the context of globalisation, and which has seen Islamic 
identity re-worked and re-interpreted in ways de-coupled from ethnic culture to 
enable individuals to negotiate their progress within community and society. It is 
suggested here that, rather than being a reactionary and melancholic step 
backwards, this increased religiosity amongst young British Muslims is actually a 
modernist development as part of the increased individualisation of globalised 
society. For many young Muslims, this Islamic faith identity is a positive and 
progressive force but, as Chapter 1 outlined, for a small minority it is part of a world 
view that takes them towards violent extremism. Chapter 1 outlined the inter-related 
factors that take some individuals in that direction, but  those who have studied the 
young British Muslims involved in violent extremism are clear that generational 
community tensions are central: ’It is the internal frictions within a traditional 
Pakistani community in Britain that best explain the radicalisation’ 75. 
 
It certainly seems to be the case that those involved in Islamist violent extremism in 
Britain and internationally have not been those with a significant background and 
deep knowledge of Islamic teachings. Rather, they have more often been 
unobservant people with superficial, at best knowledge, who have often only recently 
‘re-discovered’ Islam as ‘born-again’ in response to problems in their life, or 
converted. In both cases, a ‘de-cultured’ Islam studied away from any community 
context is something easier to mis-understand, or to be presented in an 
unchallenged but highly-questionable way. For instance, the 9/11 attackers had fairly 
‘normal’, only vaguely observant lives in their countries of origin, but became ‘born 
again’ Muslims in Europe, as did a number of the Madrid attackers: ’An individual re-
Islamisation in a small cell of uprooted fellows’ 76. Here, Islamist violent extremists 
create their own ‘community’, and are  unbound by any traditional norms, so 
explaining the girlfriend that Shezad Tanweer slept with just days before the 7/7 
attacks, and the 9/11 attackers who drank alcohol in the run up to the attacks: ’most 
of these militants undeniably behave in a more western than traditional way’ 77. This 
suggests that superficial ‘integration’ is no defence against the attraction of violent 
extremism. That non-traditional lifestyle and the use of streetwise English, in contrast 
to the community languages of Mosques, can appeal to unobservant young Muslims 
or ‘seekers’ of other backgrounds , with the purity and certainty of a ‘de-cultured’ 
Islam, underpinned by the ‘single narrative’ that supplies a ready-made victimhood 
and cause to fight for. 
 
That appeal of Islamist extremism for a marginalised minority can be seen within the 
context of the wider appeal of Islamist activism more generally, both for young 
Muslims negotiating their place in a society with many internal and external barriers, 
and to other people who want to see community advancement. For instance, 
external bodies were positive about the seemingly progressive community voluntary 
activity that Sidique Khan and other members of the ‘mullah boys’ were carrying out 
with young Muslims in the Beeston area of South Leeds, in contrast to the 
conservatism of the older generation. Leeds Council area Youth Service manager at 
the time, Maz Azghar commented that: ‘these guys were doing good work on drugs, 
racial issues and education aspiration issues’ 78. Such activist figures, and Islamist 
political groups or study circles they are part of, can offer much to individual young 
Muslims focussed on their individual identity and place, and also angry about Muslim 
community experiences of marginalisation at home and abroad, but can also be, in 
some eyes,  the ‘gateway’ to violent extremism, as Chapter 1 outlined. 
 
Here, the wider context of significant ethnic physical and cultural segregation in 
British towns and cities generally, and affecting British Muslims in particular because 
of historic economic, social and cultural factors, is relevant. As outlined in the first 
part of the Chapter, the resulting policy response of community cohesion highlighted 
the danger of separate and inevitably oppositional identities growing in communities 
of all ethnic backgrounds if greater efforts were not made to enable ‘meaningful 
direct contact’ and the building of shared values, identities and understandings 
through it. In such monocultural communities, norms and taken for granted 
assumptions can contribute to the creation of space for a minority to develop more 
extreme attitudes and actions, as Chapter 1 highlighted around the 7/7 attackers. 
 
Conclusion: The importance of Community Cohesion 
This Chapter has outlined the post-2001 shift in Britain’s policy approach to ‘race 
relations’ and its relevance to the attraction of some young Muslims towards violent 
extremism. It has argued, using empirical evidence, that community cohesion can be 
understood as a re-balancing of multiculturalist policy approaches, rather than 
rejection of them. Whilst not causing ethnic segregation or racial tensions, previous 
approaches of political multiculturalism, whilst effectively tackling ethnic 
disadvantage, have become increasingly problematic in their focus on essentialised 
ethnic difference. Inadvertently, they have exacerbated the hardening of separate 
ethnic and religious identifications that has being engendered by the profound 
economic and social changes wrought by modern globalisation, changes having 
particularly negative effects on the ‘losers’ of both white and Muslim communities in 
ex-industrial areas.  
 
The Chapter has argued that those previous policy approaches have played a 
significant role in the strengthening of Muslim identification in Britain, but also that 
this faith identity is a product of and response to globalisation. Whilst this strong 
Muslim faith identification is a positive and progressive identity basis for the large 
majority of law-abiding young Muslims in British society, it can be seen as the 
starting point for the journey towards violent extremism for a small minority of 
Islamist radicals, for the reasons previously outlined in Chapter 1. Here, 
‘contemporary Islamic radicalism, far from being an expression of ancient theological 
beliefs, is really a reaction to new political and social changes: the loss of a sense of 
belonging in a fragmented society, the blurring of traditional moral lines, the 
increasing disenchantment with politics and politicians’ 79. The evidence offered here 
is that, contrary to the claims of right-of-centre think tanks, most young British 
Muslims are ‘proud to be British’ and that their faith identity is a progressive de-
coupling of religion and culture for many, but that is can allow a minority to develop 
an antagonism to ‘others’, just as a minority of white working class young people 
express the racialised hostility and blame that groups like the EDL are currently 
exploiting. 
 
 The cohesion analysis argues that too much focus on essentialised difference can 
strengthen ethnic segregation and allow space for those more extreme forms of 
separate identifications to flourish, as well as encouraging the racialisation of deeper 
social and economic problems. Its response is propose policy approaches that focus 
much more on common needs and experiences, and shared identities, underpinned 
with contact and dialogue. The Chapter has offered empirical research evidence 
suggesting that there is significant support for this approach from practitioners 
engaged in communities experiencing significant ethnic segregation and tension, as 
well as attractions to extremist identifications amongst some young people. It is in 
this context of the need to further develop cohesion and integration, and 
underpinning inter-ethnic contact and respect that the book will now examine the 
aims, development and content of Britain’s Prevent strategy. 
Chapter 3: Preventing Violent Extremism 
 
Introduction: States responding to terror  
The previous Chapters analysed both the facts and possible causes of the Islamist 
terror threat facing Britain and the changing political context of ethnic relations since 
2001.The heightened concern post-2001 with ethnic segregation and ‘parallel lives’, 
a concern that has overtly focused on British Muslims, has inevitably shaped how 
anti-terrorism measures have been understood and experienced. For Githens-Mazer 
and Lambert (2011), the 2001 riots combined in the minds of many politicians and 
commentators, with the 9/11 attacks on New York just weeks later, and that as a 
result : ‘Prevent was quite simply born out of a panic induced confusion/correlation of 
Islam, or sects of Islam, with bases for engaging in Islamically inspired political 
violence’ 1.Indeed, it is argued here that neither the  home-grown Islamist terror 
threat, nor the effectiveness of anti-terrorist policy measures to prevent it, can be 
discussed in isolation from broader analysis of ethnic relations, ‘identity’ and the 
state’s relationship with British Muslims. This suggests a two-way relationship, with 
the broader issues shaping both the nature of the terrorist threat and the way that the 
state understands and responds to the threat, but that policy response also having 
the potential to impact negatively on British Muslims and their perception of ethnic 
relations, so worsening both the threat itself and the state’s ability to positively 
engage with Muslim communities in order to address the threat. 
 
The UK government response to this Islamist terror threat, the threat of violent 
extremism, has come in the form of the original 2003 CONTEST counter-terrorism 
strategy and the subsequent 2009 CONTEST 2 refinement. These strategies have 
contained four distinct components, Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. The 
focus of this book is on the second of those components, Prevent, a ’hearts and 
minds’ preventative approach to reducing the long-term terror threat by ‘draining the 
pool’ of potential terrorists. This UK policy response has developed within the context 
of a European Union-wide Counter-Terrorism Strategy launched in 2005 and 
containing four key strands, one of which is ‘Prevent’. This was followed up by the 
2007 EU ‘Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment Implementation 
Report’ and the ‘Counter-Terrorism Action Plan’. Such European Union strategies 
have been designed to support and underpin the strategies and approaches of 
individual member states, meaning that preventative counter-terrorist work in Europe 
has been primarily locally determined and led. As a result, subsequent EU 
documents, such as the 2008 document ‘The EU Counter-Radicalisation Strategy: 
Evaluating EU Policies concerning causes of Radicalisation’ have focussed on 
sharing experiences from individual states, so emphasising the importance for the 
international community of critically evaluating  the policy approaches of individual 
states, as this book attempts to do in the case of the UK. 
 
The content, implications and effectiveness of the highly-contested ‘Prevent’ UK 
policy agenda to date are examined here across a number of Chapters. This Chapter 
details the development, content and rationale of Prevent since its launch in 2006, 
including the refinements made to it both by the previous Labour government and by 
the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government elected in May 2010. In 
discussing the design and implementation of Prevent, this Chapter identifies a 
number of problematic features of the policy agenda, both in relation to the actual 
effectiveness of Prevent activity in reducing the terror threat and in its arguably 
negative impact on ethnic relations and on the relationship between British Muslims 
and the state. These problematic features are explored in greater depth in 
subsequent Chapters through use both of empirical research data and broader 
academic and media discussions. 
 
In analysing the implementation and impacts of Prevent to date, broader questions of 
how governments, particularly democratic ones, should respond to domestic 
terrorism need to borne in mind. English (2009) notes how terrorists often aim to 
provoke a heavy-handed state response, so leading to a spiral of violence as civilian 
outrage produces more terrorist recruits. Here, terrorist actions are deliberately 
aimed at reducing or even obliterating the middle ground of public opinion, so over-
reaction is the worst possible tactical response by governments 2.In the wake of 
terrorist events such as 9/11 or 7/7 and the domestic public and media responses to 
them, though ,it is very hard for governments to avoid an over-reaction, a crackdown 
that involves kicking down doors and arresting suspects, often identified on the basis 
of crude ethnic or political ‘profiling’. The counter-effectiveness of such approaches 
was graphically shown by events in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, when 
escalating Nationalist opposition to the British forces originally introduced to protect 
them from Loyalist violence led to large-scale internment of young Catholic men and 
disproportionate violence by British forces, most graphically seen in the shooting 
dead of 13 unarmed civilians on ‘Bloody Sunday’ in 1972. These state actions led to 
a huge growth in recruitment to paramilitary organisations such as the Provisional 
IRA, and destroyed any nationalist community cooperation or information-sharing 
with the authorities: ‘state violence against civilians played a dramatic part in 
stimulating the growth of precisely the organisation against which the state action 
had been directed’ 3. On that basis, a modern counter-terrorism strategy that has a 
clear ‘hearts and minds’ preventative approach, such as Prevent, should be 
welcomed as a balanced approach, especially as other countries, such as the USA, 
have lacked such a coherent counter-radicalisation programme until very recently 
4.The ending of terrorist threats internationally has come precisely through such a 
combination of states not over-reacting , bolstering middle ground opinions rather 
than polarisation in society and also addressing grievances. Such approaches can 
lead to re-assessment and reduction in support for the ‘cause’ within communities 
and networks from which terrorists draw. 
 
Here, the purpose of Prevent can therefore be understood as a ‘hearts and minds’ 
approach aimed at people seen as vulnerable to persuasion towards terrorism, and 
who might ‘reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community 
cohesion’ 5.Such a prioritisation of community engagement within the overall 
CONTEST strategy acknowledges that , ‘Intelligence is the most vital element in 
successful counter-terrorism’ 6.This approach attempts to focus both on increasing 
the resilience  and addressing the grievances of communities, and on identifying 
vulnerable individuals, as well as challenging and disrupting ideologies sympathetic 
to violent extremism. Here, ‘resilience’ can be understood as resisting the appeal of, 
or even standing up, to extremist political activity and terrorist recruitment attempts 
within Muslim communities. It is by those standards that the effectiveness of Prevent 
policy approaches in the UK since 2003 should be judged. 
 
A lethargic response? Pre 7/7 developments  
The British state recognition of and response to the scale and threat of the 
international Islamist terror threat outlined in Chapter 1 can be seen as sluggish both 
before and after the pivotal global event of the 9/11 attacks in which 67 Britons died 
alongside over almost 3,000 American citizens 7. This slowness was replicated 
internationally with the USA failing to heed warnings during the 1990s from its own 
experts about Al-Qaeda 8. For the UK, this failure to comprehend the growing threat 
of violent Islamist extremism was not only about Cold War mind-sets but the 
generational focus on the terror threat around the Northern Ireland conflict. The 
result has been that post 9/11 counter-terrorism measures generally, and ‘hearts and 
minds’ Prevent policies in particular,  have appeared to be reactive, designed and 
implemented under considerable political and media pressure. This is particularly 
surprising, given that foreign Islamist extremists had gathered in London as asylum 
seekers and refugees from the early 1990s, making it a key centre of organisation for 
global violent Islamism, and leading worried French security officials to dub it 
‘Londonistan’. Indeed, Bin Laden established a media information office in London 
titled the ‘Advisory and Reformation Committee’ in 1994. For right of centre 
commentator Melanie Phillips, until first 9/11 and then the grave shock of the 7/7 
attacks, Britain ‘paid virtually no attention to the extraordinary network of terrorism 
and extremist incitement that had developed under its nose’ 9. 
 
The initial response of the Blair government to 9/11 was use of the law, with five 
significant new pieces of legislation concerned with terrorism enacted between 2000 
and 2008. This included the strengthening of the Terrorism Act in November 2001 
that proscribed a number of Islamist organisations, and failed attempts to deport 
foreign Islamist radicals that eventually led to the still-controversial alternative of 
control orders being introduced as part of the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
Alongside new legislation came a new counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, 
concerned with the threat to Britain of international terrorism. That strategy identified 
four distinct components, Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. In March 2009, the 
government launched a revised strategy, CONTEST 2, which acknowledged that, 
initially, Prevent had been the least developed strand of CONTEST. In foregrounding 
Prevent in the revised CONTEST 2 strategy, the Government was here formalising 
priorities that in practice had been devised and developed subsequent to the original 
CONTEST strategy, and especially in the wake of 7/7. The main objectives for 
Prevent identified in CONTEST 2 were: 
 To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream 
voice 
 Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where 
they operate 
 Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been 
recruited by violent extremists 
 Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, and 
 To address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting 10 
Each strand of CONTEST had its own ministerially-led committee, or TIDO 
(Terrorism International Defence and Overseas), with all accountable to an 
overarching Strategy and Delivery TIDO, chaired by the Government’s Security and 
Intelligence Co-ordinator based in the Cabinet Office 11.The first holder of this post 
was Sir David Omand, former director of the government listening station GCHQ. 
Omand acknowledged the slow initial progress on Prevent in March 2010, when 
giving evidence to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security 
(APPGHS): ‘when you came to Prevent, it was much less clear what it was that 
should be done, and so a lot of time was spent with research, led by the Security 
Service, trying to work out where you could most effectively intervene’ 12.  Alongside 
this, a multi-agency Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was established, serviced and 
hosted by Thames House, the MI5 headquarters. Charles Farr, current Director-
General of OSCT, commented to the CLG Select Committee Inquiry in 2010 that 
government felt that ‘we need a strategy to stop people becoming terrorists in the 
first place’13. 
 
Despite the appearance of CONTEST in 2003, and the enactment of anti-terrorism 
legislation, government was slow to understand either the scale of the violent 
Islamist threat, or the necessity to engage with the ideological challenge of the single 
narrative and the supposed need to take violent action in its name that it posed. By 
2003, British security services ‘had become convinced that British Muslims 
represented the top terrorist threat and from that year to 2005 there would be a 
300% increase in MI5’s domestic investigative targets’ 14. However, it was only after 
events in 2004 that Government re-thought the scale of its response in general and 
the need for a more active Prevent component in particular: ‘sparking the 
government into action were the March 2004 Madrid bombings’ 15. This combined 
with the identification and arrest of the ‘Crevice’ plotters, and the August 2004 arrest 
of Dhiren Barot, all British-based Islamist terrorists, led to enhanced action. One 
thing these events in 2004 prompted was a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) and Home Office report ‘Young Muslims and Extremism’. The draft of this 
report included a letter from Cabinet Secretary Sir Andrew Turnball to John Grieve of 
the Home Office that commented, ‘there is a feeling that parts of the Muslim 
community, particularly young men, are disaffected. This includes some that are 
well-educated with good economic prospects’ 16. The report offered a thoughtful 
summary of attitudes and positions within Britain’s Muslim communities, drawing on 
a variety of recent polling data and academic sources. It clearly identified the varying 
backgrounds of those young Muslims attracted to violent extremism and the role of 
charismatic individuals within small peer groups of potential terrorists. The report 
clearly identified a minority of young Muslims with little affinity for British identity and 
values, and with support for radical Islamist political positions. The shape and focus 
of the Prevent programme to be unveiled in subsequent years can be seen in this 
draft report, in its pinpointing of the need for dialogue that disrupts ‘career paths’ of 
those drawn towards terrorism, and the need to target particular arenas such as 
Further and Higher Education campuses. However, the tensions and dilemmas for 
the later Prevent programme can also be identified in the questions that the report 
poses but fails to clearly answer over how government should respond: ‘should 
programmes be targeted specifically at the Muslim community or be ‘ethnically-
blind’?’ 17. The analysis and initial questions over Muslim attitudes posed in this 
report were subsequently investigated further by MI5 through their research project 
‘Project Rich Picture’ .By November 2006, as Prevent was being initiated, MI5 
claimed to be monitoring 1,600 people in 200 terrorist networks around 30 active 
plots, with an 80% increase in case loads during 2006 alone 18. 
 
The 7/7 London bombings of July 2005 came at a time when the government still 
lacked engagement with Muslim communities over counter-terrorism, or a clear 
Prevent strategy. One immediate response was a new commitment to consultation 
with Muslim communities that led to the ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ working 
groups, even though at the same time Blair was explicitly denying any links between 
terrorism and foreign policy and issuing his own, pre-emptive 12 point plan. 
 ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ 
In the wake of 7/7  bombings, the Government established seven working groups 
under the collective title ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ (PET), whilst also 
establishing the Commission on Cohesion and Integration 19, whose subsequent 
report re-energised many of the original community cohesion recommendations . 
The PET process had significant Muslim involvement, and ranged across issues of 
economic, social and educational experiences, creating an expectation that it would 
lead to an explicit focus on ‘Muslim’ disadvantage. In fact, Government was already 
focussed on educational and economic ‘social exclusion’ of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi-origin young people and communities 20, so, arguably addressing 
underlying root problems, but showed no inclination to integrate this as an explicitly 
holistic Muslim policy initiative. Such a governmental position can be seen as 
consistent with the wider approaches to ‘identity’ and citizenship discussed in 
Chapter 2, and to the multifactorial understanding of marginalisation identified in 
Chapter 1. The mismatch between what the PET process seemed to promise and 
what it actually delivered led to significant disillusionment amongst many of the 
Muslim groups and activists who engaged positively in this partnership activity with 
government. For instance, the conveners of one of the PET working groups later 
commented that: ,’although our recommendations were ‘commended’ by the Home 
Secretary, none were followed up or implemented, and members of the working 
group were not invited to be involved in contributing to the Prevent agenda’ 21. 
 
 As a result, Prevent emerged the following year as an agenda concerned with 
radicalisation, and issues of ‘values’ and community organisation that might be 
contributing to it 22.The subsequent focus on ‘values’ can also be seen as stemming 
from some of PET’s conclusions and the political/media response to them. PET 
highlighted deprivation, discrimination and Islamophobia as causes of terrorism, and 
called for changes in foreign policy. This combined with the decision of the Muslim 
Council of Britain (MCB) to boycott Holocaust Memorial Day because it did not 
reflect all types of ‘genocide’, and pro-Palestine suicide-bombing statements by 
senior MCB official Daud Abdullah led key elements of the Blair government to 
conclude that they could not work with existing Muslim representatives, and that 
attitudes and ‘values’ in broader sections of Muslim communities were problematic. 
The very involvement of such organisations, despite their clear democratic 
constitution, in PET led right-wing columnist Melanie Phillips to comment that, ‘the 
government had quite simply handed over policy on extremism to the extremists’ 23, 
highlighting the political pressures on the Labour government. 
 
‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ 
The tensions apparent in the PET process meant that the government formally 
launched their Prevent strategy in 2006  whilst under attack, from one side by right-
wing think tanks and influential sections of the media who demanded confrontation 
with broader section of ‘un-British’ Muslims, and from another direction by many 
British Muslims and liberal non-Muslim supporters who argued for  changes to 
foreign policy and for domestic policy approaches that encouraged dialogue and 
partnership focussed on Muslim marginalisation, rather than approaches of blame 
and communal  suspicion. The resulting compromise seemed to favour the ‘values’ 
based suspicion of wider Muslim attitudes and be based on the ‘conveyer-belt’ 
theory of radicalisation that sees wider cultures of intolerance and extremism with 
Muslim communities acted out within Mosques and political groups, and providing 
the starting point for some individuals to move further towards violent implementation 
of these widely-held beliefs. The cutting off of contact with groups such as the MCB, 
and some of the language accompanying the launch of Prevent, seemed to support 
this, but the actual implementation of the policy in subsequent years pragmatically 
left a lot of decision-making to local authorities and other bodies at local levels, so 
ensuring somewhat less reactionary Prevent activity in practice. 
 
The forthcoming Prevent strategy was announced in a speech in October 2006 by 
Ruth Kelly, the Secretary of State for the newly-formed Department for Communities 
and Local Government, following the dismemberment of the over-large Home Office. 
Kelly said: 
security responses alone will not be enough. There is a battle of ideas here - it is all 
about us reasserting shared values and winning hearts and minds.  
All of us must play a part. That means government. And it also means communities 
and individual citizens themselves. 
And that: 
I am clear that our strategy of funding and engagement must shift significantly 
towards those organisations that are taking a proactive leadership role in tackling 
extremism and defending our shared values. It is only by defending our values that 
we will prevent extremists radicalising future generations of terrorists. 24   
 
Further details were subsequently announced 25, with the initial Prevent activity 
commencing in April 2007. This was to involve DCLG funding for work with Muslim 
communities in identified local authority areas under the banner of ‘Preventing 
Violent Extremism’ and work with young Muslims in specific sections of society, 
alongside Home Office support for  Police-focussed work. The content and detail of 
this programme are discussed below. The context for this new Prevent initiative was 
a speech in January 2007 by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, head of 
Counter-Terrorism Command at the Metropolitan Police, that Britain was losing the 
battle for ‘hearts and minds’ within Muslim communities 26.  The underlying target 
group for Prevent was explained by Charles Farr, Director-General of the OSCT, in 
evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee in 2009, when 
saying that beyond Islamist terrorists already identified, ‘there is a much larger group 
of people who feel a degree of negativity, if not hostility, towards the state, the 
country, the community, and who are, as it were, the pool in which terrorists will 
swim…We have to reach that group. That is to a degree what Prevent is all about’ 27. 
 
The creation of a programme to channel money towards work with Muslim 
communities through the Department for Communities and Local Government, the 
department also concerned with local authorities, equality and community cohesion, 
could be seen as a progressive, partnership-based approach, working with Muslim 
communities rather than carrying out surveillance upon them. That was certainly the 
view of Sir David Omand, the author of Prevent and the overall CONTEST strategy, 
who saw the split of Prevent work between the security-focused Home Office and the 
DCLG ,as vital: ‘There was a deliberate attempt to get the Local Government 
Department to lead this, and to try and do it in a way that is based on the locality and 
not the ethnicity’ 28 .However, McGhee (2010) suggests that this could also be 
understood as, ‘forcing responsibility for countering extremism onto Muslim 
communities through a process of devolving responsibility downwards’ 29, so asking 
for frontline vigilance against people in their own communities. McGhee does 
acknowledge, though, that this communitarianist approach does avoid the ‘othering’ 
of British Muslims in trying to create partnership between the state and ‘responsible’ 
Muslims. Whether ‘responsible’ Muslims are the same thing as politically or 
religiously ‘moderate’ Muslims is an on-going tension within Prevent. Similarly, 
whether Prevent has actually been able to avoid appearing to target and stigmatise 
Muslims as an ethnic group and community, as Sir David Omand hoped, has also 
remained a controversial issue. This approach to building partnership against 
extremism and intolerance can be seen as consistent with the wider strategic 
approaches taken by government onwards ‘identity’ in multicultural society, as 
outlined in Chapter 2, and to intolerance and ‘hate crime’ generally: ‘government is 
attempting to promote the intolerance of extremism alongside the now familiar 
intolerance in Britain with regard to other forms of hatred, prejudice and 
discrimination’ 30.  
 
 In announcing the creation of the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund’ in 
February 2007, DCLG Minister Ruth Kelly said: ‘Violent extremism seeks to drive us 
apart. Together, we will overcome it.’ 31 The Prevent Pathfinder Fund made available 
an initial £6 million for 2007/2008 from the Safer and Stronger Communities Fund, 
via regional Government Offices to 70 local authorities whose populations included 5 
per cent or more Muslims. This was for action programmes aimed at Muslim 
communities in general, and, within those communities, at those most at risk of 
recruitment or ‘grooming’ by extremists, or at those ‘justifying or glorifying violent 
extremist ideologies and terrorism’. The aims and logic of this approach for local 
funding via the DCLG was explained in the April 2007 publication ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism: Winning hearts and minds’ 32.  The population calculation used for the 
geographical targeting was based on six-year-old data from the 2001 Census; it was 
subsequently  amended for the three-year, £45 million programme for 2008–2011 to 
include first all local authorities with a minimum of 4,000 Muslims, then with 2,000 
Muslims, within their population, but this lower threshold still excluded Crawley in 
West Sussex, home of three of the five Muslim young men convicted over the 
‘Operation Crevice’ plot to bomb the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent and the 
Ministry of Sound nightclub in London. The very use of population data to target and 
distribute fund betrayed the lack of quality intelligence Government and its newly-
created Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) had on the ‘map’ of 
violent extremism. 
 
Consistent with more general New Labour policy design, the ‘Pathfinder’ Prevent 
initiative stressed the need for locally designed approaches whilst at the same time 
offering explicit objectives that all local authority funding bids should address, and 
have agreed by the regional Government Offices. Acutely aware of the danger that 
government language, particularly if aping American-style ‘war on terror’ 
formulations, could further alienate and radicalise sections of Muslim communities, 
the Prevent documentation uses ‘we’ consistently. Indeed, the government also 
established a Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) within the 
Home Office, with one of its key functions being to help the various arms of national 
and local government avoid  ‘aggressive rhetoric’ and use language that encourages 
the positive involvement of Muslim communities 33. RICU has been one of a number 
of aspects of the Prevent strategy that have drawn inspiration from policy 
approaches previously used by the state during the Northern Ireland armed conflict, 
as acknowledged by a ‘senior civil servant’ quoted by the Times in 2004: ‘We did the 
same in Northern Ireland in the 1980’s when, as well as deploying police and troops 
on the streets, we had a massive programme of investment in the local community, 
raising living standards. We also set about bridge-building with the Catholic 
community’34. 
 
In parallel, further development to Prevent came in the 2008-2011 expansion 
through significant funding to the Youth Justice Board for work with young offenders 
in secure Institutions and in the community, and to the Prison Service, both reflecting 
well-founded concerns that radicalisation of individual Muslims was taking place 
during incarceration . The important role played for recruitment to radical Islamist 
political groups by Further and Higher Education settings also led to a funding focus 
on Universities and Colleges 35, confirmed as such by the testimony of ex-activist Ed 
Husain, who was previously involved in Islamist group Hizb-Ut-Tahrir (HUT). Prevent 
funding also led to 300 new dedicated Police posts nationally, some of them 
attached to the newly-established Regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs). This all 
added up to a 2008-2011 Prevent budget of £140 million, some £85 million of which 
came from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and the 
security-focussed remainder from the Home Office., Information-sharing and ‘tension 
monitoring’ were seen as a key part of the Prevent strategy, particularly the 
developing work with offenders, colleges and universities, with the hope that 
extremist activity could be identified and effectively countered. Underpinning this has 
been a significant strengthening of relationships between police forces and 
educational institutions across the full age range of children and young people, with 
the Association of Chief Police Officers aware that there is a ‘pressing need to 
develop the growing relationships between the police and education sector at every 
level with regard to preventing violent extremism’ 36. The Prevent approach to 
prisons, young offenders, and further and higher education institutions is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Preventing Violent Extremism in practice 
The pressure from central government on the identified local authorities, and their 
local partners, to be involved in Prevent monitoring, information-sharing and ‘forums 
against extremism’ was significant from the start. This pressure came on Local 
Authorities through the Local Area Agreements under the Comprehensive Spending 
Assessment to adopt ‘National Indicator 35’ around developing ‘resilience to violent 
extremism’, as this extract from the April 2008 Local Government Association (LGA) 
briefing document Strategic Issues: Preventing Violent Extremism shows: 
The selection or non-selection of National Indicator 35: Building resilience to violent 
extremism emerged as a contentious issue during LAA negotiations. The Home 
Office, via the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT), have produced a 
‘heat map’ which identifies 30 areas with a high risk of producing violent extremists 
and are seeking a good take-up of NI: 35 across this group. … The HO believe that 
local authorities that do not select NI: 35 are not prioritising Prevent and concluding 
that little or no Prevent work is being undertaken. To persuade local authorities to 
select NI: 35, the HO is applying pressure via the Police, and senior officials during 
LAA negotiations which has had only limited success. 37 
 
Some of the Local Authorities  receiving Prevent funding refused to adopt it initially, 
but all were required to report on it to Government Offices .Despite these on-going 
local authority anxieities, pressure from government saw Prevent continue to grow to 
the point where all Local Authorities with significant Muslim communities were 
involved, although a number of Muslim community groups refused to participate or 
accept funding 38.The relationship between national and local government at the 
heart of Prevent operation, and the experiences of those trying to implement Prevent 
at the local authority level, are also examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
The 2008 DCLG document, Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of Project Activities 
2007/2008, the product of a ‘light-touch’ review requested by the Prime Minister’s 
Office, claims that as many as 44,000 people, most of them young people, had been 
engaged by the initial Prevent Pathfinder year programme nationally 38. By 
government’s own admission, these were overwhelmingly Muslim young people 
taking part in broad and unfocussed monocultural youth activities. Government 
acknowledged that the monitoring and evaluation data from the programme to date 
was weak and unreliable, so admitting that little independent evaluation had taken 
place. An exception was Kirklees in West Yorkshire (home of two of the 7/7 
bombers), where independent evaluation identified a lack of clarity over the aims of 
the well-meaning work and its relationship to community cohesion 40. The national 
expansion of Prevent from April 2008 did lead to new guidance over evaluation 
approaches, but this was confined to vague suggestions that Local Authorities 
‘might’ decide to develop external evaluation of programmes 41.Throughout the 2007-
11 period, evaluation and assessment of Prevent activity funded via local authorities 
and other public bodies remained largely weak and limited. For instance, the 
evidence submission to the 2009-10 House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee Inquiry into Prevent from the Association of Chief 
Police Officers commented that: ‘the apparent lack of evaluation of Prevent initiatives 
has made the ‘values for money’ assessment of Prevent difficult’ 42.  One issue that 
was highlighted by Local Authority funding from early on was the unhelpfulness of 
the funding title ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’. Clearly, such concerns cannot be 
separated from deeper concerns about the overall aims and assumptions of Prevent, 
but they highlighted the reality of ‘preventing violent extremism’ being a negative title 
and starting point for constructive ‘hearts and minds work. The Kirklees research 
highlighted the use of ‘Pathfinder’ as a suitably opaque title deployed as an 
understandable avoidance strategy. Similarly, the acronym ‘PVE’ or the generic-
sounding ‘Prevent’ also played obfuscation roles in local Prevent implementation. 
Acknowledging these concerns, government formally dropped the ‘Preventing 
Violent Extreme’ title, settling instead for using Prevent as a working operational title 
as well as a strategic one: ‘We have recently revised our guidance to local 
authorities about Prevent acknowledging that the term ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism’ attached to local funding can in some areas be a barrier to promoting 
good community based work. We have acted on this be removing the label from the 
funding’ 43. 
 
What this Prevent activity has involved and how we can understand it is the subject 
of the following Chapters, but the main aspects can be briefly summarised here.  
Muslim young people have clearly been the main focus of many of the Prevent 
activities to date, with funding either used directly by local authority Education 
Departments and Youth Services, or channelled to community organisations working 
with Muslim young people, using a variety of approaches and techniques, through 
youth work, schools, and arts and sports activities. These youth-focused activities 
have included the promotion of local ‘anti-extremism’ forums and ‘road shows’ on 
extremism and Islamophobia. Alongside this has been what in reality has been 
community development or capacity-building work within Muslim communities that 
implicitly suggested weak and under-developed ‘civil society’ in and around Muslim 
communities and limited capacity in the past to counter extremism. This led to a 
significant focus on educational standards in general, and citizenship education 
specifically, in after-school Mosque schools and Madrassahs, and capacity-building 
training, support and movement towards charitable status for many Mosques and 
other Muslim community organisations. Such local work has been mirrored at the 
national level. The Prevent strategy included 30 national projects through the 
‘Community Leadership Fund’, particularly aimed at women, young people and a 
broader range of faith leaders. This included the establishment of a Young Muslims 
Advisory Group and a national Muslim Women’s Advisory Group, both clearly 
intended to promote more polyphonic and ‘modern’ leadership with British Muslim 
communities, with Prevent here providing, ‘the facilitation of the emergence of new, 
‘acceptable’ leadership within the Muslims communities of Britain’ 44. More 
controversially, Prevent has also involved promoted new national Muslim faith 
organisations, with funding going to the British Muslim Council and the Sufi Muslim 
Council, and attempts to promote ‘moderate’ versions of Islam, such as through the 
‘Radical Middle Way’ anti-extremism road show. The implications of this Prevent 
intervention in the organisation and leadership of Muslim communities, and the 
promotion of particular interpretations of Islam itself, are discussed more fully in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Prevent under Pressure 
From its initiation in April 2007, both the assumptions and operational reality of 
Prevent were highly controversial. Tensions were identified above between those 
who wanted  a more judgemental and security-focussed approach to Muslim 
‘extremism’ in general, and those who saw dangers of further marginalisation of 
Muslims in the targeted nature of Prevent  and so wanted a much more modest and 
pragmatic approach. The first camp, largely right-of centre in its politics, questioned 
what was being achieved with Prevent funding and whether it was making the 
country any safer. The Tax Payer’s Alliance (TPA), a ‘small state’ campaigning group 
closely connected to the Conservative Party, used Freedom of Information requests 
to identify how Prevent money was actually being used at the local level, following 
the failure of the Conservative Opposition Communities Spokesman Paul Goodman 
MP to obtain this data from government. Releasing their conclusions in September 
2009, the TPA commented that: 
there have been on-going concerns about the groups receiving funding and it  
has not been clear how taxpayers’ money has been spent. 45 
The TPA used this data to publicise how local authorities had used the money in 
very different ways, both in whether they were actually spending it on activity clearly 
related to the Prevent agenda or not, and how they allocated it. The clear suggestion 
was that significant amounts of Prevent funding were not ending up on the activities, 
or with the local organisations, that central government expected. For instance, 
despite the government breaking off official contact with the Muslim Council of Britain 
in 2006: Around £850,000 has been given to the Muslim Council of Britain’s official  
affiliates through different Prevent funding stream 46  
 
At the same time, Prevent came under sustained criticism from the left of British 
politics over the allegation that it was actually a front for state surveillance activities 
against British Muslim communities. Leading this critique was think-tank and Race 
Equality campaigning organisation the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) and its 
Director Arun Kundnani. The IRR used similar approaches to the TPA, and 
supporting this with research activity amongst local authority and voluntary sector 
staff involved in the actual implementation of Prevent at ground level. The result was 
the IRR report ‘Spooked’, which alleged that: 
There is strong evidence that a significant part of the Prevent programme involves 
the embedding of counter-terrorism police officers within the delivery of local 
services, the purpose of which seems to be to gather intelligence on Muslim 
communities 47 
This report was quickly picked up by The Guardian newspaper, who ran a story 
headlined : Government anti-terrorism strategy 'spies' on innocent 48, and quoted 
Shami Chakrabati, the head of civil liberty watchdog ‘Liberty’ as describing Prevent 
as ‘the biggest spying programme in modern Britain’ and an affront to civil liberties. 
Despite immediate and flat denials by government, these serious allegations have 
persisted throughout the life of Prevent, and are discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
 
The fact that both these political critiques had been developing throughout 2009, 
combined with growing disquiet on the ground, had led the House of Commons 
Select Committee for Communities and Local Government, the independent group of 
Backbench MPs charged with scrutiny of the work of DCLG, to establish an Inquiry, 
with a call for written evidence released during summer 2009, and evidence sessions 
commencing in December 2009. Written submissions were made by a wide range of 
local government agencies, Police bodies, and voluntary/faiths sector organisations. 
Witnesses appearing to give evidence included Arun Kundnani, Professor Ted 
Cantle, the DCLG Minister John Denham MP, and Charles Farr, Director-General of 
OSCT. The significant evidence generated through this Select Committee Inquiry in 
to Prevent 49 highlighted how difficult it is to quantify ‘success’, especially if Prevent 
is seen as a longer term approach rather than concerned with the prevention of 
terrorist plots now. Indeed, oral evidence to the Inquiry from the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) suggested that Prevent represented a ‘generational’ struggle 
to influence young Muslims. That Inquiry process acknowledged that Prevent had 
enabled stronger relationships between Local Authorities and Muslim communities in 
some areas, had strengthened the organisation and transparency of some Muslim 
community organisations, promoted the voices of women and young people within 
community processes, and had highlighted the need for more open debates within 
Muslim communities around the causes of domestic violent extremism.  
 
However, the Select Committee Inquiry was particularly concerned about the role of 
DCLG in what is , essentially, a counter-terrorism strategy, and how Prevent related 
to the broader work on community cohesion and integration that DCLG is primarily 
focused on. In its final report, which ‘proved to be a robust assessment of evidence 
that it had elicited in reviewing the performance of Prevent’ 50, the Select Committee 
concluded that Prevent was damaging and confusing the cross- community cohesion 
and integration work that local authorities were developing in the wake of the 2001 
Cantle report and government’s resulting prioritisation of community cohesion. Here, 
it commented that: ‘The single focus on Muslims in Prevent has been unhelpful’ 51 
and highlighted the problematic stress on ‘values’ and types of religious belief in 
saying that ‘A particular worry for many witnesses in this context is having religious 
orthodoxy mistaken for extremism… We believe that there has been an excessive 
concentration on the theological basis of radicalisation in the Prevent programme’52. 
There was a clear inference that Prevent approaches to ‘moderate’ or ‘extreme’ 
versions of Islam were counter-productive attempts at social engineering. In contrast, 
the report praised the minority of Prevent initiatives that had enabled robust and 
open debate around political and social issues, including foreign policy, such as the 
‘Project Safe Space’ work co-ordinated by the UK Youth Parliament  and ACPO. 
Unfortunately, in the Select Committee’s view, such work focussed directly on the 
root issues underpinning violent extremism was an exception: ‘We are concerned 
that much Prevent money has been wasted on unfocussed or irrelevant projects, as 
a result either of misunderstanding of Prevent or of a lack of willingness and capacity 
of local organisations to deliver’ 53. 
 
Whilst finding the charge of spying within Prevent unproven, the persistence of the 
concerns led the Select Committee to call for an independent investigation into the 
allegations .It concluded overall  that the impact of the problems and contradictions 
of Prevent outweighed any positive impacts, and so called for significant re-shaping 
of the programme: ‘Our Inquiry has shown that the current overall approach to 
Prevent is contentious and unlikely ever to be fully accepted in its existing form by 
those it is most important to engage’ 54. In particular, the Select Committee 
recommended a much greater distinction between the Prevent programme and on-
going cohesion and integration work, although they saw that cohesion activity as a 
vital part of the long-term attempt to undermine support for violent extremism: 
‘funding for cohesion work in all communities should be increased. That work should 
be done on a thematic basis and not on a monocultural or individual community 
basis. It should clearly be targeted at disadvantaged and excluded groups’ 55.This 
apparently monocultural focus on Muslims within Prevent had been one of the most 
common criticisms and, before the Select Committee Inquiry had even got 
underway, Government had responded through the creation of a smaller and 
separate ‘Connecting Communities’ fund aimed at white working class communities 
that were supposedly ‘under pressure’, but in fact vulnerable to British National Party 
agitation. These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The CLG Select Committee was largely Labour Party-dominated, but reaction to 
their report from the other main parties was supportive. Caroline Spelman, the 
Conservative shadow Communities secretary, said: "It is clear that too much money 
has been wasted on unfocused and irrelevant projects which have created confusion 
and increased the risk of alienating the very communities it ought to engage". Chris 
Huhne, the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman, said: "The Prevent 
programme alienates and marginalises Muslim communities, and exacerbates racist 
bias and ignorant views…Everyone wants to combat radical Islamism but that should 
not mean gathering and keeping intelligence on innocent people’’. 56. During the 
Select Committee process, Conservative Communities spokesman Paul Goodman 
highlighted the TPA data on the use of Prevent funding and called for a fundamental 
review of the programme 57, something the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
was to deliver in its first year in office.  This aim had already been trailed by 
Conservative Security shadow minister Dame Pauline Neville-Jones when she said 
that ‘Prevent should be aimed at bringing citizens and communities together’ rather 
than focussing on Muslims only 58, a theme apparently developed by Sayeeda Warsi, 
Chairman of the Conservative Party, who commented in speech to the 2009 Party 
Conference that ‘state multiculturalism is not integration, is not unifying and is not the 
British way’. Somewhat contradictorily, Warsi also called for the state to accept and 
work with ‘faith’ much more 59. The negativity of ‘State multiculturalism’ had been a 
theme of David Cameron’s for some time in opposition: ‘It means treating groups of 
people as monolithic blocks rather than individual citizens’ 60. The logical conclusion 
of such position is that viewing ‘Muslims’ as one undifferentiated group is unhelpful 
and misguided, but in a speech in October 2009 on ‘The future of Britain’s counter-
terrorism strategy’, Neville-Jones indicated that the ‘values’ of particular groups or 
communities were indeed their concern: ’government should tackle extremism itself, 
not just extremism when it turns violent’ 61. This analysis built on a speech she had 
given earlier in 2009, ‘Society’s role in preventing terrorism’, that solely focused on 
British Muslims, talking about the dangers of ‘gateway organisations’, the 
‘pretensions’ of the MCB in speaking for British Muslims, and the idea of creating a 
register of ‘extreme’ individuals and groups 62. This meant that in the run up to the 
2010 general election there were clear tensions within the Conservative party over 
Prevent; on the one hand talking about positive, colour-blind cohesion work, but on 
the other hand suggesting a ‘values-based’ crackdown on ‘extremism’ generally 
within Britain’s Muslim communities. 
Coalition Government: A new approach? 
The Conservative failure to win an outright majority in the general election of May 
2010 arguably exacerbated the internal tensions indicated above, as the 
Conservatives were forced to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, a party 
with significant numbers of Muslim local activists and who had already expressed 
unease about Prevent. An early measure was the decision to divert £50 million of the 
Prevent money earmarked for local authorities between 2010 and 2012 towards the 
pilot phase of a new national youth volunteering scheme, the National Citizen 
Service (NCS), explicitly concerned with social cohesion. David Cameron and his 
Shadow Cabinet had been developing their ideas on NCS for some years whilst in 
opposition, as part of their emerging ‘Big Society’ agenda. The ‘Big Society’ is an 
overtly communitarianist policy approach which appears to believe that the state 
must contract in order for volunteerism and civic society to have the space to grow. 
The concern with shared identity and values was overt in the original design of NCS, 
with the hope that it would be ‘contributing to a sense of Britishness, with the 
requirement for young people to develop a sense of what being a British citizen 
means to them’ 63. The NCS promised a 6 week-long summer programme for 16 
year olds, including residential experiences and volunteering programmes within 
local communities, with £13 million of diverted Prevent money providing 11,000 
places for summer 2011 and a large expansion planned for summer 2012. A recent 
report by the House of Commons Education Select Committee into Services for 
young people highlighted that this 6 week NCS programme cost £1,233 per head, 
almost exactly the same as German youth volunteering programmes cost for a whole 
year of involvement 64. NCS funding initially was distributed via third sector youth and 
community agencies and explicitly avoided using local authorities, making early 
criticism of NCS as being geared largely to more middle class young people and 
having little lasting effect on the poorer young people with less social capital who do 
take part as hardly surprising. Above all, for all the faults of Prevent –funded activity 
via local authorities outlined above and explored further in subsequent chapters, it 
was making some progress around citizenship and identity issues  and the 
democratic engagement of Muslim young people in some of Britain’s poorest areas, 
’NCS, on the other hand, is devoid of emphasis on political engagement and other 
contentious issues, instead focusing on issues of adulthood and responsibility’65. 
 
This  early diversion of Prevent funding was followed in November 2010 by the 
Coalition government’s decision to review Prevent under the independent oversight 
of Liberal Democrat peer Lord Carlile, although they decided explicitly not to 
examine the allegations of ‘spying’ outlined above in a ‘rebuff’ to the CLG Select 
Committee 66. What should have been a rapid review and subsequent policy 
announcement in January 2011 turned in to something much more protracted, with 
the review eventually published on 7th June 2011. The substantial delay seems to 
have been a product of significant political in-fighting, not just within the two-party 
coalition, but amongst leading Conservatives over the future direction of Prevent. 
This infighting mirrored tensions inherent in Labour’s previous approach, and were 
already evident in pre-election Conservative thinking, as highlighted above. They 
focussed on the question of ‘values’, whether Prevent focuses pragmatically on 
individuals at risk of attraction to violent extremism, or whether it sees the terrorist 
threat of symptomatic of problematic, anti-‘British, anti-democratic ‘values’ within 
wider sections of the Muslim community and so demands public adherence to those 
‘shared values’. The first public sign of these tensions came in February 2011,when 
David Cameron called for ‘muscular liberalism’ to uphold British values and explicitly 
criticised British Muslims during a speech at a counter-terrorism conference in 
Munich, the same day as the far-right English Defence League were holding an anti- 
Muslim demonstration in Luton. Cameron also criticised the previous government’s 
approach to Prevent of being prepared to work with law-abiding Islamists, suggesting 
that it was the equivalent of funding the far-right BNP to work with white youth 
attracted to violent neo-Nazism: ‘Would you allow the far right groups a share of 
public funds if they promise to help you lure young white men away from fascist 
terrorism?  Of course not. 67 As well as being an implicit slur on many Muslim 
organisations 68 , this analogy was  a regurgitation of arguments in an article by 
Dean Godson, research Director of the right-of-centre think tank Policy Exchange, 
who wrote in 2008 that ‘It’s as if the government responded to a violent insurgency 
from the neo-Nazi terrorists of Combat 18 by turning to Nick Griffin of the BNP’69.  
Just weeks before Cameron’s Munich speech, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, Chairman 
of the Conservative Party and the only Muslim in the Cabinet, commented in a 
speech rumoured not to have been cleared by Conservative Party HQ, on how 
Islamophobia had become increasingly fashionable around British dinner tables 70. 
 
The subsequent appearance of the Prevent Review was clearly understood in its 
delay, tone and content as illustrative of these on-going political tensions. The 
Independent, in its Editorial of 8th June 2011, commented that ‘few issues have 
divided the Coalition as dramatically as the question of how to meet the threat of 
home-grown terrorism’. They saw one group of ministers, including Cameron and 
Education Secretary Michael Gove as advocating ‘a radical new approach based on 
confrontation’, whilst another group that included Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg 
and Baroness Warsi as rejecting ‘the idea that there is a connection between 
reactionary religious attitudes and support for terrorism’. The Independent also 
suggested that the concerns of the latter group were shared by senior figures in the 
Security and Police Services who wanted to work pragmatically to reduce the terror 
threat. The Independent saw the Cameron/Gove group as having triumphed and the 
new Prevent strategy as leaning ‘strongly towards a confrontational approach’, as did 
The Financial Times in its Editorial of the same day, ‘UK takes values-based 
approach to countering extremism’. Some commentators were blunter in their 
assessment: ‘The document represents a triumph for the hawkish neo-con faction in 
the cabinet’ 71. Such an apparent strengthening of the ‘values-based’ approach to 
Prevent was certainly consistent with concurrent developments in Germany, where 
the right-of Centre, Christian Democrat-led government were hardening the 
approach of their own anti-Islamist extremism programme, ‘Initiative Strengthening 
Democracy’. This required that, ‘all federally-funded associations will have to sign a 
statement in which they swear allegiance to the German constitution’ and be held 
responsible for the political statements or behaviour of any of their members. This 
represented the triumph of the ‘slippery slope’ perspective that lumped non-violent 
German Muslims with questionable political and social attitudes together with the 
small minority of Islamist violent extremists. This policy approach has proved hugely 
politically controversial in Germany 72. 
 
This triumph seemed to be confirmed by the appearance of the former security 
minister Dame Pauline Neville Jones on Radio 4‘s Today programme on the day of 
the Prevent strategy release, with Neville-Jones talking of ‘people who may have the 
same values as terrorists’, and saying ‘there are plenty of Muslim groups in this 
country, I fear, that do actually hold values… which are not in accordance with the 
rule of law and democratic values’ 73. However, The Guardian’s Editorial of 8th June 
saw the new strategy more as a ’convenient fudge over the precise definition of 
extremism’. They acknowledged, though that this new approach might cause 
problems in practice as ‘it risks outlawing people who express legitimate opposition 
to foreign policy’, so exacerbating the very ideological marginalisation that Prevent 
intends to address. In contrast, The Times Editorial of the same day welcomed the 
new direction, saying that ‘it is now time to stop handing money to questionable 
religious organisations’. 
 
These political tensions and the need to satisfy differing audiences could be seen in 
the significant differences between how ministers ‘trailed’ the new Prevent Strategy 
in the media and what it actually said. Pre-launch interviews with, and leaks to, right 
of centre newspapers The Daily Telegraph and The Times suggested a new and 
hard line with The Daily Telegraph running ‘Universities ’complacent’ over Islamic 
Radicals, Theresa May warns’, on 5th June 2011, and with claims that funding would 
be withdrawn from some organisations. The actual Prevent report was somewhat 
more circumspect, suggesting that the pre-release media work had been much more 
to do with wider party political positioning than the content of the actual strategy. 
 
 
The Revised Prevent Strategy 
The new objectives identified for Prevent in June 2011were: 
 Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from 
those who promote it; 
 Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are 
given appropriate advice and support; and 
 Work with a wide range of sectors and institutions (including education, faith, 
health and criminal justice) where there are risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address 74 
 
 In launching this revised Prevent strategy, the government acknowledged that, ‘The 
Prevent programme we inherited from the last government was flawed’ 75 . In 
claiming that the previous approach had confused integration/cohesion and counter-
terrorism, the revised strategy appeared to accept the findings of the CLG Select 
Inquiry, saying that, ‘as a general rule, the two strategies and programmes must not 
be merged together’.76  Here, the government identified the significant degree of 
local decision-making and  the lack of ring-fencing for the funding as leading to what 
they identified as the ‘convergence’ of Prevent and cohesion. This claim is partly 
based on evaluation returns from local authorities but, as identified above, this data 
is significantly unreliable. It also raises issues of what exactly ‘hearts and minds’ 
Prevent work should look like, if it is not to have any connection to cohesion, and 
will not, primarily, be locally-determined. The overlap between cohesion and Prevent 
was identified by the Select Committee Inquiry as problematic and as fuelling 
concerns over spying, so the new strategy proposed a formal policy split, with the 
Home Office leading on Prevent, and DCLG concerned only with cohesion and 
integration. However, Prevent was now to focus on work in 25 areas identified as 
‘hotspots’ of potential radicalisation, with local co-ordinators to be funded directly by 
the Home Office in order for them to direct local Prevent-funded activity. However, 
the local partnership boards they will work to are likely to be very much the current 
local structures largely co-ordinated by local authorities, with this immediately 
suggesting that the formal Home Office/DCLG, Prevent/cohesion split is somewhat 
artificial. 
The June 2011 list of twenty five identified areas for Prevent activity was a significant 
departure from the previous approach of identifying a larger number of local 
authorities on the basis of their Muslim populations. The new Strategy stated that ‘In 
future, simple demographics will not be used as a basis for prioritising Prevent work’. 
77 This revised and reduced list of target areas did not include key local authorities in 
the north of England such as Oldham, Rochdale or Calderdale, all of which had 
experienced terror arrests and convictions, and racial tensions involving Muslim 
communities. In particular, it did not include Kirklees in West Yorkshire, home of two 
of the 7/7 attackers:  ‘Funding will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 
priority areas for project work on a grant basis and for activities which address 
specific local risks and are designed to establish specific Prevent benefits’. 78 The 
OSCT will have oversight of this funding, which ‘in the future will be prioritised on our 
assessment of the risk of radicalisation in specific areas’.79 The analysis behind this 
is suggested in the comments that ‘radicalisation tends to occur in places where the 
terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested’80 , and that 
‘Islamist extremist can purport to identify problems to which terrorist organisations 
then claim to have a solution’.81  This seems to represent the ‘values’ approach 
coming to the fore, although despite the pre-publication hype, the review found 
evidence of only a ‘small number’ or extremist organisations 82  receiving Prevent 
funding in the past, leading The Guardian to conclude that ‘official review finds scant 
evidence of state funds going to extremists’. 83   
 
The revised Prevent Strategy also signalled a potential reduction in the dedicated 
funding to the Police, despite positive comments on how Prevent has helped to build 
Police contact with and understanding of Muslim communities. This change was 
based on concerns from the Police themselves that they had been too dominant in 
Prevent, with ‘the number of people employed by the Police to deal with Prevent 
exceeds the numbers who have been employed by local authorities’. 84  However, 
the Police and the Security Services through the regional CTU ‘hubs’ are likely to 
remain central to Prevent as it  moves forward. Any reduction in the Police role, 
alongside an intelligence-based approach to targeting activity, could be seen as a 
partial governmental admission of Police/Security Service ‘over-stepping’ within 
Prevent, despite their denials of any ‘spying’. However, that sits uncomfortably with 
the new Prevent strategy’s statement that ‘there are some 12,000 students training 
for health qualifications within universities each year. Work has started to ensure that 
Prevent is included in the undergraduate curriculum’ 85, and their trumpeting of the 
fact that over 15,000 front-line public sector staff have already received ‘Workshop to 
Raise Awareness of Prevent’ (WRAP) training, all of which suggests that doctors or 
social workers diagnosing ‘radicalisation’ is the same thing as noting child abuse or 
hard drug use. 
 
Other key operational elements of Prevent were retained but challenged to sharpen 
their focus. This included the information and communication work of RICU, which 
was required to comply with the renewed emphasis on ‘values’: ’ going forward, we 
will want to emphasise the connection between extremist and terrorist ideologies’.86  
As trailed in pre-release media work, the new strategy also both criticised 
Universities themselves and student bodies such as the Federation of Student 
Islamic Societies (FOSIS) for not doing enough: ‘we are concerned that some 
universities and colleges have failed to engage in Prevent’.87  Good progress was 
reported in the Prisons sector, but government quoted recent research by the 
University of Huddersfield for the Youth Justice Board to suggest that the youth 
justice field now needed a risk-based, smaller and better-targeted programme in the 
same way as local authorities. The increased emphasis on intelligence-led 
approaches to individuals at risk of radicalisation within the revised Prevent strategy 
could be seen in the prominence of the CHANNEL programme within the plans for 
the future. It highlighted that CHANNEL had worked with 1120 people between April 
2007 and December 2010, with the majority being aged 11-25 years old, 290 being 
under 16, and an astonishing 55 under 12 years old. The very significant ethical 
questions raised by this demographic profile were not directly addressed in the 
document, with discussion instead focussing on the need to ensure that Channel did 
not stray in to broader cohesion or social work issues: ’we recognise the risk that the 
criteria for entry to these programmes can be too broad’. 88 The implication was that 
Channel would be focussed on the 25 priority areas identified by the strategy. 
Channel is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
This document re-iterated the judgment of CONTEST 2 (Home Office, 2009) that, 
‘The most significant terrorist threat we face comes from Al Qaida, its affiliates and 
like-minded terrorist organisations inspired by violent Islamism’. 89 This apparent 
need to focus on Islamist terror was supported by the belief that extreme right-wing 
terrorism in the UK has been ‘much less widespread, systematic or organised’ 90 in 
comparison, with those arrested being isolated individuals without training or 
support. The revised Prevent Strategy went on to admit that 17 people currently 
serving sentences in UK prisons for terrorism-related offences had links with far-right 
groups, ‘though none of these groups are themselves terrorist organisations’ and 
that, ‘extreme right-wing plots have predominantly been undertaken by people acting 
on their own or with one or two associates’.91 This dismissive characterisation of the 
far-right terrorist threat could arguably be equally applied to many of the Islamist 
terror threats in the UK in recent years, with individuals or small groups emerging 
from legal organisations like H-U-T.  
 
The sense that the revised Prevent Strategy was offering a misguided analysis of the 
far-right terror threat was heightened just weeks after its launch, when a Norwegian 
far-right activist, Anders Behring Breivik, killed 77 people in a bomb attack in Oslo 
and a mass shooting at a socialist youth camp held on the island of Uttoya. Shortly 
before he commenced his attacks, Breivik emailed a detailed manifesto that railed 
against multiculturalism and the ‘Islamification’ of Europe to hundreds of far-right 
activists across Europe, including many members of the English Defence League.92  
These events in Norway inevitably shone light on the claim of the revised Prevent 
Strategy that, ‘people involved in extreme right-wing terrorism have not received the 
same training , guidance or support as many of those who engaged with Al Qaida or 
Al-Qaida-influenced organisations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct 
operations on the scale of those planned by their Al-Qaida counterparts’.93 The 
European-wide nature of this Islamist-obsessed mind-set is demonstrated by the fact 
the Norwegian media assumed, and reported as fact, for several  hours initially that 
this mass shooting and bombing was an Islamist attack.94 In the wake of the 
Norwegian attacks, Labour’s Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper wrote to Home 
Secretary Theresa May, asking her to re-consider the scope and focus of Prevent. 
Similarly, the National Association of Muslim Police Officers claimed that the UK 
authorities had been in denial for years about the scale of the right-wing terror threat, 
and their President, Zaheer Khan, ‘said his group’s warnings in private meetings with 
officials to take the threat of extremist right-wing violence more seriously had been 
re-buffed’.95 The counter-argument deployed here was that Breivik was the usual far-
right ‘lone wolf’ 96 who demonstrated the lack of a far-right network of ideology and 
inspiration comparable to Islamist extremism. This complacent fallacy, which badly 
under-estimates the growing far-right terror threat and its clear links to ‘legal’ UK 
groups like the BNP and EDL, is discussed further in Chapter 4 as part of the book’s 
arguments that Prevent needs to take a much more holistic approach towards the 
dangers of violent extremism. In its attempts to downplay the far-right threat, Prevent 
also overplays the coherence of the Islamist threat, as Chapter 1 suggested. 
 
Conclusion: Prevent - flawed and friendless?  
This Chapter has outlined the origins, assumptions and content of Prevent policy 
approaches in the UK since its inception in 2006 as part of the CONTEST strategy. 
In doing so, it has detailed the significant modifications made to Prevent by both 
Labour and Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition governments, and the 
substantial criticisms and concerns expressed over this sensitive policy area. Whilst 
the UK should rightly be praised for a ‘hearts and minds’ counter-terrorism’ approach 
that tries to reduce support for, or involvement in, violent extremism, it is clear that 
Prevent remains remarkably friendless, even after successive modifications, 
because of its significant flaws. Those flaws arguably reflect the sharply-differing 
political views within each major party over how the causes of violent extremism can 
be understood and how government should react, with the result being clumsy and 
contradictory compromises. Those disagreements also centre on what Prevent 
‘success’ looks like, and how it should be measured, with one former official who has 
studied Prevent and counter-terrorism developments commenting that , ‘I feel  that 
the metrics by which success/progress could be monitored or benchmarked are not 
particularly tight’. 97 These flaws, their implications for Prevent activity in practice, 
and the questions they raise are addressed in subsequent Chapters. Chapter 4 
addresses the monocultural focus on British Muslims which remains problematically 
at the heart of Prevent. It also examines the implications of this for the wider 
government priority of community cohesion and integration, and the impacts that the 
contradictory approach of Prevent is having, and is likely to continue having, on its 
present basis. Underpinning this focus on Muslims is the tension over ‘values’ and 
‘means’, and a flagrant lack of concern with the growing far-right terror threat.. 
Chapter 5 takes this debate further by discussing how Prevent has actually been 
implemented at local level, and what impacts it has had. That Chapter focuses on 
local authorities and the difficulties they have experienced over clarity, control and 
direction in relation to both national government and the Police and Security 
Services. It also examines specific sectors targeted by Prevent, such as Higher and 
Further Education, Prisons and Youth Offending sector. Chapter 6 directly addresses 
the allegation that Prevent has been a front for surveillance activity, examining the 
very significant role for the Police and Security Services in both the design and 
delivery of Prevent activity, and how we might understand this. This enables clear 
conclusions to be reached around the current effectiveness of Prevent against its 
stated aims, and what a Prevent approach that was more in tune with cohesion 
approaches and so, a more effective ‘hearts and minds’ counter-terrorism 
programme that addresses all forms of extremism, might look like. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: British Muslims: A Suspect Community? 
 
 
Introduction: Muslims under the spotlight 
From the moment it was operationalized in April 2007, Prevent has focussed on 
Muslim communities, and particularly on young Muslims, as the evidence examined 
in Chapter 3 made clear. This focus on Muslims might appear self-evident given the 
serious threat of Islamist violent extremism Britain faces, but it is argued here that 
this focus, and the way that it has been framed and operationalised by Prevent, has 
been self-defeating, both to the cause of preventing violent extremism and of 
promoting community cohesion. This Chapter examines the stark contradiction 
between Prevent and the wider policy goal of community cohesion and integration 
adopted as a priority by the UK Government since 2001, and discussed in Chapter 2. 
The result has been a monocultural focus on Muslims within Prevent that is not only 
at odds with that goal of community cohesion, but which has been counter-
productive , in its impact on the feelings of British Muslims, and in the consequent 
damage to relationships between Muslim communities and the state. The  
suggestion here is that Prevent has been both flatly in contradiction to community 
cohesion and has represented clumsy attempts at ‘social engineering’ through a 
‘values-based’ (Birt, 2009) approach, apparently continuing under the Coalition 
Government , which has had a negative impact by-enforcing the ‘otherness’ of 
Muslim communities. It is also argued here that previous policy experiences of trying 
to operationalize ‘anti-racist’ educational programmes in areas of significant racism 
and racist violence by white people suggests the need for caution in the way Prevent 
has been, and is, proceeding. The evidence from such ‘hearts and minds’ work 
aimed at white young people indicates that that Prevent’s approaches of state-
funded, community-based interventions in specific, ‘named’ communities around 
‘values’ and ‘attitudes’ risk provoking a counter-productive backlash within the 
Muslim communities targeted, as well as within other ethnic and faith communities 
denied similar state funding by this Muslim-focussed policy.1 The associated lack of 
focus within Prevent to date on far-right violent extremism has significantly 
contributed to the feeling amongst British Muslims that they are being unfairly singled 
out as an entire community, whilst dangerously ignoring a growing terrorist threat 
graphically illustrated by the July 2011 events in Norway. 
A monocultural contradiction to Community Cohesion? 
Chapter 2 outlined the violent events in several towns and cities in northern England 
in 2001 and the policy re-think that this provoked. The resulting policy priority of 
community cohesion had very clear things to say about the need to strengthen 
common identities and interests across different ethnic and faith communities, and 
the importance of cross-community contact work to build it. Implicit within this new 
policy approach was a critique of the previous phase of multiculturalist policy 
operation, which had overly-focused on the needs and position of each separate 
ethnic community. Those policies developed in the wake of the watershed 1981 riots 
and the consequent analysis of structural racial discrimination, saw an emphasis on 
support and funding for facilities and structures within specific ethnic communities. 
The hope there was that strong organisations and channels of communication within 
specific ethnic communities would both counter ethnic isolation and discrimination, 
and provide safety valves for future tensions. Such approaches indeed made a 
contribution to significant advances in racial equality 2, but also had a clear downside 
that was exposed by the 2001 disturbances: the policy focus on ethnic-specific 
needs and concerns had cemented physical and cultural ethnic segregation and 
fatally weakened cross-ethnic dialogue and contact. The post-2001 re-think not only 
now saw such approaches as unhelpful, but as part of the problem in that they both 
promoted separate and exclusive identities within each community and provoked 
prejudiced envy whenever another community apparently received government 
focus or support. Chapter 2 outlined  research evidence on how such community 
cohesion work was being successfully operationalized in work with young people in 
racially-tense areas like Oldham, Greater Manchester 3, but the Prevent programme 
outlined in Chapter 3 is in clear contradiction to such community cohesion 
assumptions, aims and approaches. The result has been tensions and 
disagreements over how Prevent relates to community cohesion ever since Prevent 
was launched in 2007. As a thoughtful investigation by The Financial Times into 
Prevent in 2010 put it:  ‘The relationship between ‘community cohesion’ and 
preventing terrorism is the sore heart of Prevent’. 4  
 
Alongside the post-2001 focus on community cohesion came a clear government 
presumption that funding for specific ethnic communities and for ethnic-specific 
agencies and facilities can now only be justified if tangible community cohesion 
benefits are identified. 5 The partial acceptance of this analysis can be seen within 
the Prevent agenda, with its priority focus on Muslim youth, women and new 
religious leadership outlined in Chapter 3, rather than traditional ‘community leaders’. 
There also appears to be an acknowledgement that past policies involved public 
support for ethnic-specific organisations with questionable political positions, with the 
Prevent commitment to ‘fundamentally rebalance our engagement towards those 
organisations that uphold shared values and reject and condemn violent 
extremism’.6  
 
However, in the light of this move to community cohesion, the Muslim-specific focus 
of the overall Prevent agenda and funded activity can only be seen as a self-
defeating contradiction. The evidence from local authority Prevent programmes to 
date is overwhelmingly of work exclusively with groups of Muslim youth, as 
discussed above. Given the demographic profile of the terrorist plots outlined above, 
the need for such a Muslim-focused approach may seem obvious, and some 
Muslims have defended the monocultural focus of Prevent on that basis. For 
instance, Hanif Qadir, an ex-Islamist radical who now runs a de-radicalisation project 
in east London, comments that: ‘we have to accept that we’ve got a problem, and 
accepting Prevent is accepting that we’ve got a problem’. 7 Some Muslim-only 
Prevent provision may well continue to be needed for young people actively 
exploring the meaning and implications of Islamic faith identity, but the post-2001 
community cohesion analysis suggests that ethnic segregation is actually the context 
for this growth in violent Islamist ideologies, a growth arguably taking place well 
before post-2001 developments in British foreign policy. Here, the profound physical, 
cultural and political ethnic segregation caused by racial discrimination, and 
cemented by policy concerns with specific ethnic ‘needs’, has created inward-looking 
mentalities within some Muslim communities, just as it has in some ‘socially 
excluded’ white communities, and a strengthening of essentialised ethnic and 
religious identities that has enabled minorities within those communities to move 
towards extremism. The government describes Islamist violent extremism as a threat 
to cohesion, but arguably this extremism is an outcome of the lack of cohesion. Such 
an analysis is equally relevant to the white working-class communities, who are 
identifying with the British National Party and other far-right groups such as the EDL. 
Here, the structural economic  ‘social exclusion’ those white communities share with 
many Muslim Pakistani/ Bangladeshi communities is further fuelling this growth in 
ethnic-specific and defensive ‘identities’. 8  
 
Additionally, analysis of the 2001 disturbances clearly identified that competition over 
ethnicity-based government regeneration funding, and white resentment over the 
(incorrect) perception that Asian communities unfairly benefitted from that funding, 
was a key part of the racial tension preceding the disturbances.9 This drove 
government’s post-2001 determination to avoid ethnic-specific funding and 
regeneration schemes, yet Prevent appears to be exactly that - a Muslim-specific 
funding stream that has real potential to further fuel white working-class feelings of 
‘unfairness’, whilst leaving some Muslim young people feeling that they have been 
‘targeted’ using broad and negative generalisations about their communities. 
 
The logical conclusion of the analysis above is that the response to extremist 
Islamist ideologies is not more work with groups of Muslim young people, but instead 
programmes of integrated cohesion activity that move further and faster in altering 
the perceptions of young people and adults of all ethnic and religious backgrounds 
by bringing them together for shared programmes of activity focused on regeneration 
and community development, fun, common experiences, and on shared concerns. 
Such programmes, if planned and implemented creatively, have much more potential 
to grow a meaningful and shared national ‘identity’ then any speeches by politicians. 
Good examples of such work have existed within Prevent to date, such as the UK 
Youth Parliament’s ‘Project Safe Space’ discussed in Chapter 3, but such cohesion- 
based work has been a very small minority of the Prevent-funded work so far. Early 
Prevent guidance to local authorities from the DCLG explicitly said that Prevent is 
not the same as a wider concern for community cohesion, but local authorities in key 
areas like West Yorkshire made clear from the outset that they struggled to see the 
distinction between the two policy areas.10 
 
The downside of ethnic-specific funding, and its role in the 2001 northern 
disturbances outlined above led to an emphasis, reinforced by the Commission on 
Cohesion and Integration’s 2007 recommendations,  that policy and funding should 
work across ethnic groups, so building shared identities. The design and 
implementation of Prevent has been in clear contradiction to that approach and has 
had the predictable results of creating suspicion, competitive claims, and ‘virulent 
envy’ 11  from other ethnic minority faith groups envious of the very considerable 
government support for Muslim faith organisations and infrastructure, whilst 
vehemently denying that their faiths have any problems with ‘extremism’. For 
instance, Dr. Indarjit Singh of the Network of Sikh organisations commented in oral 
evidence testimony to the CLG Select Committee Inquiry in relation to Muslim 
communities that: ‘they have been getting additional funding for all sorts of projects 
and they therefore see themselves in a sort of favoured status as a result of 
radicalisation’. 12  
 
 A more worrying envy comparison has come from certain white communities, 
particularly those white working class communities who have been marginalised by 
post-industrial restructuring and the dominant neo-liberal political responses to it. 13 
A ‘white backlash’ against the implementation of some anti-racist/ equal 
opportunities policy measures, and the fact that such perceptions of ethnic 
unfairness contributed to urban unrest  had already been identified, and community 
cohesion was meant to offer a holistic solution. However, it is far from clear how 
much that new vision has been accepted by government and operationalised, 
judging by the monocultural focus of Prevent. The result has been two- way envy 
and resentment, with Muslim communities asking why ‘extremism’, including its 
violent political form of far-right activists discussed below, was not being addressed 
in some white communities, whilst non-Muslims have questioned why such 
significant public resources were being directed towards often bland and generalised 
youth and community development activities for Muslims only. The growing political 
strength of the British National Party 14 did lead the Labour government to establish 
the ‘Connecting Communities’ fund  15 ,aimed at certain white working class areas , 
in practice witnessing far-right-related political tensions, but described by DCLG as 
being ‘communities under pressure’. However, despite the impression created, this 
fund was not part of Prevent because far-right terrorism is not viewed as 
International in nature and so did not fall within the CONTEST remit that directs 
Prevent, and had modest resources attached to it. ‘Connecting Communities’ was 
only operational for a short time in 2009/10 before Labour’s defeat in the May 2010 
General Election brought it to a halt. In that short life-span, though, Connecting 
Communities received praise from local authority practitioners and the CLG Select 
Committee Inquiry for actively encouraging cohesion-based approaches within 
funded work, and for targeting areas on an intelligence and ‘risk’ basis rather than on 
crude demographics. However, that ‘risk’ based approach to the targeting of funding, 
which was subsequently adopted by the Coalition government for Prevent funding 
from 2011, has its own risks, as then DCLG Minister John Denham highlighted in 
giving evidence to the Select Committee Inquiry: ‘risk-based funding clearly has a 
problem in that you are indicating somebody’s assessment of risk and that has both 
a presentational and practical problem’.16 
 
This policy expansion to white working class areas was accompanied by explicit 
guidance by DCLG Minister John Denham that, ‘cross-community activities could 
form a legitimate part of Prevent activities’ and the promise of money to support it. 17 
Both these initiatives went some way to answer the criticisms of Prevent outlined 
above, and Denham also used a speech in December 2009 to Prevent practitioners 
from across the country to explicitly refute the allegations of Prevent as surveillance 
of Muslim communities, or as an attempt to change the values and leadership of 
Muslim communities. However, the amendments to the Muslim-only focus of Prevent 
were minor at best, and the interpretation of purpose by Denham suggested more 
questions than answers. For Denham, Prevent, ‘is a crime Prevention programme’, 
and that a distinction from cohesion needs to be maintained:  
Community Cohesion – building a strong society with shared values and a strong 
sense of shared identity – is a broader and more ambitious aim, involving every part 
of every community equally, not just the Muslim communities. Prevent needs to 
remain focussed on preventing crime 18  
 
Whilst addressing discussions around surveillance and political interference, this 
crime prevention formulation is highly problematic for two reasons. Firstly, assuming 
the ‘crime’ to be prevented is terrorist activity, why has Prevent activity worked with 
such large numbers of Muslim young people, yet focussed so little on political , social 
and individual/psychological factors likely to make at least some young Muslims at 
risk of being involved in violent extremism? The evaluation evidence available 
suggests that engagement with such issues has been studiously avoided in practice 
for a number of reasons, leaving much Prevent activity via local authorities and 
community groups as bland and generalised youth activities for Muslims only.19  
Crime Prevention youth activities, such as Youth Inclusion Projects managed by 
local Youth Offending Teams, have worked with smaller numbers of carefully-
targeted young people, often referred by relevant agencies. The ‘Channel’ 
programme, which is discussed more fully in Chapter 6, would seem to fit the ‘crime 
prevention’ understanding reasonably well, but the broader Prevent activity to date 
simply doesn’t fit any meaningful understanding of that concept. Secondly, it avoids 
discussion of how the monocultural approach of Prevent discussed above may 
actually be re-enforcing the likelihood of some young Muslims being attracted to 
violent extremism. The community cohesion analysis of ethnic relations in Britain 
discussed in Chapter 2 was precisely that ‘parallel lives’ had encouraged tensions 
between communities, and separate, oppositional identities. This reality has been 
confirmed by more recent research amongst young people in Oldham and Rochdale, 
Greater Manchester, with significant numbers of white and Muslim young men 
having  prejudiced and antagonistic attitudes towards ‘others’. 20 Denham focussed 
on how building resilience against extremism amongst Muslim communities was a 
key aim of this ‘crime prevention’ Prevent policy, but arguably you cannot build 
resilience against intolerance, racism and hatred of other ways of life without 
individuals and their communities having the confidence, skills and links, the 
‘bridging social capital’21, or cross-community links, that comes from meaningful and 
on-going cross-ethnic contact. Indeed, Denham himself said , as the responsible 
Home Office Minister, in the Government’s response to the 2001 urban disturbances 
that the areas of the country not experiencing racial tensions were those who had 
‘succeeded in uniting diverse groups through a shared sense of belonging to, and 
pride in, a common civic identity’.22 The Government’s consistent defence of why a 
Prevent policy separate to community cohesion, and focused solely on Muslim 
communities, is important and needed is that terrorists can emerge from cohesive 
communities, with the ACPO  supporting this because of, ‘the fact that the four 
suicide bombers in 2005 were nurtured in cohesive communities’. 23  However, as 
Chapter 1 discussed in more detail, this is simply not true – three of the bombers 
grew up in the highly-ethnically-segregated and racially tense Leeds suburb of 
Beeston, an area which fits the theory of ‘parallel lives’. From that perspective, 
attractions to violent extremism, whether radical Islamist or racist white extremism, 
are likely to be stronger in culturally, if not physically, isolated and monocultural 
communities where ethnic segregation and singular identities are the norm, yet 
Prevent has done exactly that, work with Muslims only, thereby giving the message 
that their Muslim faith is the only form of identity and experience that is of 
importance.  
 
Whilst highly contested, 24 there is clear evidence that community cohesion has been 
understood and supported by public sector practitioners. 25 Research within local 
authorities in West Yorkshire has also confirmed considerable post-2001 progress 
on community cohesion, and strong support for it from both elected local authority 
members and officers.26   This meant that the explicitly monocultural focus of Prevent 
was immediately identified, at ground level, as problematically at odds with 
community cohesion. More worryingly, evidence suggests that the very significant 
and urgent pressure from national government from 2007 onwards on local 
government to operationalise Prevent work and structures to support it has inevitably 
side-lined the on-going process of embedding community cohesion understandings 
and practice within local authority operations, as well as muddying the waters as to 
how Prevent and cohesion related to each other. Government was adamant that 
Prevent, ‘is not the same as a wider concern for community cohesion’ 27, but has 
consistently struggled to clarify this distinction. 
 
Clumsy ‘Social Engineering’ 
Whilst the terrorist bombings and other plots outlined in Chapter 1 are clearly 
serious, they have involved very small numbers of individuals. This was apparently 
acknowledged by government in introducing Prevent: ‘There has always been a tiny 
minority who oppose tolerance and diversity’, 28 but the same document baldly stated 
that ’the key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes among 
Muslims’. 29   This impression that Government was concerned with Muslim 
communities in general was confirmed by the broad brush targeting of Prevent 
funding at all significant Muslim communities even though there is no evidence from 
plots to date that terrorists are more likely to emerge from ‘dense’ Muslim 
communities. 30   Whilst a number of DCLG Prevent documents talk about extremism 
in other communities, critics highlighted that: 
 ’We have been unable, however, to document any practical Prevent work in the 
community that is not directed in some way at Muslim communities, and we have 
been unable to find any examples of work that focuses substantially on far-right 
extremism’  31 
 This focus on Muslims per se is also highlighted by the large-scale engagement with 
Muslim young people, and the clear emphasis of Muslim community capacity 
building of civic infrastructure locally and nationally 32  discussed in Chapter 3, such 
as enhanced training and support for Mosque schools. The nature of this Prevent 
engagement with Muslim communities has proved controversial. Chapter 3 outlined 
how Prevent emerged as an agenda concerned with radicalisation, and issues of 
‘values’ and community organisation that might be contributing to it. In this way, 
Prevent has offered Muslim community organisations funding for capacity building 
through an explicitly anti-terrorism agenda. The labelling of an entire community, or 
large sections of it, as susceptible to terrorist involvement that is arguably inherent in 
this approach is exacerbated by the way government has gone about this. Birt 
(2009) identifies a long-running tension in government’s approach between ‘means 
based ‘and ‘values based’ strategies, with the pragmatism of the ‘means-based’ 
approach being in tension with, and arguably side-lined by, an inherently 
judgemental and interventionist ‘values-based approach’ that has apparently been 
prioritised under the Coalition government. That ‘values-based’ approach sees 
violent extremism as inextricably linked to problematic values, attitudes and 
oppositional identifications within wider British Muslim communities. The potentially 
counter-productive dangers of such a ‘values-based’ approach that confronts 
significant sections of British Muslim communities over their political and religious 
‘values’ was highlighted by Sir David Omand in his evidence to the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security in 2010: ‘tackling head-on through 
Government resource…what you might call the Islamic world view or political Islam 
may be a very stupid thing to do’. 32 Omand went on to cite the increasingly 
draconian French approach to citizenship and adherence by Muslims to it, such as in 
the 2011 ban on wearing the Burqa in public, as evidence of how dangerous a 
‘values-based’ approach can be, and suggested that states following such an 
approach may be biting off more than they can chew. 
 
 The former, ‘means-based’ approach sees Islamist terrorism in the UK as largely a 
socio-political phenomenon and so focuses on the personal and political factors 
attracting some young Muslim men to radicalisation, and engages with groups and 
individuals who can work constructively with such young men. This approach is 
favoured by professional practitioners on the ground being asked to operationalise 
Prevent, including the Metropolitan Police’s controversial former ‘Muslim Contact 
Unit’, which worked constructively with Islamist groups who dislike British society but 
who vehemently oppose violence,34  an approach supported by strong empirical 
evidence 35 , but which was disbanded under political and media pressure. Much of 
the Prevent funding to local authorities via DCLG prior to the Prevent review of 2011 
was in practice utilised in a ‘means-based’ manner, with local authorities taking 
varied approaches to use of the funding. Some authorities distributed all of the 
funding to local Muslim community organisations, with some even including those 
community groups in the grant decision-making process. Chapter 3 highlighted the 
tensions inherent in the creation of Prevent, and the ‘values’ stance taken publicly by 
Labour ministers, such as cutting ties with the MCB, was in practice balanced by the 
‘means-based’ approach of allocating Prevent funding to local authorities without 
strictly ring-fencing the cash or second-guessing local authorities on who should be 
funded. Indeed, a 2011 assessment of the British Prevent approach to date compiled 
for an American audience by Professor Peter Neumann of King’s College London 
suggested that ‘British policymakers never quite decided if Prevent was about 
cognitive or violent extremism’.36 
 
 However, the ‘values’ based’ approach has arguably dominated how past and 
present governments have actually viewed Prevent, the way they have shaped it 
nationally, and certainly how they have publicly talked about it. The approach taken 
by the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition in June 2011, following the Prevent 
review, and discussed in Chapter 3, clearly represents a ramping up of this ‘values-
based’ approach. In this way since 2007, Prevent has arguably given the impression 
that government is overtly intervening to shape religious practice and to promote 
new types of community leadership within Muslim communities.  This ‘values-based’ 
understanding sees a problem with the way Islam itself is being understood and 
practised by many second and third generation Muslims, leading to a need to 
promote and develop a more moderate and progressive British Islam. Whilst 
President Obama has initiated a move in the US towards a more pragmatic ‘means-
based’ approach, the British government has gone the other way, at least at the level 
of public rhetoric, since the 2006 airliners plot towards the ‘values-based’ approach 
through Prevent, an approach confirmed by successive refinements: ‘As part of 
CONTEST 2, the revised Prevent strategy reflects this shift in emphasis and works 
out its rationale in greater detail’.37 One approach has been to fund new 
organisations, promoting them as the voice of modern and moderate British Islam. 
This approach saw The Quilliam Foundation (2009), headed by ex-Islamist radical 
Ed Husain  receive over £1 million, the Sufi Muslim Council over £200,000 and the 
Radical Middle Way almost £400,000 by 2009/10 from Prevent. 38 This has been 
supported by explicit guidance to Local Authorities and others receiving Prevent 
funding to prioritise work with Muslim women and young people as under-
represented voices and experiences within Muslim communities. 39 Together, this 
can be seen as an attempt by government to engineer different types of leadership 
and representation from Muslim communities, with the assumption that this will lead 
to more progressive attitudes, values and behaviour. This has been supported by 
withdrawal of funding and engagement with national umbrella Muslim organisations, 
such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), not seen as taking a sufficiently robust 
enough position against Islamist terrorism at home or abroad. Ironically, the MCB’s 
formation and development in the 1990s was encouraged by both Conservative and 
Labour governments as a clear national voice for ‘moderate’ Muslims, even though 
the MCB was always led by Islamist activists whose overtly political perspectives 
were at odds with the vast majority of practising British Muslims. 40  
 
The MCB had considerable success in lobbying for state support for Muslim faith 
schools and more policy focus on religious affiliation ,such as a question on faith in 
the 2001 Census, but their relationship with government came under increasing 
strain as the ‘values-based’ approach became predominant, with contact cut over the 
pro-Hamas views of an MCB leader. This recent  attempt by national government  
through Prevent to create a new generation and type of ‘community leaders’ can be 
seen as a parallel of policy approaches to ethnic minority communities in the wake of 
serious urban disturbances in the early 1980s 41, and has clearly provoked 
resentment from more established Muslim community groups . The dangers of such 
a ‘values-based’ approach were highlighted by the CLG Select Committee Inquiry, 
who commented that the need: ‘to debate ideas from a range of perspectives and 
not drive the more ‘radical voices underground was a concern in much of the 
evidence we received’.’ 42 For that reason, the Select Committee stressed the 
importance of the ‘violent extremism’ formulation at the heart of Prevent in 
emphasising that government’s concern was in terrorism, not religious or political 
beliefs.  
 
However, Chapter 3 highlighted how the June 2011 review of the Prevent strategy by 
the Coalition government flatly ignored that cautionary advice in deciding to focus on 
‘extremism’ generally within Prevent. Such a hardening of the ‘values-based’ 
approach was indicated in February 2011, just a week after Cameron’s Munich 
speech, in a ‘Daily Telegraph’ story headlined ‘Counter-terrorism projects worth 1.2m 
face axe as part of end to multiculturalism’. The article highlighted the case of the 
‘STREET’ (Strategy To Reach, Empower and Educate Teenagers) project, which 
was associated with Brixton Mosque in south London, and which had received more 
than £500,000 in Prevent funding from government since 2007.According to The 
Telegraph: ‘the project will have its money withdrawn this year in the first step 
towards switching funding away from strains of Islam with which government 
disagrees’.43 The Project had been focusing on African-Caribbean converts, Somali 
youth and Algerian-origin exiles, all viewed by the Security Services as high-risk 
categories for attraction to violent extremism, and one experienced counter-terrorism 
analyst who has studied the work of the Street Project carefully, commented that ‘I 
didn’t get the sense that they were proposing caliphate or sharia law in the 
UK…What is very clear from the discussions I had with members of STREET is 
‘’…this won’t be solved from Whitehall’’ ‘. 44  Brixton Mosque had become dominated 
by ‘Takfiri’ Islamist extremists such as Abu Qatada and Abdullah el-Faisal, in the 
1990s, and was the Mosque attended by ‘shoe-bomber’ Richard Reid  and Zacharias 
Moussaoui, the so-called ‘20th hijacker’, who was heavily implicated in the 9/11 
planning. It has been described as one of the key ‘epicentres’ of violent Islamist 
extremism in Europe during that period .45 Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2010) has 
carried out research there and the other main ‘epicentre’, Finsbury Park Mosque, 
and describes the battle for control of Brixton between violent jihadist and ‘Salafists’ 
with radical political and religious views but who were opposed to violence. One of 
the key roles of the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Muslim Contact Unit’, as outlined above, 
was to develop relationships of trust and dialogue with such Salafists and support 
their efforts to re-take control of Brixton Mosque: ‘Abu Qatada and el-Faisal, along 
with many others, were actually repelled by the Brixton Salafi community, who 
deemed their messages of hate and violence anathema to their understanding of 
true Islamic practice’. 46 Projects subsequently initiated by Brixton Salafists, such as 
the ‘Street’ project, were supported by Prevent on the basis that the Salafists had 
radical views but were the most effective advocates against young Islamists being 
attracted towards violence. This had involved providing youth activities, Islamic study 
classes, and social responsibility and citizenship programmes, but had been on the 
radar of opposition politicians from at least 2009, when right-of-centre think-tank 
Policy Exchange highlighted the Street Project’s Salafists roots in their report 
‘Choosing our Friends Wisely’.47 That report claimed the effects of Prevent had been 
to ‘empower reactionaries within Muslim communities and to marginalise genuine 
moderates’, suggesting that such ‘means-based’ approaches within Prevent were 
actually helping to deepen the threat of violent Islamist extremism, not address it. 
 
Ironically, the Prevent funding approach has sometimes resulted in working with 
exactly the sort of traditional Muslim Community Leaders, many of them MCB 
affiliates, that the ‘values-based’ approach has tried to move away from, as 
evidenced by the findings of the Tax Payer’s Alliance investigation and the 
considerable Prevent support from local authorities in many areas for Mosque 
Schools and committees. 48 Indeed, the pioneering ‘Peacemaker’ project, which was 
working with young people in the Oldham area on community cohesion approaches 
before government adopted it as a priority, highlighted this issue in their evidence 
submission to the CLG Select Committee Inquiry. Peacemaker pointed out that 
because of its monocultural Muslim focus, and the reliance of many local authorities 
on established Muslim community groups to receive funding, Prevent funding was 
actually resulting in backward steps in relation to community leadership and dialogue 
by rewarding traditional, religious elements and leaders within Muslim communities, 
rather than working with those focussed on racial equality issues.49 This could be 
seen nationally in the growth of Mosque-related funding as funding ceased for Racial 
Equality Councils in many areas. Ted Cantle, the architect of the government’s 
prioritisation of community cohesion, was scathing about the impact of much of this 
Prevent funding in his evidence to the Select Committee hearing: ‘It creates the 
impression that the only thing that the government is interested in is their 
Muslimness’. 50   A  report containing recommendations on how the USA should 
develop its counter-radicalisation policy approaches highlights that, ‘Government 
should not give the impression that it depends on religious interlocutors to convey 
the message to Muslim communities’51 ,and praises Dutch policy approaches that 
have worked through Dutch secular Muslims as role-models of integration, as well as 
through Islamic faith organisations. 
 
At the local level, Muslim organisations have often felt that they are being treated as 
clients and service delivers, rather than strategic partners, either playing no role in 
delivery, or having to compete with each other for funding and overtly ‘sign up’ to 
government positions against terrorism (which virtually everyone opposes) and 
‘extremism’ (which no one can agree a definition of). The danger of this ‘values-
based’ approach, and the fact that funding has been, and apparently will continue to 
be, contingent on its acceptance, is that it closes down the  open debates and 
involvements needed to undermine the appeal of violent extremism: ‘One effect of 
Prevent is to undermine exactly the kind of radical discussions of political issues that 
would need to occur if young people are to be won over and support for illegitimate 
political violence diminished’. 52  Here, in such a broad focus on Muslim communities 
as a  whole, whilst prioritising the acceptance of certain ‘values’, Prevent has 
represented the worst of all worlds, approaching an entire faith community  as being 
at risk of terrorist involvement, whilst  ‘forcing’ particular political and doctrinal issues 
that have only limited meaning to most Muslims going about their ordinary, day to 
day lives. In fact, the ruling out under the Prevent ‘values-based’ approach of certain 
legitimately-established Muslim organisations, would seem to play in to the hands of 
certain Islamist political groups, such as Hizb-Ut-Tahrir, who demand that Muslims 
have nothing to do with any democratic, secular processes within wider society. For 
Birt (2009:54), the fundamental difficulty of Prevent, ‘is an over-emphasis upon 
counter-terrorism without engaging Muslims as citizens, rather than as an ‘at risk’ set 
of communities’. The danger is that this tension will continue to grow under a re-
energised, ‘values-based’ version of Prevent. 
 
Learning from the experience of anti-racist education 
A further area of concern over this monocultural and increasingly ‘values-based’ 
Prevent agenda is its ability to achieve success on its own terms—that is, can the 
programme actually positively influence Muslim young people away from support for, 
or even involvement in, violent Islamist activity, through the variety of measures 
outlined in Chapter 3? I would suggest that there are considerable grounds for 
pessimism here, as the programme is currently designed, with some of the evidence 
in support of this assertion coming from previous attempts to educationally influence 
racist white young people potentially attracted to racial violence and far-right political 
involvements, as well as from the Prevent programme to date. 
 
An additional facet of the ‘political multiculturalism’ or equal opportunities 
approaches increasingly dominant  post-1981 was anti-racist educational 
approaches operationalised in schools, colleges and youth work settings and largely 
aimed at white young people viewed as part of the dominant white majority. Whilst 
well-intentioned, and sometimes successful with young people of particular social 
backgrounds, these anti-racist educational approaches involved inherent problems 
and unintended consequences that should act as salutary warnings for those 
designing community-based Prevent programmes. An immediate problem is the way 
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds understand and interpret any 
educational agenda designed and enforced by those in power and concerned with 
changing behaviour, whether it is delivered in schools, through Youth Offending 
programmes or in the community. Anti-racist rules and programmes introduced by 
schools from the 1980s onwards came up against this problem, with white working-
class pupils often rejecting these new anti-racist norms as part of their wider 
rejection of compulsory schooling and societal norms that felt irrelevant to their lives 
and experiences. The extension of the Prevent programme from 2008 onwards to 
youth work, Youth Offending Teams, schools and the police has risked a similar 
rejection by Muslim-origin young people selected for involvement, particularly if 
implementation is as ‘clumsy’ as anti-racism implementation sometimes was. The 
most graphic example of this was the racist murder in Manchester of a young 
Bangladeshi man by a fellow pupil in 1986, with the independent inquiry identifying 
the clumsy implementation of anti-racist policies as having strongly contributed to the 
context of the murder.53 
 
Central to the rejection by many white working-class young people of ‘anti-racism’, 
as it was sometimes implemented educationally on the ground in schools and youth 
projects, was the perception of some young people that these anti-racist norms were 
explicitly critical of the assumptions, attitudes and cultures of white working-class 
communities by ‘outsiders’ , including middle-class white people. Here, white 
working-class communities were often implicitly portrayed as racist and ignorant, 
with cultures weaker and inferior to the ethnic minority religions and cultures 
‘celebrated’ by multiculturalist and anti-racist policies. This led to feelings of 
‘unfairness’ amongst some white working-class young people, fuelled by the 
perception that their attitudes and behaviour were judged more harshly than similar 
behaviour by other ethnic communities. Some of the strongest evidence of such a 
‘white backlash’ has come from research carried out in Greenwich, south-east 
London. This research was commissioned by the Education and Youth Service 
departments of Greenwich Council in the wake of the racist murders of Stephen 
Lawrence and two other ethnic minority young men in the early 1990s, and in 
recognition of the fact that previous approaches to encourage anti-racist attitudes 
and behaviour amongst white young people in the area had failed. 54 The clear 
lesson from this research, that anti-racist projects had to be much less judgmental 
and engage with young people on a basis of respect and desire for honest dialogue, 
rather than one-way proselytising, was taken on board by other anti-racist youth 
initiatives.55 
 
Such a clear, monocultural focus within Prevent on Muslim communities, and the 
associated lack of focus on racist extremism within white communities, could well 
have the unintended consequence of hardening a defensive and antagonistic 
‘Muslim’ identity among those involved in response to a perception that their whole 
identity and community lifestyle is being implicitly criticised and scrutinised, whilst the 
faults of others are ignored. Chapter 2 offered primary research evidence from 
Muslim young people in Oldham and Rochdale that is in line with other academic 
research and which suggested both strong Islamic faith identification amongst young 
British Muslims, and an antagonism towards non-Muslim ‘others’ by a minority of 
those young Muslims. Arguably, post 9/11 popular media coverage has already had 
the effect of hardening such ‘defensive’ Muslim identities, and Prevent activity could 
further exacerbate this trend. Associated with the ‘white backlash’ by some white 
working-class young people against anti-racism was the perception that they were 
viewed as ‘all racist’, even though many vehemently denied that their motivations 
during inter-racial conflicts were actually racial.  
 
A concern with the Prevent agenda would be that at least some of the practitioners 
involved in its delivery at a local level carried problematic assumptions about the 
attitudes of Muslim young men, fuelled by some media coverage and popular 
prejudices concerning religiously observant young men with beards. This leads to a 
focus on those responsible for implementing the Prevent educational agenda, such 
as youth workers, YOT workers and teachers. There is clear evidence from previous 
research among youth workers trying to implement anti-racist work with white young 
people in West Yorkshire that such professionals lacked confidence and felt under-
prepared when attempting to implement such contested policies. These feelings 
were based on the perception that they were implementing policies and rules around 
highly sensitive issues that they didn’t really understand, and certainly didn’t feel 
confident to debate and explore with young people and communities who often had 
strong and forthright opinions on those issues. These perceptions by professionals 
tended to lead either to total avoidance of the issues, or of a rigid, ‘party line’ 
implementation in tension with their professional training as educators, and which 
often fuelled the negative reaction from young people discussed above.56  
 
Similar hesitation and avoidance of controversial issues was found amongst local 
authority staff operationalizing the initial ‘Pathfinder’ phase of Prevent in one part of 
West Yorkshire.57  Given that any educational process hoping to make genuine 
progress on the Prevent agenda in relation to ideologies of violent Islamist 
extremism and how they can be countered would inevitably lead to detailed 
discussion of Islamic teachings and doctrine, ‘Muslim’ identity and highly-emotive 
foreign policy issues around Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, it is likely that the large-
scale expansion of the Prevent programme underway since 2008 has led to one or 
both of these responses of ‘avoidance’ or hard-line implementation. Initial evidence 
suggests that ‘avoidance’ has largely been the professional response in the work 
funded by DCLG between 2007-2011, with the Prevent educational work focusing on 
Muslim young people, but explicitly not engaging with why some Muslim young 
people are actually attracted to violent Islamist ideologies, or with the broader 
political issues that fuel Islamist anger. In an in-depth investigation into the 
operationalization of Prevent, The Financial Times commented that: ‘a failure to talk 
about violent extremism is a striking characteristic of many Prevent projects’. 58 
 
Much of the activity to date in the name of Prevent has been good diversionary youth 
and community work that has provided positive and enjoyable experiential activities 
for young Muslims. More, not less, of such positive activities are needed for all 
young people, and especially for those in socially excluded communities with few 
leisure options, but such activity to date has largely avoided explicit focus on the key 
concerns driving the Prevent agenda—the ‘sharp end’ of politics and ‘extremist’ 
ideologies has not being discussed in most cases, as then-DCLG Minister Hazel 
Blears acknowledged in December 2008.59 It is clear that a significant number of 
Muslim young people, especially those aged 15 years and older, do want to debate 
and explore Muslim identity, extremism and Islam’s treatment in the media, and in 
wider geo-politics. This interest drove the growth in Muslim students’ societies on 
campuses, and in Islamist groups like HUT from the early 1990s onwards, so 
clarifying that enhanced ‘Muslim’ identification amongst young people predates 
foreign policy controversies such as Iraq.60 In saying this, the book certainly does not 
intend to condemn ground level professionals doing sterling work with disadvantaged 
young people, but simply to highlight the large gap between the stated aims and 
focus of the Prevent agenda and the reality of much of its implementation. This is in 
contrast to the excellent work being doing with young people of all ethnic 
backgrounds around democratic and political participation through initiatives such as 
the ‘Youth Parliament’ scheme that sees young people elect local representatives 
who meet to debate and investigate issues of importance to young people.61 
 
Ironically, given the community cohesion concern over single ethnic group funding, 
some progressive, community-based Muslim organisations have been explicitly 
discussing political issues and the associated attraction of Islamist ideologies with 
young people, and who are most likely to be aware of young people at risk of 
‘radicalisation’. One such example is the Hamara Centre in Beeston, South Leeds. 
The ringleader of the 7/7 bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, was a part-time youth 
worker within one of Hamara’s projects, and may well have developed the plot with 
two other local men whilst working there. Hamara have since been in the forefront of 
developing a meaningful Prevent agenda, with Muslim youth activities that enable 
discussion of extremism within a wider context of democratic political involvement, 
community cohesion direct contact with other ethnic/religious groups and analysis of 
Muslim identity within wider British society.62 Such activity suggests that Muslim 
young people are able and willing to clearly discuss ‘violent extremism’ and its 
underlying political discourse if professionals are confident and ready to undertake 
such work within an explicit context of community cohesion and citizenship activity. 
To date, however, too much Prevent funding has been retained by local authorities, 
with little reaching Muslim-led community/third sector organisations in some areas. 
This limited involvement of the community sector may well be a result of the rapid 
policy development and operationalization and the inevitable ‘playing safe’ of funding 
decisions scrutinised by Police/Security Services,63  rather than a community 
cohesion-inspired reluctance to fund single ethnicity organisations, but it has limited 
the ability of established Muslim community groups to lead, and be seen to lead by 
the wider community, on the crucial issue of tackling support for, and ideologies of, 
violent Islamist extremism. 
 
Disinterest in far-right extremism 
The above analysis makes the lack of focus on other types of politically motivated 
violent extremism within the Prevent agenda even harder to justify, with the 
Government’s ‘it’s not international in nature, so it can’t fall within CONTEST, so it 
can’t be part of Prevent’ formulation appearing to be both spurious, and a mis-
representation of what has been sometimes been happening on the ground. This is 
not only illustrated by the terrible events in Norway in July 2011, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, but also by any serious analysis of the clear links between UK far-right 
political organisations and acts of violent extremism over the past thirty years. 
 
Prior to the 7/7 attacks, the most serious terrorist attacks on London in recent times 
had come in April 1999 from the ‘nail bomber’ David Copeland, a White Supremacist. 
Copeland carried out three bombings in 13 days. The most serious attack on the 
Admiral Duncan pub, a well- known gay venue in the Soho area, killed three people , 
one of whom was a pregnant woman, and injured over 100 people, many seriously. 
His other, largely unsuccessful, targets were the multiracial areas of Brick Lane and 
Brixton. Copeland had joined the BNP and in 1997 attended meetings in his home 
area of Barking, East London in the company of party official Tony Lecomber. 
Lecomber himself had been jailed for 3 years in 1985 on explosives charges after 
attempting to carry out a nail bomb attack on the headquarters of a left-wing group. 
Police found hand-grenades and detonators at Lecomber’s home, but he still only 
got 3 years, with the judge at his trial remarkably saying, ‘you are not a terrorist in 
the normal sense of the word’. 64 Copeland left the BNP because it was not ‘hard-
line’ enough for him, instead joining the National Socialist Movement (the political 
wing of Combat 18) in the hope that they would launch a paramilitary struggle.65   He 
soon learnt to build his own explosive devices with advice from far-right websites and 
fellow far-right activists, with deadly impact, yet it subsequently emerged that neither 
Special Branch or MI5 had a file on him. He was jailed for life in 2000.66 
More recent court cases have exposed other attempts by far-right activists to create 
and use explosive devices 67, whilst the ‘Red Watch’ website is infamous for its 
encouragement of harassment against anti-racist campaigners. Underpinning the 
political and media response to these documented incidences of far-right violent 
extremism over several decades is the myth that right-wing terrorists are ‘lone 
wolves’, with the implicit suggestion that they are mentally unbalanced, rather than 
politically motivated , and have acted entirely alone. As Chapter 3 identified, the 
Labour government belatedly recognised that they had neglected far-right 
extremism, and launched the short-lived ‘Connecting Communities’ initiative in 
parallel to Prevent. As part of that, then – Communities and Local Government 
Minister John Denham commissioned Gerry Gable, Editor of the long-established 
anti-fascist monitoring magazine ‘Searchlight’ to investigate the ‘lone wolf’ 
conception of far-right terrorism. In his foreword to the resulting report, Denham 
commented that, ‘Gerry Gable’s report lays bare the myth that most far-right 
terrorism is the action of isolated individuals… In fact, those involved in apparent 
one-person actions have in all cases had clear and often long-standing involvement 
with organised groups’. 68 This judgement was based on the report’s analysis of case 
studies of almost 40 individuals with far-right views convicted for terrorist or serious 
violence offences that far-right political networks have been central to their beliefs 
and actions in every case.69 This included father and son, Ian and Nicky Davidson, 
convicted in May 2010 for manufacturing bombs and the chemical agent ricin, who 
were in contact with around 300 Nazi sympathisers worldwide via the internet. 70 For 
Denham, the evidence compiled by Gable clearly showed how the authorities have 
failed to effectively monitor far-right groups and their activists in order to spot those 
moving towards violent expressions of their racist and nationalist extremism, leading 
him to conclude that, ‘the evidence in this report leads to the conclusion that far-right 
terrorism must be treated as seriously as Islamist terrorism’.71 
This perspective that ‘lone wolf’ far-right terrorists actually emerge from, and are 
embedded within, far-right extremist networks is borne out by the case of Anders 
Breivik outlined in Chapter 3. Breivik had previously been active in the right-wing 
Norwegian ‘Progress’ party, but didn’t see them as radical enough. Breivik’s 
manifesto, posted online shortly before he began the attacks, was titled ‘2083: A 
European Declaration of Independence’, and justified his imminent attack on socialist 
young people, because they were the next generation who would destroy Norway 
and Europe through their acceptance and promotion of ‘multiculturalism’. Breivik had 
been a regular contributor to extremist websites such as ‘the gates of Vienna’, which 
focuses on the supposed threat to Europe, and, ‘the myths that Muslims, supported 
by liberals, cultural relativists and Marxists, are out to Islamicise Europe and that 
there is a conspiracy to impose multiculturalism on the continent and destroy 
western civilisation’. 72 This Islamophobic perspective of a developing ‘Eurabia’ is 
shared and debated on a number of pan-European far-right websites, actively 
developing an ideology and paranoia that some commentators see as reminiscent of 
the ‘Jewish conspiracy’ central to the interwar fascists/national socialists 73, and 
arguably amplified by ‘respectable’ right-of-centre political commentators. 74 What is 
clear is that Breivik had been in active communication for some time with far-right 
activists in a number of countries, including the UK. Those links include contact with 
EDL activists, and possibly the EDL’s funder, Alan Lake. 75  Breivik had lauded EDL 
campaigns against the ‘Islamification of Britain’ and claimed to have 600 EDL 
supporters as ‘friends’ on Facebook.76  One academic commentator suggests of both 
the EDL and the BNP that, ‘it is clear that both have a more sinister ‘back stage’ 
politics’. 77 This not only emphasises the need for CONTEST and Prevent to focus 
also on far-right violent extremism, but also the links between that far-right 
extremism and Islamist extremism. The EDL is arguably living proof of that, 
emerging as a response to Islamist extremists publicly protesting against British 
army units who had recently returned from Iraq marching through Luton. It has since 
become a national movement encompassing former far-right activists, football 
hooligans, and people apparently expressing a racialised anger at profound 
economic social exclusion and marginalisation. 78   Here, ‘the emergent academic 
literature is stressing that the relationship between the far-right and Islamophobia is 
crucial to understanding contemporary far-right extremism, yet the issue is not 
satisfactorily addressed by Prevent’. 79 
The links between legal right-wing political groups and violent extremism explored 
above expose the myth that far-right parties are now respectable and only concerned 
with electoral progress, but the comparative success at the ballot box  for the BNP at 
the time that Prevent was initially being devised and implemented may explain the 
reluctance of government to provide free publicity for such groups by publicly linking 
them with ‘violent extremism’, as criticism in 2006 of then Employment Minister 
Margaret Hodge MP for acknowledging the rise of the BNP in east London indicated. 
78   As a result, right-wing extremism was invoked in the introductions to a number of 
the government’s Prevent documents (including an incorrect reference to ‘Mosley’s 
brown shirts’!), but this appears to have been nothing more than a superficial nod 
towards even-handedness. Such apparent inconsistency, emphasised by Tony 
Blair’s post 7/7 call to ban Islamist groups like HUT whilst the BNP continued to 
grow, has not been lost on Muslim young people.  
Conclusion: Some Communities are suspect? 
 That disinterest in right-wing extremism is just one facet of the counter-productively 
monocultural focus of Prevent activity to date. In focusing solely on British Muslims, 
and in a broad-brush way that has made entire communities feel that they are the 
objects of the policy, Prevent has worked in contradiction to the wider policy goals of 
cohesion and integration, and has failed to understand the key analysis that 
cohesion offers of how distinct ethnic identities can unhelpfully harden and become 
extreme for a minority in conditions of segregation and policy approaches that over-
emphasise difference. That would suggest that the ‘hearts and minds’ approaches of 
Prevent should see community cohesion, not as a distinct but equally important 
policy strand as government has repeatedly insisted, but as the key vehicle for 
tackling violent extremism in specific communities, especially through the 
involvement of young Muslims (and young working class white people) in both 
processes of ‘meaningful direct contact’ and, within that, in processes of democratic 
engagement and political participation. The dangerous logic of this monocultural 
Prevent approach has been seen in the clumsy social engineering that it has too 
often engaged in, attempting to ‘engineer’ different sorts of communal leadership and 
even forms of religious practice within Muslim communities. This approach fails to 
also learn the lessons of previous attempts to promote ‘anti-racism’ within white 
working class communities, where such well-intentioned polices have often provoked 
a ‘backlash’ from young people who feel that their communities and cultures are 
being judged unfavourably on both an ethnic and class basis, so hardening the very 
‘identity’ that policy hoped to soften. The danger here is that Prevent has exactly that 
defensive ‘hardening’ effect on many young Muslims, at the same time as provoking 
envy from other communities jealous of the resources being targeted on one 
community in a blatantly ethnic/faith basis. The failure to address other forms of 
‘extremism’ in non-Muslim communities simply exacerbates this inherent problem of 
a monocultural Prevent. Local authorities and other agencies charged with actually 
implementing Prevent since 2007 have had to wrestle with these issues and 
tensions, and that experience is analysed further in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Confusion on the ground? Prevent  in Operation 
 
Introduction: Orders from above 
In outlining the origins, design and development of the Prevent strategy, Chapter 3 
highlighted a number of issues and tensions inherent in the approach taken to this 
‘hearts and minds’ element of the CONTEST counter-terrorism policy. These issues 
and tensions were apparent in the early days of Prevent, and remain alive today, 
despite significant modifications in the intervening years. Principal amongst those 
problematic features, from the perspective of this book, has been the stark 
contradiction to the overarching policy drive for community cohesion, integration and 
stronger common identities outlined in Chapter 2, of a Prevent policy that has been 
targeted in a monocultural fashion at Muslims as an undifferentiated, faith-based 
community understood through only that ‘Muslim’ identity. Chapter 4 analysed the 
highly negative results of such a misguided approach, suggesting that Prevent has 
inadvertently hardened that singular Muslim identity, both through the monocultural 
approach mediated through layers of religious , ‘community leaders’ and through the 
antagonism understandably provoked amongst many British Muslims at such a 
blatant focus on one ethnic community at the same time as highly-questionable 
foreign policy interventions in Muslim countries and assaults on civil liberties at 
home.  
 
As the post-2001 community cohesion analysis highlighted, such monocultural, 
ethnicity-based policy approaches also inevitably provoke envy and resentment from 
other ethic and faith communities. The fact that Prevent was jointly operationalized 
by the security- focused Home Office, and the community cohesion-focused 
Department for Communities and Local Government until 2011 only exacerbated 
that basic tension between monocultural focus on a ‘suspect’ community and 
community cohesion, between security and surveillance on the one hand and 
community engagement and development on the other. Arguably, the ‘values-based’ 
government rhetoric around the need to confront Muslim ‘extremism’, rather than 
simply ‘violent extremism’, which accompanied the Prevent re-launch in June 2011 
has only  deepened that problematic focus on Muslims as a community and the 
associated tension between Prevent and community cohesion. 
 
Chapter 3 also identified the top-down manner of Prevent’s design and execution, 
with a rapid operationalization on a demographic basis selected by national 
government and enforced through the use of government monitoring and evaluation 
procedures such as ‘National Indicator 35’ in relation to local authorities. That 
operationalization of Prevent, principally through local authorities, but also via Higher 
and Further Education Institutions, Prisons and Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) is 
the focus of this Chapter. The role of the Police and Security Services in Prevent, 
and their centrality to the sustained allegation that Prevent has been little more than 
an elaborate surveillance and intelligence-gathering operation, is explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6, although this Chapter inevitably starts to raise some of those 
important issues around the relationship between Prevent policing and 
democratically-elected local authorities that the subsequent Chapter will explore 
further. Additionally, issues already highlighted around the relationship between 
Muslim communities and arms of the local and national state attempting to 
implement Prevent will be explored further here. In doing this, two important issues 
need to be borne in mind. The first is that too often generalisations about the state of 
ethnic relations and experience across Britain have been made on the basis of 
localised academic study, and that the varied and contingent nature of local ethnic 
relations needs to be remembered. Secondly, there is always a significant ‘space’ 
between policies identified and funded by national government, and how they are 
actually implemented on the ground. For instance, there is a significant gap between 
national political discourse around community cohesion, and how it has actually 
been understood and practised. The evidence discussed in Chapter 2 on that 
practice in areas such as Oldham suggests that community cohesion implementation 
has been both more complex and more progressive than academic analysis of the 
national policy documentation and discourse suggests. That fact argues for more 
nuanced understandings of how Prevent has actually played out in practice, and this 
Chapter draws on the empirical evidence on Prevent practice available, some of it by 
the author and colleagues, to analyse the experience of Prevent in practice. 
 
 
Local Authorities and Prevent 
Despite the suggestion of Chapter 3 that Prevent had been some time in the 
planning by national government, the initial phase of ‘Pathfinder’ Prevent funding to 
70 identified local authorities emerged rapidly, with little time for planning and 
preparation on behalf of the local authority elected members and officers involved. 
Husband and Alam (2011), in their thoughtful analysis of the interplay between 
community cohesion and Prevent work by the five West Yorkshire local authorities, 
talk of, ‘the indecent speed with which Prevent, and specifically the Pathfinder 
initiative, were introduced’. 1 That was highlighted in my own evaluation of learning 
from the initial Pathfinder year of Prevent funding in Kirklees, one of those West 
Yorkshire authorities, with one of the key local authority officers highlighting how 
short a time span their Chief Executive was given to react by national government: ‘it 
was pretty late on in the year - very close to the new financial year…Basically, he 
said, ‘we’ll need to pull something together very quickly, some kind of proposals, and 
we’ll need to go to DCLG for them to have a look at and for them to approve’ (Local 
Authority Officer 1). The unrealistic timescale for this initial Prevent year ironically 
meant that many local authorities passed funding to precisely the older, Mosque-
based ‘usual suspects’ of traditional Muslim community leaders that the national 
Prevent strategy was keen to avoid, and who local authorities often privately 
acknowledged as problematic in terms of moving forward with both the Prevent and 
cohesion agendas. 
 
The initial reaction of local authorities to Prevent was largely negative, not only 
because of the short run-in time, but because they immediately saw it as problematic 
to the community cohesion agenda that they had already accepted and were 
attempting to operationalize within their range of services: 
 ‘[there were] some very crude responses which actually we saw here as doing more 
damage than good.  And therefore we were quite careful distancing the council and 
other local partners, from the national approach to Preventing Violent Extremism… it 
was overly focused on particularly young Muslims, which we saw as driving a lot of 
people deeper into themselves, away from their peers, into a more introverted 
position, which was damaging to the long-term interests of those individual and 
society as a whole’ (Senior manager, Kirklees MC) 2  
 
Chapter 3 outlined national government’s position that Prevent is of necessity, 
distinct from wider community cohesion policy operations, but from the start the 
Association of West Yorkshire Authorities struggled to see the distinction. 
Nevertheless, both West Yorkshire-based evaluations of Prevent outlined above 
identified how local authorities got on with this new challenge, building on their 
existing work. The very significant pressure from national government to participate 
and adopt NI 35 meant that there was no practical alternative. National Indicator 35, 
‘Building Communities Resilient to Violent Extremism’, asked local authorities to 
focus and report progress on: 
 Understanding of, and engagement with Muslim communities 
 Knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism 
and the Prevent objectives 
 Development of a risk-based preventing violent extremism action plan, in 
support of delivery of the Prevent objectives 
 Effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions 3 
 
 Whilst some local authorities chose not to adopt NI 35, all were required to report 
against it. Lowndes and Thorp (2010), in their study of how three different local 
authorities within one English region approached the initial ‘Pathfinder’ year of 
Prevent, highlight how one of the three authorities did not adopt N1 35 for 2008/09. 
They identify positive processes of consultation regionally over the content and focus 
of N1 35, but, ‘the final version of the indicator was Home Office –led, and therefore 
incorporated new elements as well as those discussed at the regional steering 
group’. 4  Leicester City Council, in their submission to the CLG Select Committee 
Inquiry, suggested that Prevent should also be measured against National Indicator 
12, ‘sense of local belonging’, which local authorities had primarily been using to 
measure their progress on community cohesion, but this was not accepted by 
government, and Lowndes and Thorp identify NI 35 as being used by national 
government from 2008/09 onwards to produce increasing conformity from local 
authorities who had shown local creativity in the initial ‘Pathfinder’ phase. This 
analysis is supported by Husband and Alam’s study of another English region, with 
them concluding that, ‘our data shows an inability of central government to yield up 
this level of local autonomy’. 5 The decision by the Coalition government in June 
2011 to remove the local authority-focused DCLG from Prevent operation and have 
all future Prevent activity in the new 25 target areas sanctioned and monitored 
directly by the security-focused Home Office suggests that local autonomy over 
Prevent will reduce further. 
Local Variations 
Notwithstanding the national government pressure via NI 35 for involvement in and 
conformity around Prevent, there have nevertheless been significant variations in 
how local authorities have actually  so far operationalized the programme and how 
they have actually allocated the Prevent funding coming from central government. 
Chapter 3 highlighted the information on local Prevent funding allocations revealed 
by Freedom of Information requests by campaigners as diverse as the left-leaning 
Institute of Race Relations and the right-of-centre Tax Payers Alliance. Those 
requests put public pressure on some local authorities, with some, such as the 
London Borough of Newham, refusing to divulge the detail of their £1.3 million 
spending. In response to allegations from the TPA of secrecy, Newham, which is 
generally viewed as having a strong record on community cohesion, commented 
that, ‘Just as we do not wish to favour single groups through public policy and 
services, as this can foster mistrust and extremism, we also believe that we need to 
focus on where extremist views exist, rather than stereotyping people from particular 
backgrounds’. 6  
 
Despite substantial initial misgivings around Prevent, such as those expressed 
above by Newham, local authorities have formally co-operated, but in practice have 
demonstrated a wide range of responses. A small minority, some of which have 
received very substantial funding, have been vociferous in their support for Prevent 7 
but a large number seem to have subverted the funding to a significant extent, ‘many 
statutory and community partners have been uncomfortable with direct counter-
terrorism work and have sought to employ the funds for other ends’.8  An example of 
this was Bradford , an authority determined that Prevent would not negatively impact 
on community cohesion, as a senior manager explained: ‘we have not even called 
our funding stream Prevent, we’ve called it around capacity building within 
communities.  For both round one and two we’ve actually focused on giving the 
money to communities’. 9 The RIEP research on the local implementation of 
community cohesion and Prevent  in West Yorkshire, carried out by the University of 
Huddersfield, concluded of Bradford that: ‘Prevent is seen as a potentially dangerous 
and inflammatory initiative for the local authority and its partners, so that whilst 
structures are in place to identify and address issues around violent extremism, other 
aspects of the Prevent agenda have been absorbed into the wider community 
cohesion one’.10  
 
 With such Prevent allocations made by ‘Local Strategic Partnerships’ that bring local 
authorities and other key public sector bodies together, local approaches have varied 
significantly. For instance, Dudley council in the West Midlands passed all of their 
£277,000 Prevent allocation directly to the local third sector ‘British Muslim Forum’ 
for them to commission activities 11, with a similar approach taken in Bolton, 
Lancashire. Such approaches could be seen as the logical end point of the rationale 
for Prevent described in Chapter 3, whereby Muslim communities should join in 
partnership with the state and take positions of leadership and responsibility in 
addressing the threat of violent extremism, but the approach of Dudley and Bolton 
could also be seen as evidence of local authorities washing their hands of 
responsibility. A much larger number of local authorities have provided some funding 
for and work with local Muslim communities, funding that inevitably emphasises the 
‘Muslimness’ of community groups, given the monocultural focus of Prevent.  
 
The initial ‘Pathfinder’ year in Kirklees, West Yorkshire saw the funding largely 
utilised by the local authority itself, and only a small number of external organisations 
involved, an inevitable product of the short timeframe for implementation. Local  
Muslim community groups did want to be involved, but this initially raised issues of 
capacity to deliver, especially if work was to be targeted at young people viewed as 
being ‘at risk’: 
 ’I think we just need to be careful…because from experience we know there are 
people who could very effectively deliver on the agenda but there will be others who 
are not ready yet – it’s how you build the capacity of those individuals and 
organisations to be involved in this’ (Local Authority Officer 1). 
 Husband and Alam (2011) suggest that the CTU involvement in, and scrutiny of, 
local Prevent funding bids via local authorities has inevitably influenced those local 
authorities to play safe in terms of who and what they fund. An approach taken 
strongly in Kirklees has been one of funding and support by the local authority for 
capacity-building within local Muslim communities. This included committee skills 
training for Mosque committee members, and training and support for people running 
Madrasahs, Mosque schools for young people. This training has included child 
protection, health and safety and committee skills training, as well as how to 
introduce and use materials on citizenship within the Madrasah programmes. That 
very considerable investment in local Mosques and Madrasahs was highlighted 
when some local Muslim community groups criticised the local authority for 
seemingly not passing on Prevent funding. That criticism was partially possible 
because of the downplaying of the title and source of the Prevent funding highlighted 
in Chapter 3: ‘very quickly we decided that we’d take the word Prevent out as quickly 
as possible because it gives out wrong messages’ (Local Authority officer 2). The 
focus on citizenship within Kirklees Madrasahs, utilising national citizenship material 
supported by Prevent funding, was mirrored by local Prevent work with young people 
in the community, which  focussed on ‘active citizenship’. Largely, but not 
exclusively, targeted at Muslim young people, this work used a variety of activities to 
engage young people, such as the production of DVDs and radio programmes, and 
a project on ‘slavery’. As with much of the Prevent activity supported by DCLG via 
local authorities to date, it is not immediately obvious how such work with young 
people addresses the specific goals of Prevent, but such activity builds relationships 
with young people who might otherwise be isolated and vulnerable within 
communities, and starts to build skills of democratic engagement and activity: 
’through the Active Citizenship module, there’s things around looking at the media, 
how the media portrays this.. While there was focus on the extremism side, there 
were also things about religion and ways of life’ (Local Government Officer 2). 
 
 Such work has also been targeted at young people viewed as being at risk of 
involvement in violent extremism, such as a large group of Muslim young men in one 
area of Kirklees whose racially-based ‘turf war’ with white youth in the area had 
started to spiral towards more serious and organised levels of both violence and 
religious/racially-based abuse and internet-based propaganda: 
 ‘out of the group of 25 to 30, I think there’s the element of 2 or 3 who are hard core, 
the rest are like sheep… we want to help all of them… even the ones on the fringes 
who can end up going in the  wrong directions’ (local Prevent Police Officer). 
 
Lowndes and Thorp (2010) identify distinct approaches to Prevent by each of the 
three city-based local authorities they studied in one region of England, so 
emphasising the importance of the local context and circumstances, and the 
possibility of constructive practice in the name of Prevent at ground level, with their 
evidence revealing ‘surprisingly creative outcomes, reflecting locally specific and 
highly dynamic ‘settlements’ between the local state and Muslim communities’ 12. 
The theme highlighted above of capacity building and co-ordination within Muslim 
communities was a key focus here for ‘City A’, with the creation of a stronger local 
Muslim forum being an empowering, Muslim-led process that gave those Muslim 
communities an important role in the allocation of Prevent funds. In contrast, ‘City B’s 
approach was distinctive within the region for being strongly led by the city council 
and embedded in a well-established ‘community cohesion’ narrative’ 13 ,which 
Lowndes and Thorpe suggest, enabled a gradual sanitization of the Prevent label 
and encouraged strong Muslim commitment and involvement. That cohesion-based 
approach involved both work aimed at the identity and self-confidence of Muslim 
young people, and cross-community work that even involved activities that were 
largely non-Muslim. City C was ‘reluctant to highlight Prevent as a discrete policy 
area’ 14 , and did not agree to adopt NI 35, but also had weak and under-developed 
community cohesion activity, so struggled to demonstrate clear progress. However, it 
did focus heavily on greater uptake by Muslim young people of youth activities 
offered by the city’s Youth Service, so creating a building block for the future of 
relationships and engagement. 
 
Not all bad news? 
The empirical case study evidence summarised here from both West Yorkshire and 
the region studied by Lowndes and Thorp on the operationalisation of the early 
stages of Prevent suggests some caution is needed before Prevent is condemned. 
Both case studies identify the strengthening of civil society within Muslim 
communities through training and professionalisation, alongside the creation of new 
‘governance spaces’ of representative organisations within Muslim communities. In 
their evidence to the CLG Select Committee, the local government think-tank the 
New Local Government Network highlighted that, ‘some local authorities are clear 
that Prevent has played a key role as a catalyst for enabling them to engage with 
communities with which they had no previous contact’ 15, something acknowledged 
also by both the CLG Select Committee and the June 2011 Prevent review. The 
reality of national funding being available, and the possibility, as highlighted by the 
case study evidence discussed above, of constructive work with that funding, meant 
that, in practice, both local authorities and Muslim community groups have largely 
engaged with Prevent. Husband and Alam (2011) identify how, although four of the 
five West Yorkshire Local Authorities initially refused to adopt NI 35 and so fully 
embrace Prevent, they all accepted the Prevent funding through until 2011. Similarly, 
at a time when national government funding for community groups through other 
funding streams was starting to slow down, ‘participation in Prevent-related activity 
by Muslim organisations has thus to be seen in the context of the changing funding 
environment’. 16 Indeed, despite the positive connection between Prevent and 
community cohesion in ‘City B’ reported by Lowndes and Thorp, some Muslim 
community groups felt that it was inappropriate to use Prevent money for wider 
cohesion activity: ’This became a source of tension within the co-ordinating body  :as 
one Muslim community representative put it: ‘hands off – this is Muslim money’.17 
This local engagement with a source of funding, no matter how controversial, meant 
that the major revision to the focus of Prevent in June 2011, with funding now only 
targeted at 25 local authorities deemed to be ‘at risk’ received a mixed response 
from two local authorities in the north of England who were no longer to receive 
Prevent funding: 
Mixed views on Prevent.  It's obviously good news that we're not viewed as a high 
risk area, but there is still work to be done and it would be helpful to have the 
additional funding to do it with.  We'd have been surprised and concerned if we were 
in the top 25, so on balance I'd prefer to be lower risk with less money (Local 
Authority officer, Greater Manchester region, June 2011) 
 
I think as an Authority we should be involved, we have done some excellent work in 
XXXXXX  which we can build on. The work that we have done has contributed 
greatly in involving young people in positive activities and providing safe spaces for 
debate and discussion. (Local Authority officer, Yorkshire and the Humber region, 
June 2011) 18 
 
Not where we would have started 
Such support for a local continuation of Prevent funding does not mean that local 
authorities nationally, or many Muslim community groups, have not continued to 
have profound doubts about Prevent and its lack of congruence with wider policy 
attempts to encourage greater cohesion and integration. The tensions over funding 
identified above illustrate the dangers of such a blatantly monocultural policy drive 
and funding stream. Evidence of a ‘white backlash’ against such Prevent funding 
was highlighted in Kirklees: 
 ‘people have said, ‘why is it up to us to know more about Muslim and Islam, what 
about the opposite of that?’…and we get that feeling a lot in the xxxxxx area, that’s 
where more conflict happens’ (Local Authority officer 2 ).  
 
Husband and Alam (2011) report a very similar sentiment being expressed by 
another local authority manager in West Yorkshire: ‘from the white community 
there’s a resentment and a perception that resources and attention goes to the 
Muslim community at the expense of those white communities’. 19 For the New Local 
Government Network, the operations of Prevent and its impact, as analysed in both 
Chapters 4 and 6, can undermine cohesion and give hope to those that oppose 
greater integration: ‘the Prevent agenda and community cohesion should support 
and foster one another. Many in local government fear that this is not currently the 
case’. 20 The CLG Select Committee Inquiry Report echoed such fears, not only 
calling for greater distinction between Prevent and cohesion activity, but for much 
greater resources and political support for cohesion-based approaches that 
undermine the appeal of violent extremism based on separate identities. The 
empirical research in to the operationalization of community cohesion and Prevent 
outlined here clearly shows real progress on the ‘embedding’ and mainstreaming of 
community cohesion across the functions of local authorities, and the desire of local 
authority staff to work with, and encourage, more complex and intersectional 
understandings of identity which they see as reflecting reality 21, but the inflexible 
monocultural focus of Prevent has been at odds with this. 
 
 In contrast, the Prevent review of June 2011 criticised the local authority 
operationalisation of Prevent precisely for approaches that ‘encouraged the 
convergence of Prevent and cohesion programmes’. 22   For past and present 
national government, ‘cohesion’ activity is not an effective tool against radicalisation 
and violent extremism and, ‘as a general rule, the two strategies and programmes 
must not be merged together’. 23   In fact, the empirical case study material quoted 
above, and the government’s own audit of local authority activities during the 
‘Pathfinder’ phase nationally, has clearly shown that the vast majority of Prevent 
activity has not been ‘cohesion’, i.e. activity which creates genuine cross-community 
dialogue and partnership, but rather monocultural Muslim youth activities and 
community capacity building initiatives for Muslim community groups only. That is 
why I have previously suggested that Prevent has been ‘between two stools’ 24, 
being neither focused anti-extremism political education with young Muslims, nor 
meaningful community cohesion work that involves substantial cross-community 
contact. Here, some local authorities have attempted to use the ‘space’ of local 
operation to nudge Prevent activity towards genuine cohesion, but have been 
constrained by central government control via NI 35 monitoring and regional 
Government Office officials, and by the regional counter-terrorism Policing 
infrastructure outlined in Chapter 6, which have all demanded an explicit Muslim 
focus and engagement with a counter-terrorism agenda. That ‘security’ perspective 
was clearly outlined by a senior Police Officer in West Yorkshire: 
 ‘there’s no two ways about it, it [Prevent] is part of a counter-terrorism strategy, it’s 
about a hugely violent criminal offences.  And that’s what Prevent is about and yes, 
it’s got something to do with cohesion, you can have that debate…But actually it’s 
about violent extremism and that’s the most serious crime that this country can 
encounter which goes way and above community cohesion if that makes sense?’.25 
 
Lowndes and Thorp (2010) identified a range of local authority responses to the 
relationship between Prevent and community cohesion, something mirrored in West 
Yorkshire: ‘in some authorities, the responsibility for managing Prevent and 
community cohesion was being effectively combined, both departmentally and 
operationally, while in others they remained distinct entities’. 26   Certainly, in Kirklees 
the original aim was to integrate Prevent with cohesion: ‘I think they need to be both 
done, I don’t think it can be just one or the other’ (Local Authority officer, 1), but later 
research by the author and University of Huddersfield colleagues in to the 
operationalisation of cohesion and Prevent policies in Kirklees and Bradford local 
authorities highlighted the problematic impact of Prevent on cohesion. 27 This 
research showed that, whilst positive work was being done with communities in the 
names of both cohesion and Prevent, the strong pressure downwards from central 
government to engage with the Prevent agenda had had a clear and negative impact 
on community cohesion. This was not only about the negativity of Prevent’s 
monocultural focus, or its damaging impact on the status of the Muslim community, 
but rather how it had side-lined developing community cohesion debates and local 
structures in the rush to respond to the central government diktat over Prevent. The 
University of Huddersfield RIEP research found well-developed and constructive 
local Prevent structures, the so-called ‘Gold’, ‘Silver’ and ‘Bronze’ multi-agency co-
ordination groups: 
 The structures supporting Prevent are in place in Kirklees, including the Gold and 
Silver groups (Gold provides strategic direction and overview and has senior 
representation from all statutory stakeholders and Silver provides implementation), a 
Prevent Round Table and Reference Group, intelligence sharing mechanisms which 
enable a quick response to incidents, work with the Counter-Terrorism Unit, the 
Channel process, and the informal reference to NI 35.28   
 
 but could find less evidence of clear cohesion structures and process, suggesting 
that Prevent has ‘crowded out’ the development of creative cohesion practice at a 
local level. This implication is supported by Husband and Alam’s research across the 
five West Yorkshire local authorities: ‘the data provides substantive support for the 
concerns that have been expressed elsewhere regarding the damaging impact of 
Prevent on community cohesion initiatives’. 29  
 
The national government pressure to avoid genuine cohesion activity under the 
name of Prevent has produced programmes of activities nationally that have neither 
been cross-ethnic cohesion work, nor educational activity clearly focused on the 
risks of violent extremism. The latter failing has been because of the basic tensions 
first identified in Chapter 3 as to what Prevent both wants to achieve and is actually 
capable of achieving, alongside questions of the training, confidence and clarity of 
professional practitioners asked to implement Prevent work with young people and 
communities.  
 
 
 
Professionals in the spotlight? 
A key issue here has been the skills and confidence of the practitioners on the 
ground actually charged with operationalising Prevent in their work with Muslim 
young people and their communities. Chapter 4 highlighted how previous attempts to 
promote anti-racist thinking and behaviour amongst white young people attracted 
towards racism and acts of racial violence often foundered in the past on the lack of 
confidence and clarity amongst teachers and youth workers as to what they were 
actually being asked to do. There is significant evidence that a similar process of 
professional hesitation and ‘avoidance’ has been underway within local authority 
Prevent activity and that this is a significant part of why Prevent activities have at 
times appeared bland and ‘safe’. This was highlighted in the Pathfinder phase of 
activity in Kirklees, West Yorkshire: 
 ‘The problem is we don’t have people who are experienced enough and who have 
understanding around this kind of agenda, that they (young people) can actually 
debate with confidently’ (Local Authority officer 1).  
 
Given that a genuine engagement with young people around the threat of violent 
extremism could well involve robust discussion around highly contentious political 
issues such as Israel/Palestine, British foreign policy, and Islamic theological 
interpretation, all in a climate where the media and politicians are eager to seize on 
signs of ‘extremism’, such practitioner lack of confidence is highly understandable. 
The University of Huddersfield RIEP research into how Kirklees and Bradford local 
authorities had implemented cohesion and Prevent clearly identified that local 
authority staff, and staff in partner agencies, wanted more training, ‘safe spaces’ to 
discuss these difficult issues, on both Prevent and the equally complex issues of 
cohesion.30  The need for training programmes that help practitioners feel clear and 
confident in taking on ‘hearts and minds’ work with young people around violent 
extremism was highlighted to the CLG Select Committee Inquiry by the UK Youth 
Parliament (UKYP). UKYP had previously run the innovative, Prevent-funded 
‘Project Safe Space’ highlighted in Chapter 4, and this experience had indicated an 
urgent need to up skill youth workers on this issue. However, UKYP’s application to 
run a national programme of youth worker training around the content and 
approaches of Prevent educational work had not been accepted by government. 31 It 
is also clear that Prevent has had highly problematic impacts on Muslim-origin staff 
working for local authorities and other organisations implementing Prevent. It has 
already been acknowledged above that Prevent has facilitated the building of 
stronger relationships between local authorities and their Muslim communities in 
many areas of the country, but in the process of building such relationships, local 
authorities have often relied heavily on the knowledge, or even the personal standing 
and contacts of their Muslim staff. Husband and Alam’s study in West Yorkshire 
identifies ‘a strong assertion of ignorance about the local Muslim communities within 
the local authority that resulted in a dependency on their Muslim colleagues to work 
with those communities’. 32  Not only does such a role expose Muslim professional to 
pressure from two sides, from employer and local communities, but it also 
emphasises their ‘Muslimness’, rather than their more generic professional skills and 
experience. Beyond this, such an exposed role has put Muslim professionals 
working in both the local authority and voluntary sectors in the spotlight of the Police 
and Security Services, with Husband and Alam (2011) reporting a resulting ‘chilling 
affect’ of Muslim professionals being very reluctant to take any risks in relation to 
Prevent activity for fear of being scrutinised over their political and religious attitudes 
and positions. Chapter 6 highlights how such a position is very understandable, 
given the documented cases of scrutiny of professionals such as youth workers by 
CTU police and Security Service officers. 
 
Summing up: Local Authorities in a bind? 
The result of much of the Prevent activity via local authorities to date, as discussed 
above, has usually been positive and diversionary  youth activities for Muslim young 
people only, activities that are well meaning but neither good cohesion work or 
genuinely focused on the issues and drivers central to violent extremism.33 The 
Association of Police Authorities (APA) (2009) commented in their evidence to the 
CLG Select Committee Inquiry that, ‘many Police Authorities question whether, in 
practice, there is any real difference between Prevent and community cohesion’. The 
problem here, though, has been that this activity is monocultural and so ineffective in 
terms of cohesion, just as it has had little demonstrable focus on factors and issues 
likely to lead some individuals towards violent extremism. For APA, the solution was 
a tighter focus on Muslim ‘extremism’, with some evidence from 2009 onwards that 
Police influence was being used to block Prevent support for more general youth 
activities. 34  
 What that pre-Coalition government reality on the ground exposed, as highlighted by 
the CLG Select Committee Inquiry, was the biggest tension within Prevent – the 
conflict  between the two national government departments delivering Prevent, 
DCLG and the Home Office. Each department contributed some of the overall 2007-
11 budget, with DCLG ‘owning’ some of the Prevent strategy objectives, whilst 
OSCT/Home Office ‘owning’ the others. 35 It is clear that the operationalisation of 
Prevent was built on real inter-departmental tensions over purpose and priority, as 
identified by the Local Government Association: ’Tension between OSCT and CLG 
on the nature of the focus of Prevent, and the activity which should flow from that, 
can be a problem at times’,36  with lack of consistency identified as a result.   It is 
clear that  a ‘turf war’, something far from new in the history of counter-terrorism 
policies, 37  has been taking place, based on significantly different views of effective 
ways forward, as the CLG Select Committee Inquiry process exposed:  
We in local government support John Denham’s view of Prevent as distinct but 
necessarily situated within the broader context of community cohesion and 
equalities...Police and the security services will necessarily see things from a 
different perspective....these messages need to be properly aligned across 
government. 38  
 
From this perspective, the very limited and nuanced changes in Prevent 39  and the 
associated launch of the ‘Connecting Communities’ fund made in 2009 can actually 
be understood as hard-won concessions in the right direction by a Minister with a 
clear track record of support for community cohesion 40, and the Inquiry by the CLG 
Select Committee as an attempt to bolster and support those moves, whilst the 
Home Office ‘arm’ of Prevent demanded more robust scrutiny and surveillance of, 
and judgements on, Muslim communities and organisations. This suggests that 
Prevent, as it stood prior to the 2010 General Election, had few friends even within 
government, with both DCLG and the Home Office profoundly dissatisfied with it, but 
for very different reasons, so introducing instability in local policy design and 
delivery. That instability has been subsequently addressed by the June 2011 review 
of Prevent, which cut DCLG out of the picture, and so apparently created a greater 
demarcation between Prevent and Cohesion. However, Prevent activity will still take 
place locally via local authorities, but be directly controlled and funded by the Home 
Office /OSCT. Arguably, this is actually a recipe for a sharper clash over exactly 
what Prevent is about, how it impacts on DCLG-led cohesion work and what it can 
realistically expect to achieve. 
 
Extremists on Campus? 
The very significant focus on Further and Higher Education institutions within 
Prevent is unsurprising, given what Chapter 1 suggested about both the nature of 
the ideology of violent extremism and the backgrounds of many of the people 
attracted towards it. That Chapter highlighted Roy’s (2004) assertion that Islamism, 
and the radical or even extreme versions that it takes for a minority, is a very modern 
phenomenon, a result of, and a response to, globalisation. Roy suggests that radical 
Islamism is closer to Leninism than religion, both in its essentially political analysis, 
and in its revolutionary vanguardist approach to political mobilisation. Social 
movement theory clearly shows the importance of Universities, and radicalised 
young intellectuals, to the growth of radical political movements, and many British 
radical Islamists have both been well-educated and had previous involvement in left-
wing and anti-racist political movements. This leads to a surprising consensus 
across the political spectrum about the importance of Universities to the threat of 
violent extremism, with right-wing columnist Melanie Phillips suggesting that, ‘British 
Universities have been exceptionally important breeding grounds for Islamist 
radicalism’ 41 and left-of centre writer Kenan Malik asserting that, ‘it is not Mosques 
but Universities that provide the real recruiting ground for Islamists’. 42  
 
There is some strong evidence to support this, with the BBC highlighting in 2010 that 
6 different members of University Islamic Student Societies in Britain had been 
convicted of terrorist offences. 43 These included some of the ‘Crevice’ plotters who 
made plans whilst students at Brunel University in west London. Additionally, 7/7 
bomber Shezad Tanweer was studying at Leeds Metropolitan University, whilst 
Roshanara Choudhry, who stabbed MP Stephen Timms in 2010, was coming to the 
end of her undergraduate degree course. The incident which highlighted the link 
between Universities and violent extremism more than any other was the so-called 
‘underpants’ bomber, Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to explode a bomb on a 
plane about to land in the USA in December 2009. The Nigerian Abdulmutallab was 
a previous President of the Islamic Students Society at University College London 
(UCL), and was not the first Islamist terrorist to have links to UCL. This promoted 
UCL to establish an independent Inquiry, and the umbrella body Universities UK to 
set their own working party up. 44 
 
The Prevent review of June 2011 highlighted the importance of Higher Education, 
saying that, ‘more than 30% of people convicted for Al-Qaeda-associated terrorist 
offences in the UK between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended University 
or a higher education institution’. 45 However, such a proportion is fairly consistent 
with the number of British young people who now experience higher education. 
Universities UK  suggest that this expansion towards a mass higher education 
system is not just about size, but has fundamentally altered the student experience, 
as many students now live at home, and some study part-time, so significantly 
reducing the distinction physically and culturally between ‘university’ and ‘society’. 
Jason Burke (2008) believes that the University link is overplayed, with only a 
proportion of violent extremists having experienced higher education, and a number 
of those dropping out before completion. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that further and higher education campuses have been 
important sites for lslamist radical activity and recruitment in Britain. Shiraz Maher, a 
former Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT) leader, was recruited whilst a student at Leeds 
University, and now regards HUT and similar Islamist groups as ‘gateway 
organisations’, which can provide the environment that encourages some individuals 
to move further towards violent extremism.46  Certainly, a number of violent 
extremists, including the two young Muslims from Derby who carried out suicide 
attacks in Israel, and Mohammad Sidique Khan, were associated with Omar Bakhri’s 
Al-Mahajiroun organisation. Ed Husain, a former HUT activist and now head of anti-
extremism think-tank The Quilliam Foundation, describes how such Islamist political 
organisations were easily able to operate and recruit on further and higher education 
campuses in London and across Britain during the 1990s, sometimes using Islamic 
Student Society or religious study group labels as a front. Arguably, such Islamists 
have still been operating with impunity at Universities much more recently, with a 
BBC Radio documentary highlighting a meeting that took place at UCL in December 
2009, chaired by key Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary, and conducting a speech 
via live video feed, by Omar Bakhri, who was then banned from the UK. 47 Such 
activity, often centring on visiting extremist speakers and preachers invited to 
Universities by Islamic Students Societies, had prompted the 2005 report When 
Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses, 
published by the right wing Social Affairs Unit, and written by Professor Anthony 
Glees of the private Buckingham University. Glees alleged that terrorist recruitment 
and organisation, ‘subversion’ of the British state and society, was taking place on 
university campuses, with academic authorities turning a blind eye. Glees expanded 
on these allegations in evidence to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland 
Security in February 2010, saying that ‘some universities and colleges have become 
sites where extremist views and radicalisation can flourish beyond the sight of 
academic’, 48  and suggesting that this was possible because the Security Services 
had lost interest in ‘subversion’ following the collapse of communism. Glees’ 
evidence for these allegations appears to be that some radical Islamist political 
groups, such as HUT, have carried out political activity at Universities, and that some 
individual terrorists have previously been university students but, as Chapter 1 
highlighted, even being a member of a radical Islamist political group such as HUT is 
not predictive of later involvement in violent extremism. Rather than evidence of 
causal links, such perspectives can instead appear to be crude political 
generalisations, as shown by the perspective Glees offers on student Islamic activity: 
‘I argue that particularly in the case of many student Islamic societies, they are 
actually mirrors, duplicates of existing student views, so Muslim students are 
encouraged to regard themselves as different’, 49 with the clear suggestion that this 
is the start of the ‘conveyer belt’ towards violent extremism. 
 
Such concerns and allegations have shaped the debates, and arguably, actions, 
around Prevent activity and further and higher education. Universities UK convened 
a working group in the wake of the ‘underpants’ bomber to examine these issues and 
their implications for the higher education sector. Their resulting report highlighted 
the fact that UCL’s own Inquiry had found no evidence of Abdulmutallab being 
radicalised whilst studying engineering at UCL. For Universities UK, it was clear that 
Universities should take action against anyone advocating violent extremism, and 
should control any visiting speakers, but that, it is emphatically not their function to 
impede the exercise of fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of speech, 
through additional censorship, surveillance or invasion of privacy’, 50 and radical 
views should be engaged and debated with, not banned. They accepted the need to 
identify vulnerable individuals, but stressed that radicalisation, by its very nature, 
takes place away from ‘official’ view. For the Coalition government, this very 
highlighting of academic freedom was evidence of a lack of seriousness about the 
threat of violent extremism, with the government’s Security and Terrorism watchdog 
Lord Carlile calling it ‘weak’ and detecting, ‘a total failure to deal with how to identify 
and handle individuals who might be suspected of radicalising or radicalised whilst 
within the university …The universities have to get over their reluctance to be 
prepared to look at the issue of radicalisation’. 51 This perspective featured strongly 
in the Prevent review of June 2011, which criticised some Universities for failing to 
engage in Prevent. As with much of the broader ‘values-based’ review of Prevent, 
this claim seemed to be unevidenced. Universities UK’s own survey showed, 
‘extensive engagement with Prevent :two thirds of Universities indicated that their 
institution had engaged , and several expressed a wish to do more so’. 52   Just over 
half those Universities surveyed had regular contact with Prevent Police officers, 
around half with Special Branch, and a quarter were in regular contact with the 
Security Services. Even allowing for the very substantial growth in student numbers 
generally, and numbers of international students in particular, this represents a very 
significant engagement by Universities with the Policing side of Prevent. 
 
This engagement was facilitated by guidance from the government to all Further and 
Higher educational institutions 53, and by funding to 40 Universities to develop their 
Prevent work in conjunction with key partners such as the Police and local 
authorities. These 40 Universities were apparently selected, not on the number of 
Muslim students they had, or on an ‘intelligence/risk’ basis, but on whether they were 
sited within local authorities selected for Prevent funding on a demographic basis. 
This meant that Durham University, for example, was not included, although it had 
an active HUT group over a number of years. Government claims in advance of the 
June 2011 Prevent review that ’40 universities’ were being complacent about 
Prevent seemed to simply refer to those that had received funding, but caused 
considerable alarm at those funded institutions over whether they were to be publicly 
‘named and shamed’, even though they had engaged constructively in the Prevent 
agenda. That engagement for Universities in one region of the north of England has 
included regular meetings across the whole region, and sub-regional meetings 
including the Universities with substantial numbers of Muslim students. Such 
regional meetings have highlighted considerable variations in understanding over the 
nature and level of the threat of violent extremism, with Universities who have a 
more ‘traditional’ student cohort of young, largely white, people living away from 
home, less clear how the Prevent agenda relates to them, so partially explaining 
government frustration. For Universities, the liaison with CTU/Police that Prevent 
requires is not a new requirement, as they already have close and largely positive 
working relationships with local and regional police, including over serious criminal 
issues that inevitably arise around large and complex student communities. For 
Universities, ‘violent extremism’ can involve Animal Liberation violence, or far-right 
political activity, as much as Islamist extremism, and both University officials and 
Muslim student activists questioned at one northern University were very positive 
about efforts by the past Labour government to encourage and provide funding for 
community cohesion and ‘good campus relations’ initiatives. 
 
Two specific issues in relation to Prevent and Universities arguably show the political 
influence of Anthony Glees and other right-wing think tanks. One is the overt 
criticism by the government’s June 2011 Prevent review of FOSIS, the Federation of 
Student Islamic Societies, which acts as the umbrella body for the varied Muslim 
student societies at different British Universities: ‘we judge that FOSIS has not 
always fully challenged terrorist and extremist ideology within the further and higher 
education sectors’.54 Yet, just months before, in March 2011, FOSIS had held a 
national conference on campus extremis, attended by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers!  55   Whilst local experiences of an umbrella body such as FOSIS are 
inevitably mixed, there is evidence of local University Islamic Student Societies 
playing very positive and constructive roles, both in terms of organising Muslim 
students and in contributing to wider processes of democracy and cohesion. At one 
University in the north of England, the Islamic Student Society has played the role of 
both carefully ‘vetting’ any visiting preachers and speakers, and negotiating 
constructively with the University authorities over the appointment of a Muslim 
Chaplain to the Institution. Strong involvement in the wider Student’s Union led to 
members of the Society taking up sabbatical positions through electoral support from 
students of all backgrounds, and to involvement in national student affairs that 
entailed working with students from a variety of backgrounds and political positions. 
 
Another problematic issue is the theory and reality of academic freedom in relation to 
Prevent. Higher Education is clearly about academic investigation, sometimes of 
highly sensitive and contentious social and political issues, by both academic staff 
and students. The Universities UK reported highlighted the issues this raises about 
researchers using the internet to search material that may be viewed as connected 
to violent extremism for the purposes of academic study, and how this should be 
handled. Many Universities now have protocols for such searches to ensure that if 
the Security Services follow up on a ‘flagged’ internet search, there is a clear and 
justified audit trail of knowledge and agreement. The dangers of not having such 
agreed and understood procedures have been shown by an on-going issue at the 
University of Nottingham. This followed the May 2008 arrests by counter-terrorism 
Police officers of Nottingham research student Rizwaan Sabir, and of Hicham Yezza, 
who worked as a staff member at the University's School of Modern Languages. 
Sabir had downloaded an Al-Qaeda manual as part of research for a dissertation, 
and had sought Yezza's help in drafting a PhD proposal because of his position as 
the editor of ‘Ceasefire’, a political magazine. Despite the fact that the manual was 
apparently available in the University library, and can certainly be purchased via 
Amazon, the University authorities alerted the Police, and the two were arrested, 
only being released without charge after six days. Dr. Rod Thornton, a senior 
lecturer at the University, remains suspended after criticising the University for their 
treatment of the two men, and University documents released under the Freedom of 
Information guidelines show that University of Nottingham staff were routinely 
logging and filming Middle East-related political activity on the campus. The 
University’s response is that political activity of all types on campus is monitored that 
way. 56  What this does show is both the problematic interface of academic study and 
counter-terrorism policing, and how it may well be encouraging staff within 
institutions to take on questionable roles and positions in relation to counter-
terrorism. 
 
 
Prisons and Young Offenders 
Just as Universities have  undoubtedly been a site of Islamist radicalisation, so have 
Prisons and Young Offenders Institutes (YOIs), as Chapter 1 highlighted. For that 
reason, prisoners, and young offenders at risk of incarceration have been a key 
target for Prevent activity, especially as 79 Islamist terrorists were in the British 
prison system as of June 2011, plus others convicted for non-terrorist related 
offences. This was re-emphasised by the June 2011 Prevent review, which also 
highlighted the links between Prevent activity in prisons and the community by 
saying  that, ‘over the next four years, 34 terrorism-related prisoners may reach their 
release dates’. 57  In line with the demographic and  economic  profiles of their 
communities, the number of Muslim prisoners has been growing steadily, but the 
government is aware of the danger so seeing all Muslim prisoners as potential 
radicals, meaning that ‘careful judgments are therefore required to accurately assess 
the extent of radicalisation in prisons’. 58  A key part of Prevent activity in prisons has 
been  the leadership of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) on staff 
awareness training to spot and combat radicalisation, and  the development of 
reporting and referral systems when there is potential radicalisation of a prisoner or 
young offender. This has been built around a risk and protection framework, 
involving risk assessment and early intervention when required, sometimes through 
the significantly developed network of Prison Visiting Imams. A particular concern 
here has been individuals converting to Islam, and immediately embracing radical 
versions of it, while in gaol, with overcrowding and lack of staff awareness enabling 
radicals to spread their influence: ‘The Prison Officers Association has repeatedly 
raised concerns over the radicalisation and recruitment of such young ‘vulnerable’ 
Muslim prisoners’. 59   However, assessing what conversions represent is 
complicated by wider dynamics of prison life, as Chapter 1 highlighted: ‘there has 
been something of a moral panic about individuals converting to Islam whilst 
incarcerated’. 60   In keeping with local authority-based work, there has been real 
concern amongst criminal justice practitioners within prisons as to whether they are 
suitably trained for any interventions around radicalisation. 
 
Such concerns have been heightened by the suggestion that there should be ‘de-
radicalisation’ programmes within prisons. The need for such work has been shown 
by research around violent Islamist extremists imprisoned in Spain and the UK, 
which suggests that such Jihadis remain a real threat to society even after 
conviction: ‘violent jihadists are involved in a network which has demonstrated the 
capability for ‘organisational learning’. 61 That research makes parallels with how 
terrorist prisoners from organisations like the IRA and ETA formed military structures 
and training programmes within prisons, and identifies distinct roles within personnel 
committed to violent extremism. Those roles include ‘strategists’, who see time in 
prison as a good chance to recruit, plan and train ‘team leaders’, who will then take 
on the leadership of specific terrorist ventures. Warnes and Hannah (2008) argue 
that Sidique Khan was a good example of such a ‘team leader’. 
  
Programmes of de-radicalisation have had some success with radical Islamist 
extremist prisoners in other countries, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, 
processes of political re-thinking and moving away from Islamist violent extremism 
amongst prisoners were led by ex-Jihadi leaders who had renounced violence. This 
involved seminars and discussion, with the approach adapted by Saudi Arabia to 
encompass psychological profiling, Islamic teachings to highlight the un-Islamic 
nature of violence, and diversionary sports programmes. However, it is difficult to 
see how such programmes could easily transfer to the British environment. Firstly, 
Britain only has relatively small numbers both of imprisoned jihadists, and of Imams 
trained and experienced enough to combat overt attempts at radicalisation. 
Secondly, the Islamists in Egypt who have been successfully de-radicalised were 
part of a conventional, hierarchically-organised political movement with command 
structures making it much more akin to the IRA, than to small-cell based ‘leaderless 
jihad’ of western Islamist violent extremism – which figures of credibility and authority 
amongst Islamist extremists would lead such a process in western countries? 
Nevertheless, NOMS has been developing a number of different educational 
programmes around radicalisation, one of which is ‘specifically targeted at beliefs 
and ideology related to Al- Qaeda. Following assessment, national implementation is 
planned in 2012’. 62 
 
How Prevent should approach young offenders in the community through the 
network of local Youth Offending Teams has been even more problematic, given that 
few, if any, young offenders are likely to be referred to YOTs for involvement in 
violent extremist activity, as numbers associated with such plots are small, and the 
offences involved so serious. The Youth Justice Board secured £8.3 million from 
OSCT in 2007 for Prevent work with young offenders, with the main aims being: 
 national training and support for youth justice staff to counter violent 
extremism; 
 expansion of existing programmes for vulnerable young people in 
communities where extreme views are prevalent; 
 undertaking initiatives in secure establishments for young people at risk of 
extremism; 
 initiating new schemes to develop an evidence base of ‘what works’ in 
preventing violent extremism amongst young people.  
The OSCT had identified 53 YOTs and YOIs as being at the highest risk of violent 
extremism, presumably on the same geographical location basis by which the 40 
funded Universities were identified. These YOTs were ‘invited’ to bid, but in practice 
had already been selected by OSCT, who exercised considerable oversight in 
relation to the design and content of local activity. As with Prevent funding for local 
authorities, this stream of funding emerged quickly, and many YOTs took a 
considerable length of time to start their funded Prevent –funded activity. The Youth 
Justice Board commissioned The University of Huddersfield to evaluate its Prevent 
programme through a process of interview-based case studies and documentary 
analysis, and the initial findings of that research were highlighted by government in 
its review of Prevent published in June 2011, which commented, ‘The University of 
Huddersfield have noted that all of the projects found it difficult to measure 
impact…Many of the problems identified by the University of Huddersfield could 
have been overcome with greater clarity from the outset’. 63   As a result of this 
emerging evaluation picture, the OSCT ceased funding for 33 YOTs and YOIs in 
October 2010, and asked the remaining 20 to focus more directly on de-
radicalisation and counter-radicalisation activity, requiring them to refer more 
effectively to the Channel process discussed further in Chapter 6, and advocating 
further training for front-line staff to help them do this. 
 
It is clear from this emerging picture that Prevent work via YOTs had very similar 
problems to that funded via local authorities in relation to purpose, effectiveness and 
practitioner confidence: ‘there was a perceived lack of clarity of what was needed 
and a strong emphasis on cohesion or integration-type work’. 64  Some of this work 
seems to have been with young people in the community with no offending 
background at all, or with young people of all ethnic/faith backgrounds around issues 
of racism, identity and violence - good generic youth work, but a significant distance 
from the supposed aims of Prevent, as government noted itself: ‘In common with 
many other areas of work, we consider that OSCT should have provided greater 
clarity on what was required from the outset from the YJB interventions and 
exercised greater and more consistent levels of oversight and monitoring’. 65   Similar 
issues were identified in a more localised evaluation of the Prevent activity by the 10 
YOTs in the Greater Manchester area conducted by the Greater Manchester Youth 
Justice Trust. It was clear that these Youth Offending Services (YOS) in the Greater 
Manchester area had used Prevent funding to develop a variety of positive activities 
and interventions with young people, and developed greater understanding of the 
issues around violent extremism, but the evaluation concluded that: 
 ‘Prevent is an uncomfortable companion to the YOT/YOS in Greater Manchester. 
Whilst it is accepted that involvement in criminal activity is one of many causes (or 
indeed a result) of certain vulnerabilities, it does not follow as neatly as suggested by 
this funding stream, that this will lead to extremism… it is not possible to ascertain to 
any degree how many young people have been diverted from adoption of extreme 
attitudes or behaviour through the effects of the projects’. 66  
 
The lack of distinction between community cohesion and what Prevent can be in 
practice was an issue for youth justice practitioners in Greater Manchester, as it has 
been for many local authority practitioners; ‘Respondents are unsure of the stated 
delineation between PVE and community cohesion as set out by the DCLG. Many 
see their work as a cohesive intervention that may have a preventative impact on 
violent extremism, should it be there. Projects have struggled to clearly identify a 
target group for PVE work for this reason’. 67  
 
Conclusion: Local Complexity 
This Chapter has drawn on a range of empirical data around the actual 
implementation and experience of Prevent activity on the ground to help make sense 
of what such activity looks and feels like in practice. The Chapter started by advising 
caution over generalisations around the reality of any governmental policy 
programme, with both local variations ,and the ability of local policy-makers and 
practitioners to exploit ‘space’ within national agendas, both contributing to a more 
nuanced picture than some critics of Prevent would suggest. It is clear here, as 
should be expected with such a significant public spending commitment, that some 
positive things have been achieved, and the Chapter has attempted to highlight 
some of those. For instance, there have been significant programmes of 
engagement with Muslim young people, some of them not previously engaging in 
positive work, offering both diversionary and educational activities, and personal 
development in the broader sense of ‘citizenship education’. Prevent funding has 
also enabled stronger relationships between local authorities and other public sector 
organisations with Muslim communities, and support for stronger civil society activity 
within those Muslim communities, alongside greater awareness amongst 
practitioners of issues around violent extremism. However, there is significant 
evidence that local ‘space’ to shape and determine the content and style of Prevent 
delivery has been steadily squeezed from 2008 onwards, as national government 
monitoring through tools such N1 35 and control through the very active involvement, 
and even leadership, of the Police and Security Services in local Prevent structures 
and decision-making has tightened. This was re-emphasised by the Prevent review 
of June 2011, which cut DCLG out of Prevent and made OSCT/Home Office directly 
responsible for the granting and monitoring of all local Prevent activity. This is in 
stark contrast to the anti-violent extremism policy approach adopted by The 
Netherlands, where local mayors have been given a great deal of control over how 
work against radicalisation and violent extremism is approached. That Dutch 
approach is supported by the international evidence available which suggests that 
effective anti-radicalisation and anti-extremism initiatives have to be locally-
determined and managed to engage effectively with the specificities and dynamics of 
local communities.  68  
 
Additionally, a consistent theme throughout this discussion of local authorities, 
universities, and the criminal justice field has been the lack of distinction, from the 
practitioner perspective, between any meaningful anti-violent extremism programme 
and community cohesion, and the consequent damage that Prevent is perceived to 
be doing to community cohesion through its insistence on monocultural work with 
Muslim communities that is kept firmly apart from community cohesion activity, 
something that the Coalition government’s new direction for Prevent is likely to 
actually exacerbate through its overt OSCT/Home Office direction from above. The 
other damaging impact of Prevent is the persistent allegation and feeling from 
practitioners, and the communities they work with, that Prevent is actually a 
Police/Security Service-led surveillance and intelligence-gathering programme above 
all, and it this issue which is explored in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Spooks? 
 
Introduction: Education or Surveillance? 
In outlining the origins and development of the Prevent strategy from its launch in 
October 2006 onwards, Chapter 3 also highlighted its most contentious aspects .The 
most enduring criticism, which has dogged Prevent throughout its short life, is the 
charge that this supposedly ‘hearts and minds’ approach is actually a front for large-
scale state surveillance of, spying on, British Muslim communities. Such a charge is 
a very serious one, not only because it implies significant dishonesty by the state 
and its employees who are designing and implementing Prevent, but also because it 
risks damaging the flow of ‘human intelligence’ from within Muslim  communities that 
is most likely to defeat the threat of Islamist violent extremism. Indeed, international 
analysis of how positive counter-radicalisation programmes can be developed 
suggests that, at all costs, states must avoid ‘securitising’ their relationship with 
specific communities within their population, such an approach being fatal to the 
prospects of gaining meaningful intelligence. 1 The laying of that spying charge, 
particularly through the ‘Spooked’ report by Arun Kundnani and the Institute of Race 
Relations, the media coverage of that charge, and its consideration by the House of 
Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee Inquiry, were all 
highlighted in Chapter 3. However, the gravity of the charge and its potential impact 
on Prevent’s success, means that it must be analysed in greater depth, and that is 
what this Chapter attempts to do. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that Prevent is 
just one of the four elements of the overall CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy. 
Any reasonable person would expect the state to be engaged in surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering designed to counter planned terrorist operations within that 
CONTEST strategy and holding a rigid demarcation between the different CONTEST 
elements may not always be realistic or possible. 
 
 Indeed, Chapter 5 highlighted precisely those dilemmas within the Prevent strategy 
to date over how bodies such as local authorities, Youth Offending Teams and 
Universities ,who have been implementing Prevent, should relate to the Police and 
Security services. Sir David Omand, the architect of both the overall CONTEST 
strategy and the Prevent element within it, commented to the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Homeland Security in 2010 that: ’you can’t divide government in two, into 
those people that go around spying on the population, and there are another lot of 
people going round to the population and they just don’t talk to each other. It just 
simply doesn’t work like that’. 2   Omand  was even blunter in an interview given to 
the Financial Times weeks before that, when he suggested that it would be naïve of 
the state to not use any intelligence from community-based Prevent activities, in the 
face of a very serious terrorist threat. 3 The key issue here, though, is whether any 
such intelligence is gained in ways that encourages people within Muslim 
communities to offer information in the future. Here, it has to be acknowledged that 
even if the allegations of an underhand Pursue ‘creep’ into Prevent, as this Chapter 
discusses below, are overblown,  actions carried out as part of Pursue can have 
negative impacts on Prevent activity.  An obvious example of such dangers came in 
2005, when a large-scale anti-terror raid on a family home in Forest Gate, East 
London led to the accidental shooting and wounding of one man, but no criminal 
charges: ‘left in the aftermath would be damaged lives, poisoned community 
relations, and hysteria over the extent of terrorism in the United Kingdom’. 4   
Alongside that damaging episode came the government attempt to pass what 
became the Terrorism Act 2006 and its original proposal for 90 days pre-charge 
detention, a measure blatantly at odds with Britain’s legal traditions, and one which 
led to the biggest defeat in the House of Commons for a sitting government since 
1978. 
 
Despite the damaging public relations impacts of mis-handled raids that have often 
yielded no charges, and proposed legislation that has only inflamed British Muslim 
public opinion, the importance of the Pursue arm of CONTEST cannot be 
downplayed. The Coalition government’s review of Prevent published in June 2011 
highlighted that, at the time of writing, 115 terrorism offenders were imprisoned in the 
UK, 79 of them were associated with Islamist violent extremism, and other Islamist 
radicals were imprisoned for other charges. This is despite the Glasgow Airport car 
bombing attack of June 2007 being the only Islamist attack carried out since 7/7, and 
that only injuring the perpetrators. Bleich (2010:74) comments that: ‘The British state 
has thus shown itself to be aggressive in surveillance, arrests, convictions and 
control of suspected Islamist extremist in a way that has undoubtedly saved lives 
and provided a significant deterrent to acts of violence’. This context needs to be 
borne in mind as allegations of spying within Prevent activity are considered. The 
Chapter begins by detailing the role, and significant growth, of the Security Services 
and Police in and around Prevent, including the role of the Research, Information 
and Communications Unit (RICU) and the controversial Metropolitan Police Muslim 
Contact Unit. It then examines the allegations of ‘spying’ outlined in ‘Spooked’ and 
their amplification by the media and the Select Committee Inquiry, alongside 
Government’s response. 
 
CONTEST and the growth of the security state 
Whilst Chapter 1 outlined the reality and scale of the Islamist terror threat facing 
Britain, Chapter 3 indicated that Britain’s Security and Police Services were under-
prepared to respond, both in terms of understanding and dedicated resources .Whilst 
the CONTEST strategy of 2003 marked the start of a response, the extent to which 
the state was behind the game was illustrated on 6th July, the day before the 7/7 
bombings, when the head of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, told a committee 
of senior Labour MPs that there was no imminent terror threat to Britain. 5 The 
Security Service MI5 had started to respond to the threat of Islamist violent 
extremism only after the Madrid bombings of 2004, and was still scrambling to come 
to terms with new realities at the time of the London attacks. The revelation that 7/7 
had been perpetrated by four young men from West Yorkshire led to MI5 changing 
direction :’admitting that counter-terrorism was too London-centric, the security 
service began an effort to establish regional offices around the country to work more 
closely with Police forces’. 6 MI5 has subsequently developed nine regional offices 
across the UK, with the eventual aim of 25% of the agency’s staff being based 
outside of London. 7   Alongside this has come a significant growth and re-
configuration of counter-terrorism policing, with an underlying drive for national 
integration and co-ordination. A new Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15) came into 
existence in October 2006, working closely with the multi-agency Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JTAC) established in 2003.The Office for Security and Counter-
Terrorism (OSCT),was established in 2007 at national government level, designed to 
overcome cross-departmental confusion,  The Police Special Branch subsequently 
received more funding to establish 8 regional ‘intelligence’ centres, and four regional 
Counter-intelligence ‘hubs’ in Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and the Thames 
Valley in addition to the existing Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorism unit. These 
‘CTUs’ bring MI5 staff together with dedicated Counter-Terrorism Police officers, and 
involve liaison with individual Police force staff including their identified Prevent 
officers. Gregory (2010) identifies how MI5 staff within the CTUs have directed 
Special Branch officers to engage more with local Muslim communities, something 
that has inevitably happened in and around the Prevent strategy: ‘this joint effort is 
known as the ‘Rich Picture’ approach’. 8  A BBC News feature on the establishment 
of the Greater Manchester CTU ‘hub’ in April 2007 suggested that it would have as 
many as 350 Police staff, working alongside MI5 and other security services, and 
including ‘vetted’ interpreters, as ‘officers admit that engagement is not currently 
strong enough and ‘hearts and minds’ too must be won’. 9  
 
The scale of the challenge for MI5 and the Police in trying to understand the threat of 
people within British Muslim communities attracted towards Islamist violent 
extremism is shown by the fact that for MI5, ‘only 6% of its members were drawn 
from ethnic minorities at the end of 2006’, 10   so making the traditional tactic of the 
infiltration of subversive groups much more difficult, whilst the Metropolitan Police 
only had 8% of their officers from non-white ethnic minority backgrounds. This 
knowledge deficit explains the call made by the recently-retired Manningham-Buller 
in July 2007 to recruit a network of ‘Muslim spies’ to generate much-needed human 
intelligence 11 but arguably also indicates why the authorities would be keen to take 
any opportunities that Prevent offers to gather information. 
 
Since 2007, and additional to the developments outlined above, Prevent has led to 
the Home Office  ‘providing additional funding to establish over three hundred new 
Police posts across the country dedicated to Prevent’ 12, spread across 24 forces, 
with the aim of this fitting within the on-going development nationally of 
neighbourhood policing teams. This has included 80 Counter-Terrorism Intelligence 
Officers, although funding for them ceased in April 2011 in response to the ‘spying’ 
allegations, according to the 2011 Prevent review. For some critics, this very 
substantial growth in staffing numbers within both the Police and security services is 
evidence of state agencies making the most of the ‘terror threat’ for their own agency 
purposes. 13  Individual Police Forces have received funding for Prevent co-
ordinators and, ‘this network has been supported by new Prevent engagement 
officers (PEOs) who connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood policing and 
communities’. 14   The implications of this large-scale police presence within Prevent 
are discussed below, but the fact that 30% of these 321 Prevent officers nationally 
have been from BME backgrounds is relevant to the issue of Police/Security Service 
ignorance of Muslim communities highlighted above. The Metropolitan Police 
Service planned to have 93 officers in Prevent posts by the end of 2010/11, and 
Gregory notes that a report to the Metropolitan Police Authority 2008, in the early 
stages of the Prevent funding, ‘makes very little reference to countering 
radicalisation but does emphasis the intelligence gathering aspect alongside 
community engagement’. 15 The discussions in Chapter 5 of the tensions and 
confusions surrounding local implementation of Prevent highlighted the complicated 
relationship between local authorities and the Police. Lowndes and Thorp (2010) 
found that the Counter-Terrorism Unit in their region of study were offering to 
‘screen’ applications for Prevent funding from local Muslim community groups, and 
Gregory observes that ‘within all these structures there is an inherent possibility for a 
conflict of interest or at least tension between the Prevent and Pursue elements of 
CONTEST’.16  
 
Even allowing for the possibility that intelligence-gathering, or ‘spying’ is one of the 
key objectives for the Police, it is questionable whether such a significant expansion 
in the number of dedicated Prevent Police personnel, many of whom are highly 
visible and wearing Police uniform whilst carrying out their roles, is the most effective 
use of resources supposedly dedicated to ‘hearts and minds’ terrorism prevention 
work. Measuring meaningful progress or success for such work is very difficult, and 
the commitment given by Government in the June 2011 Prevent review to downsize 
the Police role within Prevent can be seen as reflective of that. There have been 
examples of creative work that Prevent Police personnel on the preventative and 
engagement sides, rather than the intelligence sides, of the activity can achieve. One 
initiative has been ‘Operation Nicole’ and the subsequent ‘Act Now’ table top 
simulation exercises originally devised by Lancashire Constabulary. These enable 
front-line professionals and Muslim community representatives to experience how 
the Police have to react to the rapidly developing facts and circumstances of a 
simulated terrorist plot, hopefully not only building greater civilian understanding of 
the Police’s role and responsibilities in such circumstances, but also how 
radicalisation can lead certain individuals rapidly down the path towards acts of 
violent extremism. Another innovative example was the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim 
Contact Unit (MCU). This short-lived and controversial Police unit was a key 
example of the pragmatic ‘means-based’ Prevent approaches outlined in Chapter 4 
that aim to work with radical but non-violent Islamists within the community to expose 
Islamists preaching violent extremism and deny them positions of influence where 
they can manipulate and recruit impressionable others. To Spalek and Lambert 
(2010), the latter of whom served as a key officer within the MCU: ‘radicalisation is 
often conflated with violent extremism, and so those Muslims are often marginalised 
and excluded from policy-making processes’. 17   Always a small-scale operation with 
between 2 and 8 officers at any one time, the MCU focussed on community 
engagement strategies of building dialogue and relationships of trust with non-violent 
Islamist groups and individuals in key areas. This centred particularly on Finsbury 
Park Mosque in north London and Brixton Mosque in south London, both dominated 
by advocates of violent extremism during the 1990s to the exclusion of other radicals 
opposed to any form of violence: ‘at both of these sites, the partnership initiative was 
effective in securing its explicit purpose of countering the impact of al-Qaeda 
propaganda and recruitment activity within local Muslim communities’. 18  This 
involved actively working with Salafists in  Brixton and Islamist radicals associated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood at Finsbury Park, both of whom are seen as ‘beyond 
the pale’ for government engagement by the increasingly dominant ‘values-based’ 
national approach to Prevent, as Chapter 4 discussed. For the Police officers within 
the MCU, they were trying to learn the lessons painfully learnt from contact with the 
London Irish community in a different era of keeping lines of dialogue open and not 
counter-productively stigmatising whole communities, but this MCU approach faced 
hostility and negativity both from other parts of the Metropolitan Police and from 
influential sections of Muslim communities, and was disbanded. Whether the state as 
a whole has learnt the lessons from the mainland Irish community experience in the 
way to how it currently relates to Muslim communities in relation to counter-terrorism 
is highly contested.19 
 
RICU: Massaging the message? 
Whilst the innovative, ‘means-based’ engagement approach of the Muslim Contact 
Unit did not survive, Government itself has been very careful, if not manipulative, 
over how it has actually communicated with the public in general, and Muslim 
communities in particular. This has been best shown through the work of the 
Research, Information and Communication Unit (RICU), the introduction of which 
was highlighted in Chapter 3. A similar Unit had previously been used by the British 
government to counter the propaganda of republicans in Northern Ireland. RICU has 
drawn on a staff of 35 from across a range of government departments, with some 
private sector expertise. RICU’s work has included weekly newsletters providing 
‘background to topical news stories and issues that resonate in communities’, as well 
research into the attitudes and identity of young Muslims. For Charles Farr, Director-
General of OSCT, ‘a lot of the focus has been how you communicate the threat in 
and through Muslim communities in this country, what language is appropriate’. 20 
These careful government calculations around language and its possible implications 
were shown in an early RICU briefing document from September 2007, ’Counter 
Terrorism Communications Guidance: communicating effectively with community 
audiences’. This highlighted that ‘It is important to avoid implying that specific 
communities are to blame’ and that ‘terrorists operate in isolation from mainstream 
communities and are the enemies of all of us’. 21 The document went on to detail 
‘Top line CT messages’ and ‘Detailed messages’ that explained those ‘Top line’ 
approaches. They included: ‘Terrorism is not the product of any one religion or 
community’. 22   In an Appendix to the document, a ‘Language Table’ was provided 
which examined a number of possible government messages under the heading 
‘what is said’, suggested how it might actually be understood by British Muslims 
under the heading ‘What is heard’, and suggested ‘possible alternatives’. For 
instance, it suggested that  a statement ‘communities need to stand up too 
extremism/weed out terrorist sympathisers’ would actually be heard as ‘communities 
are to blame for extremism and are responsible for hiding terrorists in their midst’. It 
therefore proposed the alternative of ' we all share responsibility for tackling violent 
extremism, and there are specific tasks that communities can help us with’. 23  This 
highly pragmatic (and sensible), means-based approach was in clear contradiction to 
some of the headline ‘values-based’ statements by government ministers as Prevent 
was launched in 2006. In practice , the Labour government particularly after Gordon 
Brown became Prime Minister in 2007, worked hard to avoid formulations such as 
Bush’s meaningless ‘war on terror’ or ‘Islamic terrorism’ and instead stick to 
‘terrorism’ or ‘international terrorism’ even though, as Chapter 3 highlights, Islamist 
violent extremism was the clear focus of strategies: ‘British policy-making has been 
quite contradictory and conflicted in the extent to which it acknowledges the Muslim 
element of extremism and terrorism confronting the state’. 24 However much RICU 
has carefully constructed and massaged the government’s public messages around 
Prevent and violent extremism, it cannot ‘sell’ politically distrusted messages, as the 
Association of Police Authorities acknowledged in their evidence to the CLG Select 
Committee Inquiry. The Coalition government accepted in its Prevent review of June 
2011 that RICU’s results had been mixed to date but the lesson learnt from this 
seemed to be the wrong one. In line with their broader and arguably ill-advised lurch 
in the direction of ‘values-based’ judgments of wider religious and political attitudes 
within Muslim communities, the Government stated that ‘going forward, we will want 
to emphasise the connection between extremist and terrorist ideologies’. 25   That 
suggests that RICU will need to draw up a significantly different type of ‘language 
table’.  
 
‘Spooked’: Allegations and responses 
The very significant growth and development of the Police presence within Prevent 
between 2008 and 2011 has been highly controversial, in itself suggestive to many 
observers, as discussed more fully below, that this is overwhelmingly a surveillance 
and intelligence-gathering operation. However, if that was the intention, the Coalition 
Government seems unsure of its benefits: ‘We believe that some Prevent police 
funding has also been spent on initiatives primarily intended to build resilience and 
promote cohesion’. 26 However, this revised Prevent strategy did go on to say that 
‘We believe the police understanding of Muslim communities has improved 
significantly as a result of Prevent’ and that ‘The Police now talk regularly to 
Mosques in a way that was very rare before 2005’. 27 Certainly, Gregory (2010) 
suggests that Prevent has emphasised community policing and dialogue, with a 
heavy focus on inter-agency contact in ways that have justifiably blurred traditional 
roles and demarcations but, exactly for that reason, has therefore given at least the 
appearance of  being about intelligence-gathering. Such blurring of roles is arguably 
inevitable within a counter-terrorism strategy that attempts to include community 
development aspects as well as policing and security functions. 28  
 
For some, particularly those already critical of the past Labour government’s 
apparently offhand approach to civil liberties, it’s ‘values-based’ criticism of Muslim 
communities and its highly contentious foreign policy, Prevent’s significant growth in 
the numbers and functions of Police and Security Service personnel  has been cover 
for the development of surveillance of Muslim communities. Anti-racist campaigners 
and think-tank, The Institute of Race Relations, claimed that, ‘there is evidence that 
the Prevent programme has been used to establish one of the most elaborate 
systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain’. 29   Whilst this has been strongly denied 
by the government , the growth in Police and Security Service numbers is real , and 
so, arguably , is  an associated blurring of roles, between education and policing, 
between security apparatus and  local democratic accountability, and between the 
Prevent and Pursue arms of CONTEST. For Husband and Alam (2011) who have 
researched the implementation of Prevent by the five West Yorkshire local 
authorities, Prevent, through its Police Engagement Officers and interface between 
CTUs and local authorities, has allowed, ‘the intrusive and insidious penetration of 
the protective state’s security activities in to the domain that was traditionally 
occupied by community work or youth work, now covered by community cohesion’. 30 
The resulting allegations of covert surveillance and intelligence-gathering are 
discussed below, and whilst the actual evidence of them is contentious, the 
impression of it has taken firm hold, fuelled by political campaigning and media 
coverage. 31 
 
Certainly, the reality of Police Prevent officers playing prominent roles in local 
Prevent boards and Gold, Silver and Bronze multi-agency co-ordination committees, 
getting involved in what appears to be education and community work, and liaising 
overtly with Further and Higher Education institutions, all of which was highlighted in 
Chapter 5, ‘has raised questions of police interference in the political relationships 
between Local Authorities and Muslim communities’. 32  Indeed, some community-
based organisations have felt that the Police are actually in charge of this 
supposedly ‘hearts and minds’ Prevent programme at the local level:  
The police are such key drivers at a local level together with your counterterrorism 
officers and the intelligence services, they become the funnel through which what is 
happening in the community is funnelled back to the government... it is the police 
who are leading the agenda. 33   
 
This is confirmed by Birmingham City Council, the largest single local authority 
recipient of Prevent funding nationally between 2008 and 2011: ‘Our delivery plan 
utilises intelligence from West Midlands Police (e.g. Counter-Terrorism local profile) 
in order to target funding and provision as necessary ‘. 34   
 It was in this context of a very significant Police and Security Service role within 
Prevent, and apparently within the local operation of it by local government and 
community groups, that allegations of  ’spying’ emerged. These were crystallised in 
the ‘Spooked: How not to prevent violent extremism’ report written by Arun 
Kundnani, Director of the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) , and which was 
published in October 2009.Whilst critics dismissed the report as propaganda from an 
undoubtedly left-wing think tank, ‘Spooked’ was the product of a substantial and 
careful piece of field research that involved 32 face to face interviews with people 
involved in the local design and delivery of Prevent activity, a roundtable discussion 
held in Bradford, and the submission of a substantial number of freedom of 
information requests to local authorities. All of this was funded by the highly-
reputable Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, suggesting that the evidence and 
conclusions of ‘Spooked’ should not be dismissed lightly. Additionally, the allegations 
by the IRR had not come out of the blue; in a BBC TV ‘Panorama’ programme 
broadcast on 16th February 2009, journalist Richard Watson claimed a source ‘at the 
heart of the government’s counter-terrorism work’ believed that Prevent programmes 
were being used to gather intelligence and that intelligence analysists were in place. 
The OSCT completely denied that allegation, as they did the allegations of 
Kundnani/IRR made later in 2009. 35 
 
The allegations by Kundnani of spying within Prevent activity came within a broader 
critique of the very assumptions and starting points of the Prevent programme, with 
the clear suggestion that Prevent was having negative, counter-productive effects 
through its approach to Muslim communities: 
 ‘their ‘hearts and minds’ are now the target of an elaborate structure of surveillance, 
mapping, engagement and propaganda. Prevent has become, in effect, the 
government’s ‘Islam policy’.’ 36   
 
For Kundnani, the well-meaning partnership basis of shared responsibility for 
confronting the ideology of violent extremism had not been lived up to by Prevent in 
practice. The suggestion here was that the inter-departmental battle and on-going 
tensions identified in Chapter 5 over whether Prevent was mainly transparent 
community engagement led by DCLG, or a much harder-edged and only partially 
visible Policing and intelligence-gathering programme run by the Home Office/ OSCT 
had clearly been won by the latter, with the result being community-based activities 
that were not what they seemed. The broader critiques of ‘Spooked’ echoed many of 
the points raised in Chapter 4, such as the contradiction to community cohesion, the 
fact that Prevent locally was often working through precisely the older and 
conservative ‘gatekeeper’ community leaders that government policy had long seen 
as problematic, and that Muslim community groups were, in practice, being funded 
for mainstream activities such as improvements in Mosque schools by funding 
programmes specifically concerned with anti-terrorism. 
 
Within that broader context, the concerns over surveillance activity in Prevent 
focused on the involvement of Prevent Police officers throughout the funding, 
planning and even implementation of local, DCLG-funded Prevent work, and what 
exactly the balance between intelligence-gathering and community engagement 
therefore was in the programme This fear of surveillance has been heightened by 
the greater involvement of Police officers in education-based Prevent activities that 
would be normally seen as the territory of youth and community workers:  
‘A significant part of the prevent programme is the embedding of counter-terrorism 
police officers within the delivery of other local services. The implication of teachers 
and youth, community and cultural workers in information-sharing undercuts 
professional norms of confidentiality’. 37  
 
For Kundnani, this suggested that there had been a counter-productive blurring of 
the line between Prevent and Pursue. ‘Spooked’ found some blatant evidence of 
such a blurring: ’A West Midlands Police counter-terrorism officer has been 
permanently seconded to the equality and diversity division of Birmingham City 
Council to manage its Prevent work. He is supported by two workers, a young 
person’s development officer and a researcher/analyst, whose posts are directly 
funded by the OSCT’. 38 Whilst such an arrangement may have been exceptional 
nationally, the more mundane ‘embedding’ of Prevent Police officers raised serious 
issues, both of ethics and effectiveness, for Kundnani’s respondents.  
 
Many of these ethical issues were first identified in Chapter 5 and revolve around 
appropriate roles and responsibilities, and who shares what ‘intelligence’ with whom. 
Problematic features of Prevent activity in this regard have included the desire of the 
Police/Security Service side to ‘security check’ organisations and individuals involved 
in Prevent community-based delivery, even if those individuals already work for 
reputable organisations such as local authorities. Delivery agencies, such as local 
authority Youth Services, have been asked to sign Information Sharing Agreements 
that cover briefings given to their senior officers that they are then obliged to keep 
confidential from their own staff. The Channel initiative is discussed below, including  
how this inevitably led to requests that local agencies report the names of and 
concerns over individuals deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation to local Prevent 
Boards, or so-called ‘Silver Groups’. More broadly than that, many of the ‘Spooked’ 
respondents who were engaged in youth and community work recounted being 
asked by Prevent Police staff for the names, movements and attitudes of young 
people they worked with. For instance, one youth project manager from London 
commented that he was asked , ‘to give information about the general picture, right 
down to which street corners young people from different backgrounds are hanging 
around on, what mosques they go to, and so on’. 39 Such requests seem to have 
been part of the ‘mapping’ approach to the gathering of ‘Rich Picture’ intelligence 
outlined above, with the result being, in Kundnani’s view that community 
organisations and individual local authority youth and community work staff were 
increasingly wary of what was being asked of them. ‘Spooked’ quotes a specific 
allegation of intimidation of five youth workers in Camden, north London by MI5 
officers as part of efforts to recruit them as informers. 40 At the same time, local 
authorities have felt that information flows within Prevent are one way only, with 
them expected to pass intelligence on, but CTUs and Police not willing to pass 
anything the other way, often claiming that local authority Chief Executives did not 
have the right ‘clearance’. 41   Arguably, these concerns demonstrate a naivety about 
the way community interaction and security aspects of counter-terrorism strategies 
will inevitably interact, as the Northern Ireland experience indicates. 42  
 
 Kundnani acknowledges that, at ground level, positive community cohesion-based 
youth and community work has been developing over the last few years, and that 
some of this activity continued with Prevent funding, but ‘under the radar’, in the 
initial stages of the programme. However, as the Police and Security Service 
structures outlined above became established and ‘embedded’ within Prevent, such 
creativity and flexibility within community-based programmes became increasingly 
difficult. For the respondents quoted in ‘Spooked’, this increasingly assertive 
Police/Security Service role in Prevent was not just ethically wrong but tactically 
misguided. One northern respondent commented of the Police that: they don’t seem 
to understand that their engagement fails because they do not have legitimacy and 
trust within the community’. 43   This British Prevent approach to the role of the Police 
and Security Services in actual counter-radicalisation work is in contrast to the 
approach adopted in The Netherlands, where, ‘the domestic intelligence service has 
played a very limited role in outreach and engagement and considers its principal 
task to be that of supporting interventions that deal with ‘very radicalised people’ 44, 
in the Dutch version of the Channel programme. Whilst the British government might 
argue that the objective of such high-profile Prevent policing has been to build 
relationships of trust with Muslim communities and professionals, the evidence from 
‘Spooked’ is that this has been counter-productively heavy-handed. The argument 
here is not that the Police do not have a legitimate counter-terrorism role to play but 
whether that such an overt involvement in funding and monitoring Prevent activity, 
and increasingly even delivering it to young people and community groups, is 
effective, or rather whether it is counter-productive through the unhelpful blurring of 
professional roles and their proper boundaries. Local authorities clearly feel that this 
Police involvement has unhelpfully blurred the distinction between ‘Prevent’ 
(education and community development-based activity) and ‘Pursue’ (necessary 
surveillance and policing interventions) with this having a counterproductive effect: 
‘there is a danger that the levels of suspicion and mistrust around Prevent could be 
used as a tool by those elements who seek to undermine cohesion’.45 
 
Arguably, the future downsizing of the Police role in Prevent announced by the 
Coalition government in June 2011 implicitly accepts that point. That subsequent 
action is not surprising, given the Conservative Party reaction to the publication of 
‘Spooked’ in October 2009.Conservative Security Shadow Minister Pauline Neville-
Jones, writing in a newspaper article ,saw such allegations as symptomatic of 
Labour’s approach to Prevent, an approach that confused intelligence and 
community engagement within one programme to the detriment of counter-
terrorism.46 
 
With The Guardian newspaper prominently highlighting the ‘Spooked’ allegations 47 
and Labour backbench MPs questioning the government’s approach at the same 
time as this Conservative Party criticism, it truly felt that Prevent with its approach at 
the time was friendless. Charles Farr, Director-General of OSCT, acknowledged the 
damage done to involvement of communities in Prevent by these allegations despite 
the government’s rebuttal of them, when giving evidence to the CLG Select 
Committee Inquiry: 
 ‘I find the reasons for their not wanting to engage are rooted in the 
misrepresentations which Prevent suffered from notably in the articles that The 
Guardian ran, to some degree based on the IRR report by Kundnani…When we talk 
to people who do not want anything to do with Prevent, I find that they do not want 
anything to do with a mythical construct of Prevent which does not exist and is not 
part of the strategy’. 48   
 
 Indeed, Farr’s explicit position in his Select Committee evidence was that the reality 
of Prevent, especially since the advent of Counter-Terrorism Local Plans that provide 
detailed intelligence briefings to local authorities and their partners, was quite the 
opposite to that implied by the ‘spying allegations: the direction of the information, 
intelligence if you will, regarding the Prevent programme is from the Police and from 
the Security agencies into local authorities’. 49  John Denham, the Minister for 
Communities and Local Government, was also forthright in his denial of the ‘spying’ 
allegations in an interview on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme on 8th December 
2009: 
 ‘Alan Johnston (the then-Home Secretary) and I instructed there to be an 
investigation into every single one of those allegations that have been made…not a 
single one of those allegations stood up…. I have got to say, up until now this is 
exactly the sort of thing I want to deal with today – the idea that this is happening up 
and down the country when actually there is no evidence that it is’. 
 
 As Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer  highlighted, a number of these 
‘untrue’ allegations in ‘Spooked’, including the Camden youth workers issue detailed 
above, were already a matter of public record,  and that it was entirely unclear how 
the government had quickly concluded that there was no substance in these very 
serious charges: ‘Given that the nature of the allegations hinges on a lack of trust, 
assuring members of British Muslim communities that these allegations are all false 
without providing an authoritative account of their investigation is problematic: it 
ignores community perceptions of the problem and the situation – and does little to 
alleviate fears or concerns’. 50  
 
Despite that assertion, the CLG Select Committee expressed considerable concern 
about the allegations raised by ‘Spooked’ and by others, focussing heavily on issues 
of surveillance in their oral evidence sessions. Their resulting report concluded that: 
‘We believe that the misuse of terms like ‘spying’ and ‘intelligence gathering’ 
amongst Prevent partners has exacerbated the problem. We recommend that the 
Government take urgent steps to clarify how information required under Prevent 
does not constitute ‘intelligence gathering’ of the type undertaken by the police or 
security services’,  and ‘...we cannot ignore the volume of evidence we have seen 
and heard which demonstrates a continuing lack of trust of the programme amongst 
those delivering and receiving services…If the Government wants to improve 
confidence in the Prevent programme, it should commission an independent 
investigation into the allegations made’.51 
 
 The government rejected that call for an Inquiry, and with the General Election 
campaign commencing shortly after the report’s publication, official response did not 
come until the 2011 revised Prevent strategy from the Coalition government. That 
review stated that: ‘There have been allegations that previous Prevent programmes 
have been used to spy on communities. We can find no evidence to support these 
claims. Prevent must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or 
communities. Trust in Prevent must be improved ‘. 52   That went alongside the 
pledge that ‘Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a 
mistake in the past’. 53  Obviously, the proof or otherwise of this will come as the new 
Prevent strategy is operationalized, but the retrenchment of Prevent into the Home 
Office/ OSCT, so separating counter-terrorism, even of the ‘hearts and minds’ 
variety, from cohesion and integration work of the DCLG, as the Select Committee 
Inquiry recommended, is a positive starting point. However, this still begs questions 
as to the basis and objective of future community-based Prevent activity in the 25 
target areas, especially given the assertive, ‘values-based’ rhetoric that 
accompanied the launch of the revised Prevent strategy.  
Channel: A way forward? 
Perhaps the most open and obvious Prevent interaction between CTU/Police and 
local authorities has been through the so-called ‘Channel’ initiative, an approach of 
identification and early intervention with young people viewed as vulnerable to 
radicalisation and manipulation by violent extremism. Channel began in 2008, with 
The Times highlighting that ‘Eight areas of the country identified as potential 
breeding grounds for violent extremism are to start government-funded ‘intervention 
programmes’ to prevent susceptible individuals from being radicalised’. 54   The 
article portrayed Channel as an acceptance by the Police that hard-edged Pursue 
arrests alone could not address the threat of violent extremism. Two pilot projects, in 
Preston, Lancashire and Lambeth, South London had run from 2007, being then 
extended to a further eight areas in 2008. Five of those new sites were in West 
Yorkshire, with a Police Prevent Officer interviewed in 2008 for the Kirklees Prevent 
evaluation commenting at the time that:’ it’s a project called Channel, its run by the 
government but only in certain areas of the country… to see how we can engage the 
community, build trust and confidence and prevent certain groups trying to promote 
extremism’ (Prevent Police Officer). Ian Larder, the ACPO leader of the Channel 
initiative nationally, was quoted by The Times as saying, ‘it may be theological 
discussion is needed, or they need mentoring. The project reflects the need to 
address the problems in our communities. We are asking the community to work with 
the police and statutory agencies to stop people that have been identified as 
displaying strange behaviour becoming violent extremists’. 55  
 
CONTEST 2, which was published in 2009, identified Channel operating in 11 areas, 
with a further 15 planned; by June 2011 the government highlighted that, ‘Channel 
now covers about 75 local authorities and 12 Police forces’. 56   Chapter 3 outlined 
the significant number of people who had already gone through Channel by then, 
1120 in total, the large majority of them young people. The local Prevent multi-
agency arrangements of ‘Gold’, ‘Silver’ and ‘Bronze’ liaison and co-ordination groups 
provides the mechanism for Channel to operate, with individual agencies identifying 
and ‘nominating’ young people viewed as being ‘at risk’ of radicalisation, with those 
young people then referred on  via the ‘Bronze’ group arrangements to a variety of 
agencies, such as youth work, housing, social work, or faith-based organisations, 
who offer packages of educational, diversionary or specifically de-radicalisation, 
activity. 
 
Arguably, the analogies repeatedly made by government ministers between Prevent 
and policies of diversion from knife crime, or hard drug use, ‘crime prevention’ work 
as then-Minister John Denham put it in 2009, are most convincing in relation to 
Channel. This is because the Channel approach has used  locally-agreed 
assessment criteria to identify ‘at risk’ individuals, and respond with intervention 
packages in a targeted way, unlike the large-scale and unfocused youth activities 
representing the vast majority to date of Prevent work funded via local authorities. In 
its evidence to the CLG Select Committee, ACPO highlighted the fact that 7/7 
bomber Hasib Hussain had drawn graffiti in support of Bin Laden and the 9/11 
attacks on his exercise books whilst at High School in Leeds. Similarly, Germaine 
Lindsay attempted to access radical Islamist websites whilst at High School in 
Huddersfield, and in both cases ACPO suggests that referrals to a process such as 
Channel might have made a difference to their subsequent trajectories. 
 
 In its organisation and approach, Channel has drawn heavily on the experience of 
multi-agency approaches to child protection or ‘safeguarding’, as modern 
governmental jargon describes it, involving what the CLG Select Committee saw as 
justifiable information-sharing: ‘It should be acknowledged that the sharing of 
personal information in the interests of crime prevention, or to protect vulnerable 
people, is sometimes necessary’. 57   However, the Select Committee went on to say 
that during their Inquiry process, ‘it became clear that the Channel project epitomised 
many witnesses’ concerns of ‘spying’ about the involvement of the Police in the 
delivery of public services’. 58 Charles Farr, Director-General of the OSCT, had firmly 
rejected the allegations of spying and inappropriate police involvement in his oral 
evidence to the Committee, saying that a referral to Channel was actually a way of 
helping people avoid criminalising themselves. For Farr, Channel was a clear 
success, enabling government to create, ‘support networks…which can identify 
people who look as they are being drawn into the world of violent extremism and 
providing them with some sort of intervention’. 59   However, the fact is that local 
Channel co-ordinators who refer young people on to providers are overwhelmingly 
Prevent Police officers. This does beg a number of important questions around civil 
liberties, though, particularly over whether any state has the right to intervene over 
the political or religious views expressed by a young person, no matter how 
vulnerable, before any criminal action, or planning towards one, has actually taken 
place. An American report on how their counter-radicalisation work can become 
more coherent bluntly concluded that, ‘aggressive, government-run intervention and 
de-radicalisation programs, such as the Channel project in the UK, would be rejected 
as too intrusive in the American context’. 60   This civil liberties dilemma for the local 
British agencies charged with actually implementing Prevent generally, and Channel 
in particular, was highlighted by a senior manager in Kirklees council in West 
Yorkshire, who suggested that Channel represented an acceptable compromise: 
‘we had a massive debate politically around how far do you take this in terms of 
people’s rights to be extreme and rights to have quite extreme views, and that very, 
very productive kind of debate that you can have when people are being a little bit 
extreme…But we did manage to get some political consensus about when people 
are vulnerable and how it can then be used to radicalise them to much more violent 
extremism if you like, and when it spills out then that will have an impact on cohesion 
and even on crime’. 61   
The government justified  and sharpened the focus of the intervention approach of 
Channel in June 2011 by stating that local tendencies to sometime steer ‘people 
towards Channel who may have been perceived as potentially vulnerable in some 
broader sense, rather than specifically at risk of being drawn into terrorism’ and that 
‘these trends need to be corrected’.62  It stretches credulity, however, to imagine that 
the 290 under 16 year olds, and the 55 under 12 year olds referred nationally to 
Channel between April 2009 and December 2010 really fit that apparently tight 
definition of suitability. The development of the ‘Channel’ initiative within Prevent has 
been seen as progress by many, both locally and nationally, because Channel works 
with much smaller numbers of ‘at risk’ young people in a more targeted and 
intelligence-led way. However, this may well simply be a smaller scale surveillance 
or ‘fishing expedition’ in that there is little  hard academic evidence as to how those 
genuinely at risk of involvement in ‘violent extremism’ can be identified in advance, 
so adding to doubts over the whole role of, and significant resource allocation to, the 
Police within Prevent. Despite very close government investigation of those Britons 
to date involved in Islamist terror plots,’ the security services can identify neither a 
uniform pattern by which a process occurs nor a particular type that is susceptible’.63 
The danger here is that ‘fact’ based profiles of susceptibility over-estimate individual 
political views and underestimate the processes of mentor-disciple relationships and 
peer group operations that can tip individuals quite rapidly towards violence, and that 
predicting this in advance is very difficult, as Chapter 1 highlighted.  Kundnani 
identifies such concerns over the actual targeting of Channel in ‘Spooked’, quoting 
one of his practitioner respondents as saying, ‘Badly behaved young persons who 
happen to be Muslim or who have said something in anger then become known to 
the system as ‘at risk’. 64   This highlights real concerns over the skills and 
understandings of those involved in the Channel referral and ‘intervention’ work. This 
is also highlighted by Fahid Qurashi who comments that: ‘Through my own research, 
I have found that teachers have repeatedly and wrongly referred young Muslim 
students for a Channel intervention over such trivial issues as enquiring about halal 
food, and prayer facilities in schools. Yet the new strategy seems to be oblivious of 
this kind of fallout’ 65    
It is also clear that, in practice, Channel has worked with a significant number of 
people who are not at danger or extremist Islamist radicalisation, but who are 
vulnerable to other sorts of political extremism, such as racism or even far-right racist 
political activity. 66   The Prevent review of June 2011 stated that ‘Channel needs to 
deal with all types of terrorism’ 67 ,  so mirroring the reality of Prevent practice by 
Youth Offending Teams analysed in Chapter 5. This might be seen as helpful 
flexibility, but also as evidence that the longstanding government insistence that 
Prevent does not deal with other, non-Islamist, forms of violent extremism because 
they are not international or organised in nature is more about rhetoric than reality. 
However, in keeping with the ‘values-based’ tone of the June 2011 Prevent review, 
the government stated that ‘Prevent will not fund interventions providers who 
promote extremist ideas or beliefs’. 68  As Chapter 4 highlighted, it may be precisely 
such radical Islamist groups with perspectives based on Salafism, or the ideology of 
The Muslim Brotherhood, who are best equipped to dissuade young Muslim radicals 
away from violent extremism, but the government will not now countenance their 
involvement. If such law-abiding Islamist groups are not allowed to play a role in 
Prevent’s de-radicalisation efforts via Channel, it is far from clear who will have the 
credibility and convincing, theology-based arguments to persuade radicalised young 
Muslims in more constructive, law-abiding directions. 
 
Conclusion: Perception is everything? 
Whether or not  ‘spying’ in any meaningful sense, in a greater degree than is normal 
in existing community-based policing approaches, is really central to Prevent, this 
perception has taken hold to a very significant degree, as Charles Farr and the 
OSCT acknowledge, and it is arguably a case of shooting the messenger to blame 
‘Spooked’ and its resulting press coverage. The bungled terror raids and draconian 
attempts to limit civil liberties in the name of counter-terrorism outlined above had 
already created a climate of distrust, especially in some Muslim communities 
experiencing negative wider relationships with the Police and the state. It was always 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to maintain clear demarcation between the Pursue 
policing and Prevent  ‘hearts and minds’ approaches to community engagement 
within the CONTEST strategy: ‘there is an inevitable tension in relation to the 
community-oriented multi-agency ‘soft’ policing engagement with Muslim 
communities, under Prevent, and the more ‘hard’ policing requirement of intelligence 
gathering, under the lead of MI5, investigations and arrests under Pursue, with its 
focus on stopping terrorist attacks’. 69  Additionally, the Labour government’s well-
meaning approach to Prevent of trying to foster partnership and shared responsibility 
for the issues arguably has muddied the waters further, particularly around the role 
of the Police, who have found themselves in their Prevent activities stuck between 
those ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ roles. In an article on Prevent written in the early stages of its 
implementation, 70  I suggested that Prevent was ‘between two stools’, and that has 
certainly been true of the Policing aspect of the programme. Here, precisely through 
attempts to engage both with local communities and with the key statutory and 
voluntary sector agencies delivering Prevent, the Police have been encouraged by 
politicians and the Security Services directing CONTEST and Prevent to stray 
unhelpfully well beyond their normal roles into functions, such as direct engagement 
with young people, involved for instance in youth provision. In itself, this was bound 
to raise issues of appropriacy and boundaries, and the fact that it has been done 
through an explicitly anti-terrorism programme made allegations of surveillance 
inevitable. As a recent American report on approaches to effective counter-
radicalisation suggests:   ‘none of the agencies that are mainly concerned with 
counter-terrorism should be seen to play a dominant role in counter-radicalisation ’.  
71 Of course, the Police should build dialogue and stronger relationships of trust with 
British Muslim communities, but it shouldn’t need a counter-terrorism programme to 
enable this. 
 
Clearly, high levels of vigilance are needed against further Islamist terror plots, but 
the question here is whether a crude Prevent focus on Muslim communities as a 
whole, steered overtly by the Police and security forces in an effort to ‘spot’ likely 
terrorists will really be effective, or may even be counter-productive because of the 
suspicions and distrust this approach engenders amongst ordinary Muslims. The 
term ‘hearts and minds’ originates in counter-insurgency campaigns and was based 
on isolating insurgents through winning the support and trust of the majority. 72   On 
that basis, the long-term success or otherwise of Prevent is unclear, as the 
appearance and partial reality of state surveillance that is central to its 
operationalisation has seriously damaged the prospect of community partnership. In 
contrast, moving towards community cohesion- based approaches of community 
engagement ‘would create the space and legitimacy for a more sophisticated, 
intelligence-led approach to tackling specific local threats as and when they occur’. 73 
Such an approach would suggest a clear separation between policing and cohesion-
based community development activities, as highlighted by the overwhelming 
majority of submissions to the Select Committee Inquiry, and their subsequent 
recommendations. 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Failing to Prevent? 
 
Writing this book some years after the 7/7 attacks of July 2005, the impact of those 
events remains powerful. For those who lost loved ones that day, or those who were 
injured, the impact will be permanent and very personal. For Britain as a whole, 
though, the impact is also likely to be long-lasting. Whilst the 9/11 attacks on New 
York led both to many more fatalities, and to very significant foreign policy 
responses, American public opinion could at least re-assure itself that the airliner 
attacks were perpetuated by foreigners who had come to the USA. For Britain, the 
shock was different, as the 7/7 attacks were carried out by four young Yorkshiremen, 
all raised and educated, and some born, in Britain - ‘ordinary’ young Britons with 
regional Yorkshire accents who had willingly killed themselves in order to also kill 
fellow Britons in the name of their understanding of Islam. That reality of domestic 
terrorism, sometimes based on suicide attacks, is something that the USA now also 
has to confront, and it is a threat that inevitably raises profound questions of identity, 
separation and commonality in society, and around how states based on democracy 
and the rule of law should respond. Such questions have not lessened over the last 
few years despite the lack on any further such Islamist terrorist attacks – the number 
of foiled plots, some leading to convictions, and the sheer good luck of no injuries in 
the failed 21/7 attacks on London and the 2007 car bomb attempts on both central 
London and Glasgow Airport, means that few people are under any illusions about 
the scale of the threat that Britain faces from Islamist violent extremism. 
 
A Home-grown threat ? 
Whilst commentators from different places on the political spectrum have been quick 
to offer ready-made explanations for such a domestic terror threat, whether that be 
neo-imperialist and Islamophobic British foreign policy or an Islamic culture 
committed to both separation and conflict, any reasonable reading of the academic 
evidence available cautions against simplistic understandings of causes and 
motivations. Chapter 1 outlined the different main understandings of what is driving 
Islamist violent extremism in western countries, and highlighted that all these 
explanations have both strengths, but also significant flaws and limitations. 
 
 
Islamist terrorists and plotters , whether it be the 7/7 attackers in their ‘suicide 
videos’, or others captured in recent years, such as Roshanara Choudhry after her 
attempted murder of MP Stephen Timms, have stressed British foreign policy as 
their motivation, and it is clear that misguided foreign adventures have made Britain 
significantly less safe. However, the ideology that drives Islamist violent extremism 
was strengthening its influence on young British Muslims well before the Afghanistan 
and Iraq invasions, as shown by the number of terrorists plotting attacks on Britain 
and other western countries before 2003, or even before 2001. That raises the 
question of the Islamist ‘single narrative’, and how and why some people who 
subscribe to it are attracted further towards violent extremism. 
 
 The ‘single narrative’ has its roots in the political reaction to the failure of secular, 
socialist-tinged nationalism in the Muslim and Arab worlds, and to the energetic 
propagation internationally of very literal and conservative, even reactionary, forms 
of Islam by oil-rich dictatorships keen to protect their privileged positions. However, 
why is this ‘single narrative’ attractive to some young British Muslims? The context of 
a heightened Islamic identity amongst young Muslim in Britain and other western 
countries can be understood, not as a reactionary look backwards, but as a 
modernist phenomenon, a response to globalisation by second and third-generations 
of Muslim settlers coming to terms with being a Muslim minority in increasingly 
secular but nominally ‘Christian’ countries. For many young Muslims, this 
prioritisation of Islamic faith identity, as confirmed by the empirical data presented 
here, is a positive and progressive development that allows them to negotiate their 
place, both within their own communities, and within wider society. For a small 
minority, however, it can be a vehicle for antagonism, or even hatred, towards non-
Muslim ‘others’ and  to western society in general. 
 
A number of explanations have been offered for the drift towards violent extremism 
of this small minority of British, and indeed, western Muslims. Poverty is one such 
explanation, and indeed it is true that the Pakistani and Bangladeshi-origin 
communities, who compromise the large majority of British Muslims, are the poorest 
and most disadvantaged ethnic groups in terms of employment, living conditions and 
educational achievement. However, that marginalised situation is improving rapidly, 
and, more importantly, many of the young British Muslim terrorists have been well-
educated and from comparatively comfortable backgrounds. Here, it is clear that any 
issue of disadvantage is about how violent extremists view ’their’ people, rather than 
their personal situation. Similarly, the argument that the Islamist terrorism threat is a 
product of extreme Mosques runs up against the fact that the majority of British 
Islamist terrorists have not been radicalised through Mosques. Instead, they have 
often been comparatively ignorant of Islam, being ‘born-agains’ or recent converts 
who move straight from ignorance to extreme interpretations of Islam through private 
study circles or speakers, rather than community-based mosque involvement. That 
rapid process of radicalisation for many highlights the central importance of group 
dynamics, peer group operation, and the role of charismatic leaders within them, as 
the vitally-important research of social psychologist Scott Atran shows. Atran’s 
investigation of the 9/11, Madrid and Bali Islamist bomb plots shows how group links, 
loyalties and dynamics are vital, with ‘my people’ for such terrorists often not even 
being the ‘ummah’, but their small and tight friendship group  that has become their 
world. All the evidence suggests that such groups of British Islamist plotters have 
radicalised themselves and formulated outline terrorist plans before, or in tandem 
with, making any contact with ‘Al-Qaeda central’, with some, such as the Madrid 
bombers, having no contact at all. This Islamist threat is one of small, leaderless 
cells inspired by the ‘single narrative’, and not a traditional, hierarchical terrorist 
‘army’ controlled until his death by Osama Bin-Laden. 
 
The relevance of Community Cohesion 
This all cautions against simplistic understandings of the terrorist threat that Britain 
faces, but there are wider contextual issues that need to be considered. The most 
important, arguably, is the position of many British Muslim communities, and the 
state of British ‘race relations’. The 2001 riots involving young Muslims in the 
northern towns and cities of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford prompted a very 
significant government re-think and new priorities for policy approaches to ‘race 
relations’. A new priority of ‘community cohesion’ was promoted, and this book has 
argued that community cohesion is vital, not only to responding effectively to the 
threat of Islamist violent extremism, but also to understanding how this threat can 
grow and harden within corners of British Muslim communities, in the same way as 
support for violent racist extremism can and does grow within some parts of white 
communities. Community cohesion clearly identifies the dangers of ethnic 
communities living separate lives, whether physically or culturally, and the extent to 
which this can harden distinct and mutually-antagonistic ‘identities’. Such ethnic 
segregation is clearly most stark in ex-industrial areas where communities of all 
ethnic backgrounds have highly-restrained housing, employment and leisure options, 
and the fact that large portions of British Muslim communities live in such areas 
indicates how distinct, separate and inwards-looking identities might develop within 
parts of communities. Similarly, many of the white working class men attracted 
towards the far-right political organisations like the BNP and EDL over the past few 
years come from monocultural, ‘segregated’ white communities left marginalised and 
impoverished by de-industrialisation and neo-liberalist policy responses to it. In both 
cases, segregated physical and cultural spaces combined with inequality can lead to 
oppositional identifications and a racialised understanding of the social and 
economic conditions creating their community’s marginalisation. 
 
 The community cohesion analysis also identifies the problematic impact of well-
intentioned governmental ‘political multiculturalism’ or equal opportunities polices 
since 1981. Those policies have had many positive impacts, especially in 
significantly reducing many aspects of ethnic minority marginalisation and 
disadvantage in Britain, but have also had significant downsides. In particular, they 
have essentialised and reified ethnic identity, engaging and privileging separate and 
distinct ‘ethnic’ identities at the expense of both commonality and other forms of 
identity. Such a policy focus on ethnicity has arguably ‘opened the door’ for a growth 
in faith-based identity, which, in the case of Muslims, has interacted with real 
domestic and global political events to produce very strong ‘Muslim’ identification 
with distinct and often segregated Muslim communities. The community cohesion 
analysis is that such strong and separate ethnic or faith identities, whether Muslim, 
or racialised whiteness, and policy acknowledgement and indulgence of them, is not 
viable in Britain’s increasingly diverse society and that continued drives for ‘equality’ 
for distinct communities must be balanced by an approach of encouraging greater 
commonality and more de-centred and intersectional personal identities. This is 
particularly true in a political and indeed societal context where class and the reality 
of class-based inequality is increasingly denied. Community cohesion has become a 
major policy priority since 2001, and research by the author discussed in this book 
suggests that, rather than being the ‘death of multiculturalism’, cohesion represents 
a new and potentially productive phase of a multiculturalism re-balanced to focus 
more strongly on commonality as well as diversity. This community cohesion 
perspective argues very strongly that if there is a problem of antagonistic and 
oppositional ‘identities’ within specific communities, the answer is not more work 
with, and focus on, that specific identity but instead, quite the reverse – productive 
ways forward have to focus more on commonality, more cross-ethnic contact and 
dialogue, and on equal and genuine participation in society. It also argues for more 
intersectional, de-centred and ‘cooler’ forms of identity to be recognised and 
supported, rather than further reification of essentialised ethnic/religious ‘hot’ 
identities that will inevitably lead to conflict in an increasingly diverse society. This is 
the context in which we can and should discuss the effectiveness of any ‘hearts and 
minds’, anti-violent extremism programme such as Prevent. 
 
Failing to Prevent? 
I have taken some time here to re-state both the complexities of what causes and 
motivates Islamist violent extremists, and the key arguments of the community 
cohesion analysis of ethnic relations and identity in modern British society, because 
this book has argued that Prevent to date, as designed and implemented by national 
government, has largely disregarded both, and that this goes a long way to explain 
why Prevent has been ineffective and so reviled. We do need an effective anti-
violent extremism ‘hearts and minds’ programme, particularly one targeted at young 
people living in tense and marginalised areas, but Prevent so far has not been it. 
 
Past and present British governments do deserve credit for including a ‘hearts and 
minds’ preventative element within the overall CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, 
and for attempting to operationalize this through partnership activity with, and 
resourcing of, sections of Muslim communities. Such approaches demonstrate 
awareness of the lessons from other counter-terrorism campaigns, namely that a 
securitised over-reaction, a kicking in of doors and a crackdown on entire 
communities, is the worst and most counter-productive approach possible, and that 
partnership and dialogue is vital to secure the ‘human intelligence’ that will ultimately 
expose and defeat those committed to violent extremism. However, the manner in 
which Prevent has been designed, operationalized and managed means that it has 
largely failed in those terms, as it has left Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike 
feeling that it is actually about surveillance and control of one specific, entire 
community, rather than partnership, whilst also failing to effectively engage 
educationally with those at risk of attraction to violent extremism. This book has 
attempted to detail those significant flaws and drawbacks of Prevent, as it is currently 
conceived and constructed, in order to identify more productive policy approaches, 
and those flaws are briefly summarised here. 
 
From the perspective of this book, the greatest failing of Prevent to date has been its 
flat contradiction to, and malign effect upon, the policy priority of community 
cohesion outlined above. The book has presented clear evidence that Prevent has 
not just failed to work in tandem with that drive for greater cohesion and integration, 
but has also undermined it and squeezed the space into which community cohesion 
thinking and practice was growing at ground level. Contrary to the cohesion analysis 
of unhelpfully over-developed, specific ethnic identities, Prevent has focused only on 
the ‘Muslimness’ of British Muslim communities and individuals through its 
monocultural and broad-brush focus on Muslims only, and in its practical working 
through religious organisations and leaders. That has been exacerbated by 
Prevent’s clumsy and inappropriate ‘social engineering’ within Muslim communities, 
through attempts to encourage more varied and polyphonic forms of leadership, and 
by the overt promotion of particular types of Islamic religious thought and practice, 
something that is surely entirely inappropriate for a democratic western government 
to engage with. Much of that ‘social engineering’ activity has been driven by the 
‘values-based’ perspective on Prevent, which sees the danger of Islamist violent 
extremism as closely connected to ‘values’ and outlooks in wider, mainstream 
sections of some British Muslim communities, something that must be tackled in 
order to disrupt the ‘conveyer belt’ towards violent extremism. The June 2011 
Prevent review appeared to represent a triumph of that ‘values-based’ approach to 
the detriment of pragmatic, ‘means-based’ engagement with conservative Muslim 
communities who may hold arguably illiberal social  ‘values’ but who have the ability 
to divert young Islamists away from the path towards violent extremism. 
 
That monocultural focus on an entire community has further hardened a ‘defensive’ 
and essentialised Muslim identity that had already been encouraged over previous 
years by policies of political multiculturalism that privileged ethnic specificity, and by 
Islamophobic political and media scrutiny. That Muslim defensiveness has been 
hardened also by Prevent’s complete lack of interest in the growing threat of far-right 
racist violent extremism. Prevent emerged as the BNP, a political party whose 
members have very significant criminal records for terrorist offences and serious acts 
of violence, was growing politically, but any threat of far-right violent extremism was 
being dismissed, fuelling the Muslim sense of an unbalanced political scrutiny. That 
disinterest was reiterated by the Prevent re-launch in June 2011, only for the Norway 
massacre weeks later to expose a substantial and growing far-right, pan-European 
network that looked and sounded a lot like extremist Islamist networks. This 
highlighted the fact that Prevent had mis-represented the nature of both Islamist and 
far-right violent extremism, over-emphasising the organisation of the former and 
badly under-estimating the latter. 
 
 As the community cohesion analysis of the lessons from the 2001 northern riots 
suggested, such a monocultural focus on one community has also had the 
predictable effect of promoting ‘envy’ in other ethnic and social communities, who 
are jealous and questioning of a substantial funding stream aimed at one community 
only whilst, wrongly, claiming that there is no ‘extremism’ in their communities. It is 
clear from the empirical evidence discussed in this book that community cohesion, 
with its focus on cross-community work, has significant support from policy makers 
and practitioners at the local level, and was making developmental progress prior to 
the appearance of Prevent. For that reason, practitioners on the ground struggled to 
see the distinction between cohesion and Prevent, and wanted to address the 
dangers of oppositional and separate identities, and attraction to violent extremism 
through further development of cohesion-based approaches and practice. Such 
cohesion-based community-based Prevent interventions locally would play to the 
strengths  and experience of the practitioners being asked to deliver it on the ground, 
but instead the UK approach to Prevent  to date has meant there is clear evidence 
that such professionals have not felt comfortable trying to implement a programme 
aimed at Muslims only, and one supposedly overtly concerned with terrorism – they 
have felt themselves to be lacking in the skills, educational clarity and political 
support from above, just as educational practitioners did in a different era when 
asked to implement overt anti-racist programmes with white young people often 
holding strong racist views. 
  The efforts of local authorities to take a cohesion-based approach to Prevent that 
would circumvent these problems, and potentially enable more productive and 
holistic practice approaches to Prevent, have been increasingly thwarted by national 
government through the control it exercises via reporting mechanisms such as NI 35, 
and by the very significant control exercised over local Prevent operations by the 
Police and Security Services, something hardened by the decision of the Coalition 
government in June 2011 to give the Home Office total control over Prevent. In 
contrast, there has been no sign of the new cohesion and Integration policy strategy 
promised by the Coalition government from the early days of their election. In this 
long absence, policy focus on cohesion, and any national funding or political support 
for it has progressively withered. 
 
Nothing has poisoned Prevent’s chances of progress to date more than the clumsy 
and over-blown roles for the Police and Security Services within local Prevent design 
and delivery. Whilst accepting that a total distinction between the Pursue and 
Prevent arms of CONTEST is impossible to always maintain, the Police have got 
their role in Prevent badly wrong in their eagerness to build community engagement 
with Muslim communities, and the downsizing of the Police’s role in Prevent 
announced in the June 2011 Prevent review implicitly accepted this. No ‘hearts and 
minds’ programme that asks British Muslims to re-think certain assumptions, and be 
prepared to pass on information is ever likely to succeed when led so overtly and 
inappropriately by the Police and Security Services in ways that completely blur, or 
even break, important boundaries and demarcations around professional roles and 
responsibilities. In many local areas, Police have not only led local Prevent 
arrangements, but even played a strong role in the delivery of supposedly education-
based engagement with young people and communities. That is simply not their job, 
those are not job roles they are trained or equipped to do, and this reality has badly 
damaged efforts to build coalitions of support against violent extremism. Whether 
this overblown Police and security service role in Prevent has represented ‘spying’ in 
any organised sense is hard to say, but it has given the clear impression of being 
surveillance, and that charge has not gone away, leaving Prevent as a tainted 
‘brand’. The June 2011 review of the Prevent strategy has put funding and 
monitoring of local Prevent activity directly in the hands of the Home Office/ OSCT, 
and the danger here is that the influence of Police and Security Services on what 
remains, in the 25 new target areas, community-based educational interventions 
aimed at young people, will only grow further. 
 
Prevent: A better way 
 Work that fulfils the aims of Prevent will be needed for the foreseeable future, but it 
can and should be done differently to the present approach, and that different 
approach can also be a better and more effective one. We do need anti-extremism 
‘hearts and minds’ work, but it  needs to be congruent with community cohesion, and 
so aimed to young people and communities of all ethnic, faith and social 
backgrounds, partially in recognition of the fact that other forms of violent extremism 
also pose a threat. That is not just to ensure that Prevent supports wider efforts to 
develop and promote cohesion and integration work, but because over-developed, 
singular and oppositional ethnic or faith-based ‘identities’ are the starting point for the 
drift towards violent extremism for a minority, so anti-violent extremism approaches 
need to counter ‘hot’, singular identities through stress on commonality, complex 
personal identifications and plurality, not re-enforce those singular identities. 
 
That argues for a much stronger and better-resourced cohesion and integration 
strategy than Britain has at present, one that actively encourages ‘meaningful direct 
contact’ between people of different ethnic, social and geographical backgrounds 
through a variety of means. Where does that leave Prevent ? Would anti-violent 
extremism work be side-lined by a growth in generalised cohesion work? This book 
would argue for a Prevent-funded strand of cohesion activity that focuses directly on 
political debate and democratic participation of young people, but which does this 
through multi-ethnic, cohesion-based activity. The UK Youth Parliament/ ACPO 
initiative ‘Project Safe Space’ 1 has shown that such work is possible within a 
Prevent framework, enabling robust debate amongst young people of different 
backgrounds around issues of equality, politics and foreign policy. An expansion of 
such an approach, specifically targeted at areas where racial tension and extremism 
activity are viewed as problematic, would enable policy to address greater cohesion, 
the democratic participation of young people and tackling the attractions of violent 
extremism in tandem. Similarly, the ‘Youth Parliament’ scheme itself nationally and 
locally has shown great success in encouraging young people of different ethnic and 
social backgrounds to engage in political debate and represent other young people. 
That is another forum where real political conflicts can be discussed in ways that 
teaches the skills of, and encourages involvement in, democratic political processes. 
Leading community development organisation, The Young Foundation, has been 
developing a youth leadership scheme, ‘Uprising’  2  which has trained and 
supported young leaders from different ethnic and social backgrounds to develop 
work with young people, with the young leaders trained within an explicit cohesion 
and anti-discriminatory environment. All those initiatives show that we already have 
models of work with young people and communities that explicitly address issues of 
politics, identity and attractions of extremism, and do so within a framework of 
cohesion and integration. Those examples go alongside the exciting community 
cohesion practice that is starting to develop locally, such as in Oldham, and which 
has been discussed in this book. Such an approach to both Prevent and cohesion 
would so build on existing frameworks and structures, and would not need to start 
from scratch, as the Coalition government’s mis-judged ‘National Citizen Service’ 
seems determined to do. What such a cohesion-based approach to Prevent would 
require is much more support for practitioner training and experience-sharing than 
has taken place to date. A properly-funded national programme of training and 
support for anti-extremism community-based practitioners, such as youth workers, 
teachers and community-based activists from a variety of backgrounds, would be a 
significant policy advance, whilst costing merely a proportion of the money wasted 
on the mis-guided Prevent programmes to date. Such an approach would need 
national politicians to focus on educational, rather than surveillance-based 
approached, show trust in those involved in local design and delivery. 
 
In arguing for such a cohesion-based approach to future Prevent work, it must be 
acknowledged that there will sometimes be a need for monocultural work, for 
instance, with young Muslims who are questioning what Islam suggests about 
responses to current political realities, or white young people expressing racialised 
resentment and attraction towards far-right groups. However, having such specific 
and targeted monocultural work within an overall cohesion-based framework is very 
different from the current top-down Prevent focus on Muslims as an entire 
community. Similarly, there will be a continuing need for Channel, or a similar 
programme, that engages with vulnerable individuals at risk of active radicalisation of 
various types, but approaching this both through a cohesion framework and a closer 
tie-in with existing youth offending and child protection structures will again make 
Channel appear less of surveillance-based ‘fishing expedition’ than it is at present. 
 
Will any of the proposals outlined above ensure that any future acts of Islamist, or 
far-right, violent extremism will be avoided in Britain? No, because no ‘hearts and 
minds’-type Prevent programme can ensure that. What a cohesion-based approach 
to Prevent activity can achieve is remove the current stigma around the tainted 
Prevent brand, and instead build real resilience within individual communities and 
between communities. Such resilience would enable individuals to be more aware of 
violent extremism and how to avoid it, to better speak out against those promoting 
violent extremism within communities, and to articulate for commonality when 
extremists argue for separation, conflict and the necessity of killing fellow citizens 
setting out on their morning commute to work. 
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